Category Archives: Basque Country
Euskadi and Galicia 2012
Early regional elections in the Basque Country (Euskadi or CAPV) and Galicia were held on October 21, 2012. The Basque Country and Galicia are autonomous communities of Spain. My famous Guide to the 2011 Spanish Election includes tons of details about regional autonomy in Spain, the roots of the current regional structure and other issues related to autonomous communities.
Euskadi (Basque Country)
The Basque Parliament (Eusko Legebiltzarra/Parlamento Vasco) has 75 members, elected by province through d’Hondt closed party-list PR with a 3% threshold by province. Each province (Álava/Araba, Guipúzcoa/Gipuzkoa and Vizcaya/Bizkaia) elects 25 members. The lehendakari, the head of the Basque government, is elected by the Parliament.
Provinces have played a major role in Basque history; until the 19th century most Basques identified with their province rather than a broader Basque nation. The Basque provinces, unlike all other Spanish provinces, retain elected government (diputaciones) which, under the Basque Country’s special fiscal status (the concierto económico), have the power to collect and distribute taxes. However, the three Basque provinces do not have similar populations. The southern province of Álava has a population just under 320,000 while Biscay has a population over 1.1 million. The equal distribution of seats between the provinces was meant to be a means of ensuring Álava’s support for Basque autonomy and as a means of enticing Navarra from joining the CAPV (which has never happened). If seats were to be distributed equally, Biscay would elect 38 member to Álava’s 13.
My Guide, noted above, included a profile of the Basque Country:
Euskadi is the most well known of Spain’s regions to the casual observers, if only because of the existence of an armed terrorist movement seeking independence. It is also a matter of political debate where nobody can ever agree on anything. Basque nationalism is, alongside Catalan nationalism, of the two main peripheral nationalisms in Spain which drive and influence Spanish politics so much. The existence of a terrorist movement seeking Basque independence has given the region and Basque nationalism as a whole a bad name, which it does not deserve. The population of Euskadi is 2,183,615 (INE 2011). The capital of Euskadi is Vitoria-Gasteiz but the largest city is Bilbao. The community is composed of the provinces (called ‘historical territories’) of Biscay (Bizkaia or Vizcaya), Gipuzkoa (in Spanish, Guipúzcoa), Álava (in Basque, Araba). Basque provinces, unlike all other provinces, have a directly elected legislature (Juntas Generales) and are responsible for raising taxes. The region is known as Euskadi or the Basque Country (in Spanish, País Vasco). I prefer the term ‘Euskadi’ because it is both shorter and commonly used to refer to the political ‘Basque Country’ which excludes Navarre and the three French Basque provinces. The Basque term ‘Euskal Herria’ (which means ‘land of Basques’ or close to that) is used to refer the greater Basque region including both the autonomous community of the three provinces (often referred to in short as ‘CAPV’ or Euskadi), Navarre and the three French Basque provinces (Iparralde).
Basque history is long, fascinating and very controversial as it is inherently political given the founding tenets of Basque nationalism. The Basques speak a language known as Euskara or Basque, which is famous for being a language isolate. It is one of the few languages in Europe which is not Indo-European and the origins of either Euskara or the Basque people are not known for certain. The mainstream view are that the Basques are the last remaining ancestors of the pre-Indo-European peoples of Europe and have lived in the region since the prehistoric Aurignacian period. That is the most commonly accepted view, though it is by no means universal nor is it a proven ‘fact’. Original Basque nationalist theses claim that the extraordinary resistance of the Basque people to outside influences and conquest is a sign of the racial superiority of the Basque race above all others, though this is, of course, false. The Basque people are a very strong-willed people, extremely proud of their identity, lifestyle and ancestors. Furthermore, it also helps that the Basque terrain is quite harsh and unfavourable to foreign domination. The valleys and mountains of northern Euskadi and Navarre are very wooded and patchy, making it perfect for locals to hide and hardly appealing to foreign invaders. Basques have long defended themselves against any foreign invaders, most notably when Basque hordes massacred Charlemagne’s Frankish troops at Roncesvaux in 778. The Franks, Visigoths and later Muslims never managed to exercise full control over the Basque lands and Navarre. A Basque kingdom, which later became the Kingdom of Navarre, emerged in 824. Under Sancho III the Great (1000-1035), the Kingdom of Navarre reached its peak of influence through Sancho’s marriages and alliances which expanded the Navarrese realm westwards into present-day Old Castile. The coastal areas of the kingdom had come under Castilian control in 1199, though the Castilians had promised to recognize and uphold the special charters (fueros) of the Basque provinces. Civil war in Navarre allowed the Castilians to conquer Navarre between 1512 and 1524, although, again, by promising to recognize and uphold the Navarrese fueros. These fueros granted the provinces fiscal, legal and political autonomy, various exemptions from trade regulations, exemption from military service outside their province and so forth. To speak of a “Basque people”, united with a strong national conscience like the Catalans is, however, totally misleading. Basques were strongly attached to their families, community and at most to their province but there was no common identification as “Basques” above all. The family, village and province were their markers of identification, not an artificial “Basque nation”. Attached to their home turf, traditions and legal advantages, the Basques strongly identified with the ultra-conservative Carlist movement during the First Carlist War. Even after the Carlist defeat in 1839, the fueros were maintained and Euskadi remained a Carlist stronghold until at least the Second Republic. The Basque fueros were abolished in 1876.
The loss of the fueros in 1876 and Euskadi’s integration in the Spanish market proved beneficial to Basque economy, especially in the province of Biscay. In the late nineteenth century, large-scale mining of rich iron ore deposits in western Biscay led to emergence of Euskadi as Spain’s second main industrial and trading hub (after Catalonia). Originally exported to Britain for processing, Bilbao and western Biscay went on to acquire their own blast furnaces to process the iron ore into steel. While Basque steel production – the main economic activity in Euskadi until the 1970s – was concentrated around the Bilbao estuary and the city’s left bank, it was by no means just a local industry: metallic transformation, siderurgy and related industry was a major industry in the rest of northern Euskadi. The steel industry in Euskadi made the region one of the country’s wealthiest regions, and, as such, attracted much internal migrants starting in the late nineteenth century and picking up again during the Francoist era especially in the 1950s and 1960s. Most immigrants to Euskadi came from the neighboring (and poorer) regions of Old Castile, La Rioja, Navarre or the more distant but very poor Galicia. Unlike in Catalonia, there was not much immigration from southern Spain. According to a 2010 study, while 74% of Basques were born in the autonomous community, only 51-53% saw their parents were born in Euskadi as well. 16% said their parents were born in Castile and León, 6% in Extremadura and Galicia and 3% said their parents were born in Andalusia. Galicia and Old Castile are very conservative regions (although poor), but that did not prevent visceral opposition to non-Basques and general xenophobia from being a founding tenet of Basque nationalism.
The founding father of Basque nationalism is Sabino Arana, who was by all accounts a rather insane man with a weird mish-mash of reactionary, racist, xenophobic and ethnocentrist ideals and myths. In his seminal work on the issue, Bizkaia por su independencia, Arana’s thesis is the stark separation between a pure, devoutly Catholic, superior, manly and intelligent Basque race and a impure, atheist/socialist/liberal (Arana hated all three), feminine and inferior Spanish race. Arana considered the immigration of non-Basques, maketos or ‘Koreans’, to Euskadi to be a danger to the moral fabric of Basque society and a threat to all that is Basque (Catholicism, racial superiority, Euskara). Those maketos, with their new-fanged ideas of socialism and atheism were clear dangers to Basque society and they should be run out of town with stones and sticks, in order to defend the traditional, Catholic Basque society. The original ideology of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), founded by Arana in 1895, can be summarized in the party’s motto: Jaungoikoa eta Lagi-zaŕa (God and the ‘old laws’ [fueros]). Arana, despite his faults, had a huge influence on Basque nationalism and the whole Basque society. He ‘created’ a history for Euskadi, based partly on facts and a lot on myths; he designed the Basque flag; invented a Euskara vocabulary of political neologisms; he wrote the anthem; he even came up with the term ‘Euskadi’ itself. Arana was a separatist for most of his life, but he had a strange and unexplained change of heart a year before his death, when he became an autonomist. Since then, the PNV has found itself oscillating between autonomy and independence, usually leaning for the first option. The PNV grew in the 1910s to emerge as the largest Basque nationalist force during the Second Republic, where it sided with the republicans in exchange for the formation of the first autonomous Basque government excluding Navarre in 1936.
The Basque economy has historically been based around heavy industry: iron ore mining in western Biscay, steel works and siderurgy in the rest of northern Euskadi but particularly around Bilbao, the economic capital of Euskadi. Industry still accounts for 22.5% of the region’s GDP despite the steel crisis in the 1970s-1980s which forced industrial reconversion in much of Euskadi. Industry and since the 1980s the success of industrial reconversion in favour of services, finance and tourism has made the Basque country a small motor for the whole Spanish economy (6.2% of Spain’s GDP) and also the wealthiest region in all of Spain – even ahead of Catalonia. Euskadi’s GDP per capita of €31,314 is the highest in Spain and is much above the EU and Spanish average. Its unemployment rate, 12.17%, is the second lowest in the country. Euskadi suffered heavily from the steel crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s, which led to a decline in the region’s population and high unemployment as most steel plants and shipyards closed their doors. Bilbao and its industrial left bank was touched especially hard, but Bilbao has since bounced back with a vengeance with a spectacularly successful program of industrial reconversion and urban renewal, pushed initially by the Guggenheim Museum and since then by urban development, tourism and a growth in the upper-end service and technology sector (BBVA bank, Iberdrola). Euskadi is also known for the largest workers cooperative in the world, Mondragon, which is based in the small working-class Gipuzkoan town of Arraste-Mondragón. The Basque economy has significantly benefited from the region’s ability to raise taxes on its own account (like Navarre), instead of being heavily dependent on tax transfers from Madrid.
Basque politics and nationalist competition has been influenced so much by ETA, the separatist terrorist organization which has killed over 800 in Euskadi and across Spain since its foundation in 1959. ETA has been successful in driving a wedge through Basque society, rendering the issue of Basque nationhood and self-determination extremely divisive and problematic. Unlike ‘Catalanism’ and Catalan nationalism which is far less problematic, Basque nationalism is not backed up by a century-long history of cohesive, broad ‘national identity’ as in Catalonia which had a very precocious notion of its own ‘nationhood’. Euskara or Basque nationalism has not historically had a broad intellectual and cultural base like Catalan nationalism, which had a strong cultural background and intellectual contingent backing it up. These factors, plus ETA’s existence, have made politics in Euskadi very polarized. ETA’s violence was not and will not be successful in forcing Madrid to give it all it wants, but it has been successful in restricting the political debate (until recently). Up until the 1990s or early 2000s, ETA’s indiscriminate terror created a climate of fear which discouraged extensive political dialogue, participation or activism from those who were not Basque nationalists or even those who were moderate nationalists. That changed in the late 1990s and early 2000s with the emergence of virulently anti-nationalist and anti-ETA civic organizations such as ¡Basta Ya! which form the roots of the UPyD, which has a small but loyal base with non-nationalist Basques.
ETA has also split Basque nationalism into two streams: the ‘moderate’ or ‘democratic’ stream, more centrist or centre-right, dominated by the PNV, Euskadi’s natural governing party; and the left-abertzale stream, left-wing, more radical and in general more favourable of ETA’s actions as a necessary evil on the path to independence (but increasingly critical since 2006). To think of “Basque nationalism” a common, all-encompassing movement is very misleading. Basque nationalism is marked as much by the ideological struggle of nationalism carried out against the ‘Spanish parties’ (PSE, PP) as by the internal competition for the nationalist capital. The PNV is the largest Basque nationalist party, but its position in the centre of the political spectrum in Euskadi has opened it to virulent criticism from theabertzale parties (either as too conservative, too soft on nationalism or ‘traitors’ to the national cause). In the 1980s, the main abertzale forces were Herri Batasuna (HB), ETA’s political front; Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE), a non-violent left-nationalist party formed out of ETA’s moderate ETA-pm wing in the 1970s and after 1986 Eusko Alkartasuna (EA), a non-violent left-nationalist party led by former PNV regional president (lehendakari) Carlos Garaikoetxea. Most of EE merged with the PSE in 1993, reducing the field to the violent pro-ETA HB and the non-violent left-wing EA which increasingly became the PNV’s junior partner after 1998. HB and its subsequent incarnations (EH, Batasuna, EAE-ANV, EHAK-PCTV, SA, Sortu, the list goes on) were banned beginning in 2002. Since 2011, the main abertzale force is Bildu, whose trajectory and controversial nature is discussed in the section on political parties.
The official languages of Euskadi are Spanish and Euskara (Basque). Basque is a language isolate and one of the handful of non-Indo-European languages in Europe. It is entirely different from Spanish or any other widely-used European language, meaning that is much harder to learn from a Spanish-speaker (or anybody else) than Catalan or Galician would be. If you don’t believe me; ‘Sartaldeko oihanetan gatibaturik‘ means ‘Captive in the rainforests of the West’. The survival of the Basque language is proof of the tremendously resilient, strong-willed nature of Basques, proud of their heritage like none other. 76% of Basques identify Spanish as their mother tongue, 18.7% identify Euskara as their mother tongue while 5% identify both as their mother tongues. The most Basque-speaking province is and has always been Gipuzkoa (35.8% Basque mother tongue), while Álava has always been the least Basque-speaking province (93.6% Spanish mother tongue). Euskara has come back from the brink of extinction in the 1950s when its use was banned and repressed. Basque is now something of the ‘preferred’ language in Euskadi like Catalan in Catalonia (though not as strictly and universally enforced), and its use is especially prevalent in education. In Basque schools, there are three models to choose from: A is Spanish with Basque language courses, B is bilingual and D is Basque with Spanish language courses. D is the preferred option at all levels, from 71% in child education to 52% in post-secondary. Generally, lower-level education is heavily ‘D’ while higher-level education and especially post-secondary studies are more balanced though option D now outweighs A. Overall, 62% of students of all levels are in option D, 12.7% are in option A and 24.7% in option B. The level of D education ranges from 76.5% in Gipuzkoa to 42% in Álava.
A 2006 study showed the payoff of Basque-intensive education: 57.5% of those 16-24 are full bilinguals compared to 30.1% in the wider population. Only 17.6% of those 16-24 do not speak Basque compared to 51.5% of the wider population. Overall, 51.5% of Basques are thus Spanish-uni-lingual, 30.1% are bilingual and 18.3% are ‘passive bilinguals’. Gipuzkoa has the highest percentage of full bilinguals: 49%. But 65.8% in Álava and 57.7% in Biscay do not speak Basque. Generally, the youngest Basques are in majority bilingual, those between 35 and 64 are in majority uni-lingual and those over 65 are more bilingual. Proficiency in Basque has kept growing at a rapid and encouraging pace since the 1980s, and most of those who lose Basque language skills are old. Yet, Basque still faces challenges in society. 70% use Spanish only, only 12.5% use Basque more than Spanish. Full bilinguals of course tend to speak in Basque as much as or more often than they do in Spanish, but even with full bilinguals the use of Spanish is preferred in social situation such as work, outside or in social situations.
The PNV plays a central role in Basque politics and government. It is something of a ‘natural governing party’ or a ‘perennial winner’ in Euskadi though it is not by any means the ‘dominant’ political force. It faces competition within the nationalist arena to its left and competition outside the nationalist arena from both left (Socialists) and right (PP). In 43 electoral events since 1977, the PNV has been the largest party in Euskadi in 40 of those (the PSE in 2, HB in 1). The PNV’s domination of Basque electoral politics is helped by its position in the centre of the political spectrum. Its moderate nationalist tone appeals to the bulk of Basques who are proud of their identity although not necessarily separatist or fluent in Euskara. It is nationalist enough to appeal to the more nationalist of Basque nationalists, but moderate enough as to not alienate moderate nationalists/regionalists. The PNV has been the largest party in all general elections except for 1993 and 2008, with support between 23% and 34% in general elections.
Crucial to the PNV’s institutional dominance of Euskadi is its control of the Basque regional government and the regional presidency, lehendakari, between its 1980 creation and 2011. The PNV won the first regional elections in 1980 and won all other regional elections since then (though it did not win the most seats in 1986). Its hegemony was first challenged in 1986 when the then-lehendakari, Carlos Garaikoetxea quit the party and created his left-wing splinter, EA, which won 15.8% and 13 seats in 1986, while the PNV suffered a rout with merely 23.6% against 22% for the PSE. But the PNV’s José Antonio Ardanza was able to create a stable governing coalition with the Socialists until 1998 while EA (and HB)’s support gradually weakened. In 2001, an anti-nationalist front of the PP and PSE fell flat on its face as Juan José Ibarretxe’s PNV-EA won record-high levels of support (42.4%). It was only in 2009, with a stronger-than-ever Socialist party against a very divisive Ibarretxe PNV government that the non-nationalists finally broke through. Though the PNV’s support held tight, the PSE won a record-high 30.7% and 25 seats, which, alongside 13 PP deputies, allowed the PSE’s Patxi López to become the first non-nationalist lehendakari in Basque history. His days may be counted, however, given the collapse in support for both PSE and PP in the 2011 elections. The non-nationalists were helped in 2009 by two factors: firstly, for the first time in Basque regional elections, there was no abertzale list linked to Batasuna therefore Batasuna called on its supporter to cast blank ballots (9% of voters did so) but blank votes are not counted in seat allocation. Secondly, each of the three provinces in the Parliament are represented by 25 members, regardless of population. This equal representation serves to massively overrepresent (by over 10 seats) the strongly non-nationalist province of Álava-Araba at the expense mainly of the PNV stronghold of Biscay. In 2009, if the provinces had seats based on population, Ibarretxe could have won reelection with the support of PNV, Aralar, EA and EBB deputies.
Because of its thirty-one year stint in power in Vitoria, the PNV has tended to confuse government institutions with party institutions. It has shaped Basque politics and institutions to its liking, for example with control over the Basque media (the EITB). Beyond that, the PNV is more than a regular party. Especially in smaller towns, it is also something of a social organization and its local offices, batzokis, serve as bars or hang-outs for party members. In rural areas, PNV members are a tightly-knit family with a sense of community unusual in most parties.
PNV support is highest in Biscay, the birthplace of the party and the province where it has exercised full institutional control since the transition (control of Bilbao and the provincial government since 1979). Its support in rural, Basque-speaking villages in eastern Biscay often reaches upwards of 60% and up and beyond 70% in good years. It is traditionally weak, however, in the working-class industrial hinterland of Bilbao’s left bank in large towns such as Barakaldo, Portugalete or Santurtzi. Language is a major determining factor in making one a Basque nationalist or not, but it is by no means the only indicator nor is it perfect. A number of prominent PNV members and leaders either speak poor Basque or learned it only later in life. The PNV has high support even in those Biscayan and Alavan municipalities where few people speak Basque. The abertzale left is strongest in the province of Gipuzkoa, the most nationalist and most Basque-speaking province. The province has kept an industrial base of small or medium-sized businesses or family industries, and communities in the valleys are tightly knit together and have often provided a back base of support for ETA (especially during the dictatorship, when local priests – the Basque Church is nationalist – opened their doors to ETA fighters). Parties such as EA, HB or Bildu have been strongest in the province of Gipuzkoa. The provincial capital of Donostia-San Sebastián has been a battleground between PSE-EE, HB, EA and since recently Bildu. The southern province of Álava-Araba has long been the least nationalist, partly because the southern edges of the province in the Ebro valley have spoken Spanish since the Middle Ages and feel little if any connection to the Basque nationalist. The PNV can be the largest party in the province, but the largest city and Basque capital of Vitoria-Gasteiz is usually fought between PSE and PP, while the PP dominates in most of the Ebro valley in the south of the province. Between 1990 and 2001, Alavan opposition to Basque nationalism was notably expressed by the Unidad Alavesa (UA) party, similar to the Navarrese UPN: conservative, localist in an old Carlist way and anti-nationalist. UA won 18.5% of the votes in the province back in the 1994 elections, winning 5 seats in the Basque Parliament.
Lehendakari Patxi López called for early elections in August after PP leader Antonio Basagoiti decided to withdraw his support from the government. Patxi López, the first non-nationalist and non-peneuvista head of the Basque government, has been quite unpopular in the Basque Country. The main cause of his unpopularity seems to be his controversial deal with the PP, which came after he had promised that he would not sign such a deal. He is certainly reviled by almost all Basque nationalists (and others) after his counter-nature alliance of convenience with the PP. In Euskadi, the PP carries tons of negative baggage, not least the perception shared by most nationalists that it is the anti-Basque and ultra-centralist heir of the Franco regime.
On matters of governance, Patxi López has a fairly mixed record. The Basque economy itself is doing quite well compared to other regions in Spain (notably Catalonia), but mainly because of structural reasons unrelated to the government’s policies. The region’s economy, historically based around industry and manufacturing, suffered from particularly violent de-industrialization in the 1980s; but it has managed relatively well in the current Spanish economic crisis, a crisis wrought in large part by the utter collapse of the construction industry. Because the construction industry has never been as large in Euskadi as in other regions, particularly the coastal regions, the economic collapse post-2008 has been slightly less violent in the Basque Country. The local unemployment rate was 15.5% in the third quarter of 2012, which is the second lowest in the country (and 10% below the national rate). The fact that Euskadi, along with Navarra, benefits from an unusual fiscal arrangement (concierto económico) whereby it is the three provinces rather than the central administration which collects the taxes gives the region more control over its own fiscal policy and makes it less tied up to the economy of the other regions.
Despite a jobs market which is slightly less horrible than the rest of the country, the region’s debt has grown exponentially since 2009. The debt/GDP ratio stood at 2.2% when Patxi López took office in 2009, it has grown to 10.2% in the first quarter of 2012. This debt load, however, is still inferior to the national average of 13.5% (the combined debt of Spain’s 17 regions is equivalent to 13.5% of the Spanish GDP). The Basque government made some spending cuts, notably in health, education and public safety.
The Basque terrorist organization ETA announced a “definitive cessation of armed activity” in October 2011, an historic event which likely signals the end of the armed conflict in the Basque country. Nonetheless, the issue of ETA – particularly the fate of ETA’s prisoners in Spanish jails – remains a very controversial issue in Spain. With the end of the armed conflict, the Basque nationalist left – the abertzale left – has been allowed to enter the political arena once again. The Spanish law on political parties in 2002 had allowed Madrid to ban the various abertzale parties accused of having links to ETA or being pro-ETA. In 2011, however, the courts allowed the abertzale left to participate in the May local and then the November general elections. The coalitions of the abertzale left (Bildu in May, Amaiur in November) won 26% and 24% in the two elections in 2011. For these elections, the abertzale coalition – which includes EA, Alternatiba, Sortu (widely considered as Batasuna’s political front) – took the label Euskal Herria Bildu (Basque Country Together). Its candidate for lehendakari was Laura Mintegi, a Basque nationalist author and university professor.
On the left, the local United Left (IU) suffered a major split in March 2012. Up until that point, IU (which is experiencing a huge upswing in support in Spain) was known locally as EB-B (Ezker Batua-Berdeak, United Left-Greens), and it had some success in the 1990s and early 2000s. However, EB-B was hurt badly by the legalization of the abertzale left, which took a lot of its support. In the 2009 Basque elections, EB-B had already lost two of its three seats in the Basque Parliament. The split is due largely to an internal conflict between two leaders, Mikel Arana on one side and Javier Madrazo on the other. The latter, favouring a more independent relationship with the IU, regained control of EB-B and broke ties with the IU. The former, favouring closer ties with IU, created Ezker Anitza (EA), which has become the local federation of the IU.
Patxi López’s top rival during the campaign and the favourite in all polls was the PNV, and its candidate for lehendakari, Iñigo Urkullu. Urkullu is the leader of the PNV, and his nomination as candidate for head of the regional government breaks with established historical tradition in the PNV which has always had a fairly strict separation between party leadership and the regional presidency. In contrast to his predecessor as the PNV’s candidate for lehendakari, former lehendakari Juan José Ibarretxe (1999-2009), Urkullu strikes a markedly more moderate and less divisive tone. Ibarretxe, especially after his controversial “Ibarretxe Plan” for reforming the statute of autonomy, was a very divisive and somewhat confrontational figure who alienated many non-nationalists which clearly nationalistic and identity-based rhetoric. Urkullu, who is slightly to the right of Ibarretxe, also tacks back to the PNV’s more moderate brand of nationalism.
In this campaign, even if the PSE-EE and especially the PP’s campaigns warned against the PNV’s alleged “hidden agenda” about sovereignty, Urkullu seemed to put the issue on the backburner. The PNV campaign was focused heavily on the economy and job creation, citing the economic crisis as its top priority. It did not completely sideline the issues of independence, but was infinitely vague about what it entailed. Urkullu has set 2015 as the date for the definition of a new statute of autonomy, although it is unclear whether he intends a piecemeal reform of the 1979 statute based on “bilateral relations” or some ambitious sovereignist scheme akin to Ibarretxe’s Plan. He has used language such as “21st century independence” and the PNV’s manifesto hinted at some kind of “devo-max”, vowing to fight for the devolution of more and more powers from Madrid.
In contrast, Patxi López focused his campaign on defending self-government within Spain against Mariano Rajoy’s austerity policies and upholding the welfare state. The Socialists attempted to paint Urkullu and the PNV (a centre-right party) as right-wingers who would implement austerity similar to Rajoy’s very unpopular austerity policies.
Turnout was 63.73%, down from 64.68%. The (slight) decrease in turnout is rather interesting, given that the legalization of the abertzale left had led to a fairly significant increase in turnout in 2011 (when it decreased slightly nationwide). Turnout did nonetheless increase, albeit marginally, in Gipuzkoa, the abertzale stronghold. It must be said, however, that in the 2009 election, a lot of abertzale supporters had actually turned out to vote: since their party was banned, they accounted for the 101 thousand (nearly 9%) of “votos nulos” (null/invalid votes). Results were as follows:
EAJ-PNV 34.63% (-3.93%) winning 27 seats (-3)
EH Bildu 25% (+15.28%) winning 21 seats (+16)
PSE-EE 19.13% (-11.57%) winning 16 seats (-9)
PP 11.73% (-2.37%) winning 10 seats (-3)
IU-LV (EA) 2.72% (+2.72%) winning 0 seats (nc)
UPyD 1.94% (-0.21%) winning 1 seat (nc)
EB-B 1.56% (-1.95%) winning 0 seats (-1)
Equo 1.05% (+0.51%) winning 0 seats (nc)
Escaños en blanco 1.03% (+1.03%) winning 0 seats (nc)
Others 1.21% (+0.5%) winning 0 seats (nc)
The PNV, as widely expected, emerged as the winner. With 34% of the vote, it held its ground fairly well, considering the circumstances. On these results, Iñigo Urkullu will be the next lehendakari. It is quite unlikely that he will create a formal coalition with any party: a deal with the PSE would have been possible in the 1990s, but relations between the two parties have become quite acrimonious in recent years; a deal with EH Bildu would prove controversial and probably too difficult and unworkable for both involved. Instead, Urkullu has indicated that he will form a minority government which will seek support from other parties on a case-by-case basis. He has made conciliatory gestures towards all parties, and has touted the possibility of an legislative agreement (like the 2009 PSE-PP deal) with some parties (maybe EH Bildu). He seeks broad agreements and consensus on some major issues, and has already arranged to meet other parties to work out some kind of economic pact to deal with the crisis.
The PSE-EE suffered a very bad defeat. Not quite a record-breaking crushing defeat, but nevertheless a very damaging result for a party which had been rather successful, between 2004 and 2009, in increasing its level of support in Euskadi. It was a combination of different factors which sunk the Socialist vessel in Euskadi: Patxi López’s unpopularity, the controversial deal with the PP in 2009 and the nationwide collapse of the Socialist brand with the economic crisis. Patxi López’s record in government was judged, by most Basque voters, to be fairly mediocre and unspectacular.
The collapse of the national PSOE into a hapless state of disrepair since 2010/2011 likely played a role in this election. After losing the 2011 general election in a landslide to Rajoy’s PP, the PSOE strategy was apparently to bet everything on the rapid collapse of the PP’s popularity (with the economic crisis/depression and the austerity policies) in the hope that the PSOE would quickly regain those voters it had lost in 2011 (as they punished the PSOE for Zapatero’s economic policies during the early crisis). One could say it was a fairly sound strategy, given that such scenarios often happen, and certainly the first part of their calculation did happen very quickly – Rajoy’s government is extremely unpopular, and large majorities of voters reject his stringent austerity measures.
However, the PSOE failed to take into account that it has a huge credibility problem with the wider electorate. Voters seem particularly unforgiving, and they haven’t forgotten that the PSOE, in power, implemented many of the same kind of austerity policies which it now fights tooth-and-nail against. The PSOE’s message in opposition has been anti-austerity, but voters still associate the PSOE with austerity and the PSOE’s leader, Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, doesn’t really help matters for them considering he was a top bigwig in Zapatero’s old cabinet.
As for Patxi López, his political career is probably not over just yet. While he is unpopular, right now, in Euskadi; his image in the rest of Spain still seems to be quite positive. He has been talked about as a potential candidate for Prime Minister for the PSOE in the next general election, and it is unlikely that this defeat will put a full stop to that speculation. He has already indicated that he will not be stepping down as the leader of the PSE-EE.
The PSE-EE lost votes to other parties, but also a good number of its voters to abstention (the first explanation for the small decrease in turnout). It likely lost some votes to the PP and PNV, some voters might have voted strategically for the moderate PNV to keep out the more radical EH Bildu. However, it probably lost a good number of supporters to abstention. It is hard to quantify how many they might have lost, but there seems to have been a two-way street: some nationalists who did not vote in 2009 turned out this year and swelled EH Bildu’s ranks; while some PSE and PP voters from 2009 abandoned their parties in favour of abstention.
The PSE’s collapse was such that the PNV placed ahead of the PSE in some of the party’s traditional bases, including Bilbao’s working-class Left Bank (Barakaldo, Sestao, Trapagarán, Basauri); although in these cases it was due to the PSE’s collapse since 2009 rather than any PNV inroads.
EH Bildu, like Bildu in May 2011 and Amaiur in November 2011, is the big winner of this election. 25% (and 21 seats) places its performance about on par with that of the abertzale coalitions last year, but it is far superior to any of the results won by the political arm of ETA (HB) in yesteryears. HB peaked at roughly 18-20% in its best years, it won 17.9% and 14 seats in the 1998 regional elections (right after an ETA ceasefire) and 18% in the 1990 regional elections. Once again, it is clear that the abertzale has expanded its appeal beyond the traditional its pro-etarra base to non-violent left-nationalists. As the 1998 and 2001 regional elections proved, the abertzale‘s electoral appeal is greater in peacetime conditions when ETA is silent (in the 2001 elections, after ETA had broken its 1998 ceasefire, Batasuna collapsed to 10%). This year seems no different. The silencing of ETA in 2010, followed by the permanent ceasefire in 2011, has significantly expanded the appeal of the newly legalized abertzale left.
This year, EH Bildu’s campaign hit all the right notes for the present context. It has distanced itself from ETA and violence, even if ETA victims decry their “blank slate” attitude (how can the former supporters and enablers of violence be receiving so much support and heaps of praise?, they ask) and the abertzale‘s hurry to shut the door on the past. Regardless, the end of political violence in Euskadi and the slow creation a freer political climate where fear and the risk of intimidation is much lesser, has opened up a wide door for the abertzale left. Left-wingers, left-nationalists and other leftists who had in the past rejected ETA’s violence have jumped onto the abertzale‘s bandwagon. In this campaign, EH Bildu de-emphasized, to a certain extent, the issue of separatism/independence in favour of a bread-and-butter discourse tailored to the contemporary socio-economic context. Observers noted how EH Bildu’s electoral meetings were closer to anti-capitalist rallies than traditional separatist rallies. The party talked about social policies, the economy, food sovereignty and other issues of particular relevance to a region with over 15% unemployment.
There has been, in some ways, an increase in Basque nationalism in Euskadi in recent years, though still nothing compared to what’s going on in Catalonia now. The idea that Euskadi would be better off without Madrid given how badly the rest of Spain is doing is gaining supporters. Nevertheless, the percentage of Basques who actually support the independence of a Basque nation-state is fairly low, certainly much lower than the 60% polled by the PNV and EH Bildu.
In the 2009 elections, Aralar and EA, two component parties of EH Bildu, won 6.03% and 3.69% respectively. However, an additional 100,939 votes were considered “invalid”, around 95-96k of them were cast for Batasuna’s illegal political front (D3M). Taking these invalid votes into account, the abertzale left (plus EA and Aralar) won in the vicinity of 17-17.5% of the vote in the 2009 election. Therefore, assuming that all Aralar, EA and Batasuna voters from 2009 voted from EH Bildu this year, you still have a very significant gain for the abertzale coalition since 2009, at least +8%. EH Bildu gained some votes from other parties and non-voters. It took some votes from PNV in all three provinces and probably took a few votes from PSE, considering the (limited) coincidence between the two parties in some cases.
EH Bildu’s performance in the abertzale stronghold of Gipuzkoa was quite underwhelming. It won 32.2%, basically tied with the PNV (32%), when it had won 35% (against 22% for the PNV) last November in the general elections. Many have ascribed EH Bildu’s poor result in the province to the party’s unpopular administration of the province (it controls the provincial government/legislature, the Juntas Generales). In Donostia-San Sebastián, one of the abertzale coalition’s major gains in May 2011, EH Bildu placed third (with 22%) behind the PNV and the PSE.
The PP suffered a pretty bad result, its worst result in a regional election since 1990. It is clearly a disappointing result for the Basque PP’s leader, Antonio Basagoiti, who was likely hoping for a slightly better performance by his party. This poor result might weaken his hold on the party’s leadership, some of the most right-wing figures of the local PP, such as former interior minister Jaime Mayor Oreja, had already showed their displeasure with some of his more moderate positions. The local PP bore the brunt of Rajoy’s unpopularity. It appears as if the PP lost middle and working-class votes to abstention, but maintained its strong results in Euskadi’s wealthiest neighborhoods and municipalities. On the other hand, the PP might have regained at least some of the votes it lost to the PSE and UPyD in the 2009 election.
What does the future hold for Euskadi? Urkullu gives signs that he will be a fairly pragmatic and moderate lehendakari, especially when it comes to the issue of independence. It is fairly ironic that Catalan nationalism, usually noted for its moderation in contrast to Euskadi’s more radical (and violent) brand of nationalism, is now taking the more “radical” path following the huge Diada on September 11 and with Mas’ bid to force a referendum after the 26-N regional elections. Dealing with Catalonia, where nationalism is clearly on an upswing because of the region’s precarious fiscal and economic position and its battle with the central government, will probably be Mariano Rajoy’s biggest headache. The Basque situation seems rather calmer. Urkullu has noted that the situation between Catalonia and Euskadi is different, despite the Basque PP’s insistence that there was a “secret pact” between the PNV and CiU. He is unlikely to make much waves, and even his reform of the statute planned for 2015 seems fairly moderate, in sharp contrast to Ibarretxe’s confrontational and divisive Plan. It does remain to be seen what Urkullu entails when he talks about “21st century independence”, but the PNV has never really sought traditional independence as a nation-state but rather some kind of quite novel “multi-layered sovereignty”.
On economic issues, the PNV has indicated that some cuts will need to be made. Urkullu proved quite lucid by saying that cuts and “efforts” will be necessary, but at the same time he talks about “defending the welfare state” and other vague rhetoric, similar to the one used by Rajoy in 2011 (we all know how far that went).
The Parliament of Galicia (Parlamento de Galicia) has 75 members, elected by province through d’Hondt closed party-list PR with a 5% threshold by province. A Coruña elects 24 members, Pontevedra elects 22, Lugo elects 15 and Ourense elects 14. The two smallest provinces are slightly over-represented at the expense of the two most populous provinces. The PP regional government backtracked on a controversial electoral reform before the election.
My Guide, noted above, included a profile of Galicia as well:
Galicia is one of the country’s most geographically isolated regions, located north of Portugal in northwestern Spain. It is notably the only region where a majority of the population usually speaks another language than Spanish. Galicia has a population of 2,794,516 (INE 2011). The capital of Galicia is Santiago de Compostela but the largest cities are Vigo and A Coruña. The community is composed of the provinces of A Coruña, Lugo, Ourense and Pontevedra.
Galicia is the mythical home of Breogán, a Celtic king and Galicia’s first inhabitants were Celtic (Gallaeci people). That is why Galicia is sometimes considered to be part of a broader alliance of Celtic nations, though the Gallaeci and their language have long since disappeared and the current Galician language is certainly not a Celtic language. In 411, Galicia fell to the Suevis who established their own state, independent of the Visigoths (until 584) even after the Visigothic conquest of Iberia in 416. Galicia was invaded by the Moors during the Muslim conquest, but never came under permanent Muslim control and was rather a thorny backwoods for the Muslims who made armed incursions into Galicia every few hundred years. In the confusing dynastic games of Christian Spain during the early Reconquista, the Kingdom of Galicia alternated between independence, Asturo-Leonese control or Castilian hegemony. Unlike Euskadi or Catalonia, Galicia’s two “sister nationalities” in Spanish political-lingo, Galicia is marked by an early and complete integration into the Castilian realm though its integration was originally a bit problematic (revolts and so forth). Galicia became a poor and isolated region in Spain, distant and poorly connected to the centres of industry or power. The mountains of eastern Galicia, poor communications, small landholdings and the power of the Catholic Church made economic development difficult and also prevented the development of a common “national myth” or “national ideal”. Poor and isolated, Galicia became a land of emigration. Starting in the nineteenth century, Galicia’s share of the Spanish population would decline from 12% to just 6% today. Some Galicians left to find jobs within Spain such as in the steel plants of Bilbao, but most emigrated to South America (Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay have large Galician communities) or western Europe. The Galician diaspora can vote in Galician regional elections and their votes, roughly 12% of voters (in 2005) can be crucial in closely-fought elections. In the last elections, the diaspora vote gave the Socialists an additional seat at the right’s expense.
Galicia was a heavily agricultural region until the 1970s and still accounts for 6.7% of the region’s GDP today. Galicia has traditionally had some of the smallest landholdings (minifundios) in all of Spain. The minifundio agrarian system has impeded on the competitivity of Galician agriculture, and as such most agriculture in Galicia has historically barely been enough for a family’s subsistence. The small size of land has contributed to the region’s poverty and sub-development. Politically, poor communications and the small size of landholdings were favourable to the hegemony of the Catholic Church and to a general lack of political mobilization (Galicia is known for its low turnout levels). Livestock is the main agricultural activity in the region. Along the region’s rugged (but beautiful) coastline, fishing is the main employer. Galicia has the largest fishing fleet in Spain (over 50% in fact) and perhaps the largest fleet in Europe as well. Despite the historical dominance of agriculture, industry is strong in Galicia as well since the 1970s: it currently accounts for 16.4% of the region’s GDP. Shipbuilding is important in Ferrol (an old naval base and Franco’s home town) and Vigo. Textiles are the main industry around A Coruña and Arteixo, which is home to Inditex, the second largest textile company in Europe and owner of the world-famous Zara brand. Automobile manufacturing is important in Vigo, which has a large Peugeot-PSA plant. In recent years, banking and especially tourism have become major employers as well. Galicia remains rather poor, with a below-average GDP per capita of €20,343. Unemployment is 17.25%.
Galician nationalism emerged out of a cultural movement of artists and intellectuals in the late nineteenth century who re-discovered and popularized the Galician language, Galician culture and literature. Alfonso Castelao is perhaps the most famous of these intellectuals, and the most popular of them (also because of his republican political activities). During the Second Republic, a Galician nationalist party – the Partido Galeguista (PG) was founded though it never achieved much support, electing three members as part of the Popular Front in the 1936 elections. It was successful, however, in passing a Statute of Autonomy in June 1936 which proved stillborn a month later with the success of the coup in Galicia. After the Francoist regime, during which the use and expression of Galician culture and language was frowned upon, the Galician nationalist movement was divided into a plethora of feuding parties ranging from communists in the UPG-BNPG to centrist liberals in the refounded PG. A centrist liberal party created out of the remnants of the UCD in Galicia, the Coalición Galega, achieved some success in the 1980s peaking at 13% in the 1985 Galician elections. It was soon eclipsed by the BNG, the left-wing nationalist coalition which was at its roots a radical communist party led by the communist UPG but which ‘deradicalized’ upon absorption of smaller left-wing parties. The BNG is by far the largest Galician nationalist party, and the only nationalist party with representation in the regional legislature. A smaller centre-right coalition, Terra Galega (TEGA) won 1% in the 2009 elections but governs the city of Narón – the eight largest city in the region.
Galicia is the only region of Spain where a majority of the population usually speaks a language other than Spanish as their mother tongue. That language is Galician, a language separate from Portuguese since 1500 which is closer to Portuguese than Spanish but has been influenced rather considerably by Spanish through centuries of Castilian domination of Galicia. Galician is co-official alongside Spanish in Galicia. According to 2008 statistics, 89.15% of Galicians can speak Galician ‘a lot or considerably’ (moito and bastante) and 57.84% can write Galician ‘a lot or considerably’ (moito and bastante). Furthermore, 56.4% of Galicians usually speak only in Galician or more in Galician than in Spanish. The use and knowledge of the language is higher in rural coastal areas and inland but is much lower in urban areas and with younger Galicians. The proximity of the language to Portuguese is a point of political debate. Galicia’s political elites and the PP defends the idea of Galician as an independent language, while nationalists are more ‘reintegrationist’ and see Galician as a regional variant of Portuguese and not as a separate language. The Galician government has traditionally been far less ‘activist’ or aggressive in its promotion of the Galician language in public administration or education (though education is bilingual) than the Basque or Catalan governments.
Poverty, isolation and in majority non-Spanish by mother tongue, Galicia could appear to be a Socialist or nationalist stronghold. In fact, Galicia is a conservative stronghold and the only region in Spain in which the PSOE (known here as the PSdeG) has never been the largest party in any election. Despite the fact that most in the region speak Galician more often than Spanish, a nationalist ideology which requires a broad social base believing in their separate ‘national identity’ and a ‘national myth’ has never been capable of being more than a second party. The division of Galicia into tiny, poor and unproductive smallholdings has discouraged the growth of social movements such as nationalism (but also socialism and communism), while being quite favourable to domination by the Catholic Church, which, unlike in Euskadi and Catalonia (to a lesser extent), has never had any nationalist ideals. Unlike in Catalonia, the industrial bourgeoisie in Galicia is pro-Spanish and backed Franco’s regime. As for socialism or communism, smallholders in Spain (unlike in France, where they are long marked by anti-clericalism and republicanism) have always been devoutly Catholic and traditionally scared of the threat of ‘socialist collectivism’. As such, nationalism is strong in Galicia but has never been a dominant political ideology as in Euskadi and Catalonia; while socialism has never taken root in rural areas though urban workers are left-wing. The PCE has never been relevant, the best they’ve ever done is 4.7%.
The UCD won three elections, and the PP has won all other elections in Galicia since then. The PSdeG has never been the largest party in Galicia and has only been the largest party in the province of A Coruña a handful of times. Galicia has also produced some pretty famous Spanish conservative leaders: Franco (of course) but also Manuel Fraga, the founder of AP; and Mariano Rajoy. In Galicia, even the PP has taken on some nationalist symbolism. Fraga campaigned in Galician and emerged as a forceful voice for a strong, autonomous Galicia within a united Spain. There are signs, however, that urban growth (cities being quite left-wing) is favourable in the long-term to Socialists. They came within 3.25% of winning the region in 2008, the closest they’ve ever been to the right in a general election (the PSOE was 10 points behind the PP in 2004). In 2008, the PP won 44.32% against 41.07% for the PSdeG-PSOE, 11.63% for the BNG and 1.39% for the IU. Rural, sparsely populated inland or coastal areas are the main bases of the right in Galicia. The left is strongest in urban areas, most notably in A Coruña, Ferrol, Vigo, Arteixo, Lugo, Ourense or Pontevedra. Santiago de Compostela is more right-leaning, though it was governed by the PSdeG for 24 years between 1987 and 2011. A Coruña was governed by the Socialists between 1983 and 2011.
The AP won the first regional elections in 1981 with 26 seats against 24 for the UCD. The first two legislatures were marked by infighting within the AP and political divisions on the right, which allowed the Socialists to take power mid-stream in 1987. In this context of division on the right, Manuel Fraga, the founder of the AP and by now the driving force in the refoundation of the Spanish right as the PP, decided to abandon his political ambitions in Madrid in favour of his native homeland. As the PP’s candidate in the 1989 Galician elections, Fraga won an absolute majority and defeated the incumbent centre-left coalition. In 1993 he increased his majority and the PP held on to its absolute majority in the 1993, 1997 and 2001 elections while the PSdeG was in state of disrepair after falling behind the BNG in 1997 and again in 2005. However, Fraga’s leadership was criticized in 2002 during the Prestige oil spill during which he and Aznar sat on their hands doing little in response. In 2005, the PP fell to 37 seats – one less than the absolute majority while the PSdeG increased its support considerably from 17 to 25 seats while the BNG fell from 17 to 13 seats. The Socialist Emilio Pérez Touriño formed a coalition government with the BNG, led by the more radical Anxo Quintana. In 2009, however, the PP, now led by Rajoy ally Alberto Núñez Feijoo won an extra seat (at the BNG’s expense, the Socialists held all their seats) and thus reconquered its historic stronghold. The Galician legislature over-represents the sparsely populated and more conservative inland provinces of Lugo and Ourense at the expense of Pontevedra and A Coruña which concentrate the vast majority of the Galician population. In the 2011 local elections, the PP showed its strength in the province of A Coruña with its historic conquests of A Coruña, Ferrol and Santiago. But in Vigo, Pontevedra, Lugo and Ourense it proved unable to topple Socialist-BNG (or, in Pontevedra, BNG-Socialist) coalitions. In fact, in all those cities, the governing party be it the PSdeG or BNG all increased their support. A sign of a slow evolution of the impenetrable stronghold of Spanish conservatism towards the left?
Alberto Núñez Feijóo called for early elections. Feijóo faced fairly tough circumstances: an unpopular national PP government and the terrible economic situation, while he himself was defending a very narrow absolute majority in the Galician legislature. This was a very high-stakes deal for the national PP, which had suffered an unwelcome cold shower in regional elections in Andalusia in the spring, elections which were hailed as the first sign that the PP’s post-election honeymoon was already falling apart. The PP wanted and needed to retain its hold on its traditional Galician stronghold, and this likely explains why Feijóo called for a snap election: he felt confident that the PP could take advantage of nationalist disunity and the local Socialists’ (PSdeG) corruption problems.
Feijóo is a key ally of Mariano Rajoy, and the austerity policies which the Xunta has implemented in Galicia since 2009/2010 have served as a “model” for Rajoy’s austerity measures. In Galicia, Feijóo has a somewhat “strong” record to stand on – again, compared to other regions. The region’s debt is high, at 12.8% of GDP, but is below the national average (13.5%) and while it has gone up since 2009, it has not increased as quickly as in other regions. Unemployment is 20.1% in Galicia, below the national rate of 25%, and it decreased in the third quarter of 2012 (from 21.1% in the second quarter). While the Xunta was dinged by El País for allegedly dressing up its debt level (a favourite activity for many regional governments in Spain), the PP received a major boost late in the campaign when Mexico’s oil monopoly PEMEX kind of confirmed that it would invest 247 million euros in the construction of an industrial complex in Galicia (Vigo and Ferrol) for storage, shipment and deliveries of oil industry liquids. The PP claims that this investment, which it has welcome in grandiose manner, will create over 2,500 jobs in Galicia.
Aware of the unpopularity of the central government and the national PP, Feijóo distanced himself somewhat from the national party during the campaign. His party notably released posters which minimized the PP’s logo, he campaigned on a Galicia Primeiro (Galicia First) slogan.
The opposition, which governed between 2005 and 2009, was going through dire straits when Feijóo called the election to take advantage of their problems. The Socialists (PSdeG) were divided and hit hard by a corruption probe (Operación Pokémon) which notably forced the resignation of the PSdeG mayor of Ourense.
The main Galician nationalist party, the left-wing BNG, was hit even harder by internal divisions. Trouble had been brewing in the fractious and heterogeneous coalition of parties which is the BNG, particularly between the current leadership formed and backed by the post-communist nationalist UPG and the old leader of the BNG, Xosé Manuel Beiras and his faction (Encontro Irmandiño). In the 1990s, Beiras, a famous Galician author, had led the BNG out of electoral oblivion to a high of 18 seats (and second place) in the 1998 regional elections. After his departure from the BNG’s leadership, the party’s electoral fortunes took a slow downwards trend: 17 seats in 2001, 13 in 2005 and 12 in 2009.
At a BNG congress earlier this year, the UPG coalition led by Guillerme Vázquez and Francisco Jorquera narrowly defeated an opposition slate led by Beiras and other factions. Following this congress, Beiras’ faction walked out and created a new political party, ANOVA. Other factions, largely the centrist factions, joined other smaller groupings in creating a more centrist nationalist coalition, Compromiso por Galicia (CxG). Ahead of the elections, Beiras’ bunch, ANOVA, joined up with the local IU (EU), led by Yolanda Díaz, to form a common list: Alternativa Galega de Esquerda (AGE, Galician Left Alternative). The EU has always been an also-ran in very conservative Galicia, it peaked at 2.9% in the 1981 regional elections and won only 1% in the last elections in 2009.
Turnout was 63.8%, down from 64.43% in 2009. There was a surprisingly high level of invalid votes (2.55%) and blank votes (2.69%). The results were as follows:
PPdeG 45.72% (-0.96%) winning 41 seats (+3)
PSdeG 20.53% (-10.49%) winning 18 seats (-7)
AGE (EU-ANOVA) 13.99% (+13.02%) winning 9 seats (+9)
BNG 10.16% (-5.85%) winning 7 seats (-5)
UPyD 1.48% (+0.07%) winning 0 seats (nc)
Escaños en blanco 1.19% (+1.19%) winning 0 seats (nc)
SCD 1.1% (+1.1%) winning 0 seats (nc)
CxG 1.01% (-0.10%) winning 0 seats (nc)
Others 2.02% (+0.89%) winning 0 seats (nc)
Feijóo’s PP defied expectations and was reelected, not only securing its thin absolute majority won in 2009 but expanding its majority by picking up three extra seats. The PP did lose nearly 1% off of its 2009 result, equivalent to 135,493 votes. Feijóo’s victory is a significant victory for the national PP and the Rajoy cabinet, given how crucial these elections turned out to be for the national PP. In his victory speech, Feijóo even mentioned Rajoy – saying that his victory would have been impossible if voters had not felt that Rajoy was “governing responsibly” and that the “efforts” and “difficulties” it demanded were not for a “good cause”. That being said, Feijóo’s big victory owes a lot to the division and shabby state of his two traditional opponents (the PSdeG and the BNG) and his management of the region rather than to any Galician plebiscite in favour of Rajoy’s austerity measures. Nevertheless, as the centre-left daily El País argued, the results in Galicia will serve as an “encouragement” to Rajoy’s austerity policies.
The Galician PP was able to motivate its electorate to turn out, and the PP’s rural base stuck with Feijóo; compensating for fairly significant PP loses in some urban areas – A Coruña, Vigo, Pontevedra and Ourense. It was able to stave off a minor threat in the SCD, a new centre-right party led by Mario Conde, a former banker who recently got out of jail for embezzlement.
The real winner of these elections was Xosé Manuel Beiras’ new left-nationalist coalition, AGE, which defied all expectations and won a spectacular result, placing third – ahead of the BNG – and taking nearly 14% of the vote. The new left-nationalist coalition, which has been styled the “Galician Syriza” (a reference to Greece’s left-wing anti-austerity coalition which is now the embattled country’s largest opposition party), seized on the climate of social and economic discontent prevalent in Spain. Beiras’ coalition placed emphasis on socio-economic rather than traditional nationalist themes, taking clear anti-capitalist tones and calling for the reconstruction of society. In doing so, it not only seized a sizable part of the traditional BNG nationalist electorate, but also fed off the PSdeG’s collapse. The PSdeG’s collapse was particularly big in Galicia’s major cities, where AGE performed best: 20.6% and second place in A Coruña, 21.8% and second place in Santiago de Compostela, 20.2% in Ferrol and 19.5% in Vigo.
AGE was helped by Beiras’ well-known charismatic figure, which transformed him into Feijóo’s most vocal opponent. His success should be a major cause for concern for the PSdeG, which was the clear loser of the elections. The party, which had maintained its high level of support (from the 2005 election) in the 2009 ballot, lost over a third of its 2009 votes and collapsed to only 20.5% and 18 seats. The PSdeG was clearly affected by Operación Pokémon, but also by internal divisions and uncertain leadership in a party which is used to fractious relations and internal divisions. Again, Feijóo’s decision to call a snap election in October rather than next spring (as scheduled) was clearly calculated and he wanted to seize on the PSdeG’s troubles. The early election caught the Socialists off guard, and even if they managed to patch their lists together and unite behind its leader, Pachi Vázquez, it was not without some trouble. The PSdeG’s campaign, which wanted to turn the Galician election into a referendum over Rajoy’s policies, was not up to par with Feijóo and Beiras’ campaigns. Even Rubalcaba admitted after the fact that the reason why the PSdeG did so badly is that they failed to present a strong “alternative” to the PP. Again, the hapless Pachi Vázquez certainly did not measure up to either Feijóo or Beiras. The PSdeG’s decrepitude plunges the party into uncertain waters, not unlike the terrible situation the party went through in the late 1990s.
The AGE’s success has also plunged the BNG into uncertain waters. The BNG’s leadership has resigned, and it has called for “unity”, “reflection” and “change”. It is likely too early to say what is the future of the Galician nationalist movement after this election, especially given the BNG’s paltry fourth place showing behind the new coalition of its former leader.
The AGE’s result is quite interesting. It was boosted by local factors, first and foremost Beiras’ charisma and the troubles of both the PSdeG and BNG, but it is undeniable that AGE’s success could have national implications, primarily for the PSOE. Once again, with this result and the PSE’s result in Euskadi, the Socialists are the clear losers of these two elections. The party must wake up to the fact that it faces a clear credibility crisis, and its old voters are not buying into the party’s new-found distaste for austerity. Spanish politics as a whole have been shaken up by the economic crisis, both the PP and PSOE are increasingly discredited in the eyes of voters, and the succession of unpopular austerity measures have created a profound social malaise in the country. Voters are losing trust in traditional parties, and are turning to the IU, UPyD, regional parties or minor parties (notice the success in both regions of Escaños en blanco, which wants a recognition of invalid votes in the form of vacant seats); they are also losing trust in the country’s democratic institution. Both the PP and PSOE seem rather oblivious to this situation, or they are at the very least very much unable to confront it (certainly the PP has its hands tied up with the crisis and the wider Eurozone crisis).
Rubalcaba’s leadership of the PSOE will be shaken up a bit by these defeats, probably even more if the PSC does very poorly in Catalonia on 26-N. He has already said that he would go if the party told him to go, though he is not resigning just yet. The PSOE has been unable to profit at all from the PP’s collapse.
All eyes in Spanish politics are set on Catalonia, which holds a snap election November 26. Very interesting things are going on in Catalonia, and it is aligning to become one of Mariano Rajoy’s biggest headaches in the future. The regional president, Artur Mas, has taken a surprisingly confrontational and nationalist attitude, no doubt because of the difficult economic situation in which Catalonia finds itself. He wants to call a referendum of some kind, and he hopes to receive a strong popular mandate for his nationalist agenda from the voters on November 26. Polls indicate that Mas’ centre-right CiU will make gains, though it is uncertain whether he will be able to win an absolute majority in Parliament.
Legislative elections were held in Spain on November 20, 2011. All 350 members of the Congress of Deputies and 208 out of 266 members of the Senate were up for reelection in these snap elections. I had covered the details of this election, but also some very extensive details about Spanish history since the Restoration, the political parties in contention, the political issues and the regions of Spain in some 100 pages (!) in my Guide to the 2011 Spanish Election. I wish to apologize to those who had hoped to follow my liveblog. Apparently it never worked for the readers, and I didn’t find that out until it was all said and done. Technology never works these days.
Spain has been one of the European countries hit the hardest by the European debt crisis and the world recession. Its unemployment rate, 21.5%, is the highest in the EU, and 4.9 million people are out of work. Nearly half of those under 30 are unemployed. The logistics of the debt crisis in Spain are made all the more difficult in a decentralized country like Spain, where seventeen autonomous communities account for 40% of total spending and have run up some huge debts (€121.4 billion in total) and whose combined deficit rose to 2.8% of the country’s GDP last year (while the central government’s deficit fell from 11 to 9% of the GDP). Spain is widely considered as one of the most vulnerable countries in this European debt crisis, alongside Greece and Italy, and could be one of the next “dominoes” to fall in case things get even worse. Spain’s Socialist government, led by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero since 2004, has taken lots of heat over its initially sluggish response to the growing crisis and then suffered the brunt of popular discontent when it was compelled to implement very tough austerity deals including wage freezes for public employees and massive spending cuts. In the May 2011 regional elections, Zapatero’s governing Socialists (PSOE) suffered an historic trouncing at the expense of the opposition conservative Popular Party (PP). Zapatero himself was not running for reelection as President of the Government this year, being succeeded by his right-hand man and former Vice-President of the Government Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba. Rubalcaba faced Mariano Rajoy, the leader and candidate of the PP since 2004, when Rajoy failed in his bid to succeed his predecessor José María Aznar as President of the Government.
The Guide covers the details of Spain’s electoral system in more breadth. The 350 members of the lower house, the Congreso de los Diputados, are elected through d’Hondt closed list party-list proportional representation in Spain’s 50 provinces which have have between 2 (constitutionally-set minimum) and 36 seats. Theoretically, the threshold in each constituency is 3% but in practice in all but the largest constituencies (Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia etc) the threshold is much higher – up to 25% in three-member constituencies. Furthermore, the electoral system over-represents smaller provinces: there were only 38,685 voters per deputy in Soria back in 2008, but in Barcelona there were 128,392 voters per deputy that same year. The high threshold in most provinces penalizes national third-parties whose base is more homogeneously spread throughout the country, and has resulted in a two-party system around the PSOE and PP where regionalist parties in Euskadi and Catalonia are also advantaged by the electoral system. The 208 elected members of the upper house, the Senado, are elected through partial block voting in each province in peninsular Spain, which elects four senators. Ceuta and Melilla elect two members, the larger islands in the insular communities (Mallorca in the Balearics and Gran Canaria and Tenerife in the Canaries) elect three senators each while the smaller islands in the insular communities elect a single member each. In provinces with four senators, voters may vote up to three candidates. In those with two or three, for up to two. In those with one, for a single candidate. Voters vote for individual candidates (each party slate has three names in four-seaters) and those four winning the most votes are elected. This usually means that seats are split 3-1 between the winning slate and the runners-up. The remainder of seats are elected indirectly by the legislatures of the autonomous communities. Each autonomous community is entitled to one member plus one additional member for every million inhabitants. The electoral system and the Senate are both major political questions, and movements such as the indignados have demanded electoral reform with ideas such as open lists, regional constituencies, a single national constituency or a mixed German-type system (so, with an FPTP component) being some of the commonly proposed alternatives to the current system.
You can find more about the electoral campaign in the Guide, but the result of a low-intensity campaign which ultimately never impassioned voters and which was marked throughout by certainty over the result was a dip in turnout from 73.85% to 71.69%. Blank votes increased from 1.11% to 1.37% and null votes from 0.69% to 1.29%.
PP 44.62% (+4.68%) winning 186 seats (+32)*
PSOE 28.73% (-15.14%) winning 110 seats (-59)
CiU 4.17% (+1.14%) winning 16 seats (+6)
IU-LV 6.92% (+3.15%) winning 11 seats (+9)*
Amaiur 1.37% (+1.37%) winning 7 seats (+7)*
UPyD 4.69% (+3.5%) winning 5 seats (+4)
EAJ-PNV 1.33% (+0.14%) winning 5 seats (-1)
ERC 1.05% (-0.11%) winning 3 seats (nc)
BNG 0.75% (-0.08%) winning 2 seats (nc)
CC-NCa-PNC 0.59% (-0.09%) winning 2 seats (nc)*
Compromís 0.51% (+0.39%) winning 1 seat (+1)
FAC 0.4% (+0.4%) winning 1 seat (+1)
Geroa Bai 0.17% (-0.07%) winning 1 seat (nc)
In the Senate:
PP 136 seats (+35)*
PSOE 48 seats (-40)
CiU 9 seats (+5)
PSC-ICV-EUiA 7 seats (-5)*
EAJ-PNV 4 seats (+2)
Amaiur 3 seats (+3)
CC 1 seat (nc)
* PP includes 1 UPN deputy; 3 PAR senators 2 UPN senators
* IU includes 2 ICV, 1 CHA and 1 EUiA
* Amaiur includes independents (5 deputies and 2 senators), EA (1 deputy and 1 senator) and Aralar (1 deputy)
* CC-NCa includes CC (1 deputy), NCa (1 deputy) and AHI (1 senator)
Please note that results are calculated by the Spanish government based on valid votes, which includes blank votes – envelopes containing no party ballot. In my Guide, I calculated results based on the total number of candidate votes, including solely votes cast directly for a party list. I have not calculated results on this basis for this election.
Without any surprise, the PP has won an historic majority. It has won its highest vote share and seat count in its history. The PP’s absolute majority provides Spain and the tumultuous financial markets with the ‘stable government’ they had longed for. Mariano Rajoy, in good part by chance, will finally become President of the Government. For the PP and Rajoy, now comes the hard part. It inherits a very bleak economic record: record-high unemployment, youth disillusion with the lack of job opportunities, popular discontent over austerity measures and the political system, a big deficit and rising debt, autonomous communities up in debt to their necks and some autonomous communities unwilling to cut as much as the central government would like them to do. During the campaign, the PP promised basically nothing and in fact Rajoy declined to reveal his full programme during a televised debate with Rubalcaba. The PP talked in some very broad terms about fighting the crisis, fighting unemployment and summed up its policies to catchphrases like ”modernization”, “growth”, “competitiveness”, “opportunities”, “reform” and above all the good ol’ c-word: change. Its slogan was “súmate al cambio” (join the change). Despite its sixth plank saying “we will carry out an austerity plan that will commit all the levels of government” this did not keep the PP, during the campaign, from attacking the PSOE on the front of spending cuts.
Whatever the PP said during the campaign, it is quite certain that they will undertake a program of austerity – they have said so themselves – but what form it will take remains to be seen. If you believe their program, it will mostly be in the form of labour market liberalization, business tax cuts, and public sector reform on the bases of rationalization, transparency and efficiency. They have, in their program, promised to uphold the welfare state and have said that health and education are their ‘priorities’. They have also promised tax cuts and other tax-incentive/goodies as some sort of counterbalance to austerity. Whether they follow through on this in practice remains to be seen, but given what austerity means in practice and the realities of the Spanish economy, I wouldn’t hold out hope.
While the PP’s victory is quite phenomenal in most regards, the election was more of a defeat of the PSOE than a victory of the PP. Certainly in terms of governance, the PP now has a commanding majority in Parliament and quasi-universal control over local government in most regions (only 5 out of 17 regions are not governed by the PP or its allies, and it controls the vast majority of provincial capitals) – an ideal situation similar to that of the PSOE in 1982-1983. But despite the PP’s landslide this year, its vote share actually only increased by 4.7% while the PSOE’s vote declined by a full 15 percentage points. Something which indicates the polarized nature of Spanish politics (especially given how the PP is the most polarizing party), but also the comparatively little embrace the PP received. Its victory this year is more a win by default, as the main opposition party which has played its cards pretty well and was reassuring during the campaign, than any widespread popular movement or embrace of the PP’s policies. The dip in turnout this year is indicative of this feeling of political apathy, and it serves to set it apart from the PSOE’s landslide defeat of an incumbent government in 1982 where there was a real popular embrace of the party as an inspiring vehicle of change and behind a charismatic young leader. No such emotions this year – voters were not very interested by the campaign, and Rajoy as a person retains the image of uncharismatic politico/Galician tax collector. It is almost resignation to a result known long in advance and behind a party which isn’t that bad but which isn’t inspiring any political mania.
The election is really a defeat for the PSOE more than anything. The governing party has suffered an unprecedented thumping, losing 15% and nearly 60 seats in Congress. With such a result, the PSOE has won the worst result in its recent history – falling below the 125 seats of the 2000 Aznarslide and the 118 seats it had won in the first free elections in 1977. In 1977, Spain’s political system was not yet constructed along stable lines and you had a lot of lingering left-wing votes in parties such as the PSP which would be eaten up by the PSOE. There is little way to spin it: it was a catastrophically bad result for the PSOE. In large part, the PSOE was the victim of the economic crisis. It had been criticized for its sluggish handling of the crisis when it first hit in late 2008 and then received the bulk of popular discontent over tough austerity measures it had been compelled to implement. These austerity measures included public sector wage freezes, a VAT hike, cuts in public spending, cuts in welfare allocations, pension reform and labour law liberalization. These measures, implemented by a left-wing party, really hit the core of the PSOE’s traditional electorate. A lot of traditional Socialist voters found themselves alienated from their traditional party and, in this election like in May, either did not turn out or voted for other parties either on the left (IU), centre (UPyD and regionalists) or the right (PP). On 20-N, the PSOE was really shrunk to its rock-solid core electorate. The party’s attempts to distance the campaign from the crisis and unemployment to issues where it is nominally stronger: social spending, welfare and so forth, failed. There was certainly no escaping the crisis this year and the PSOE’s desperate attempts to run on a traditional left-wing platform concerned with social issues could not work out. Rubalcaba put up a good fight, but ultimately he was doomed before it even started. It was not as much a defeat for him as a person rather than a defeat for the PSOE as a whole. Perhaps if the PSOE had been perceived as a “strong” government with a more concerted approach to the economic crisis (analysts have described Artur Mas’ Generalitat as a ‘strong government’, for example) rather than perceived as being wobbling all over the place it could have done a bit better. In a normal election, all things equal, it would probably not have been all that hard for Rubalcaba to defeat Rajoy, but this was not a normal election.
What was surprising was that there was not even a dead cat bounce for the PSOE in the results. A lot of people, myself included, had thought that the PSOE could slightly overperform expectations and receive a tiny boost from last-minute strategic voting for people wary of a PP majority or hesitating left-wingers who, in the past, had often tended to break at the last minute for the PSOE. No such thing this year. In fact, as the PP majority was pretty much a certainty, it could have depressed some PSOE voters from voting and allowed other voters to vote more “freely” – the small parties and regionalists: IU, UPyD, CiU, PNV and Amaiur all did a bit or quite a bit better than what was expected. Even some soft right-wingers might have taken the freedom to vote for parties such as UPyD as the PP’s majority looked so set in stone before the vote.
Only the provinces of Sevilla and Barcelona have remained loyal to the PSOE. In Sevilla, Felipe González’s former cabinet minister Alfonso Guerra won another successive victory at the helm of the PSOE’s list, constantly reelected since the first elections in 1977. But Jaén broke its unbroken streak of voting PSOE in every single election since democracy and voted PP. Even Huelva, another solidly loyal Socialist province, narrowly voted PP.
The PSOE must now reconstruct itself. A regular congress will be held in February, in which Zapatero will step down as official leader of the party. Who will replace him, and whether Rubalcaba will replace him, remains up in the air. The names of Defense Minister Carme Chacón, the President of the Congress José Bono, MEP Juan Fernándo López Aguilar, the secretary-general of the congressional caucus Eduardo Madina and Basque lehendakari Patxi López are commonly cited as potential successors. The PSOE starts from far, but perhaps its fight back will be easier than the one it faced in 2000. It is the opposition – the largest opposition force by far – to a government which faces an extremely tough economic situation and which will need to implement sour-tasting medicine quickly. In 2000, it faced a popular government which rode the wave of economic prosperity and growth with only little bumps until the Madrid bombings. No such luck for the PP government this year. The PSOE is discredited for the time being, but it is hard to see the discredit lasting very long when the government starts being compelled to introduce sour-tasting economic medicine. We are already seeing the PS in next-door Portugal start fighting back after losing this summer’s elections in a landslide to the opposition conservatives. More than any “right-wing shift” in Europe with the economic crisis (a flawed theory brought up by the Canadian paper The Globe and Mail) there is pretty much a strong anti-incumbent mood in those countries which are suffering from the economic crisis or whose governments have implemented unpopular policies in relation to the economic crisis (Spain, Greece, Italy, France, Germany, the UK etc). I expect a similar situation to emerge in Spain. Therein lies the silver lining for PSOE supporters.
IU and UPyD, Spain’s two main national-level third parties, had a good night. IU won its best result since 1996 and really its first truly good results in a long time. With 11 seats and 7%, it roars back from the brink of extinction where it laid after the 2008 election (where it won only 2 seats). It performed strongly in its traditional strongholds of Madrid (8%), Catalonia (8.1%), Andalusia (8.3%) and Asturias (13.3%) but also Aragon where, in coalition with the left-nationalist CHA, it won 10.5% and one seat (for CHA). There is, however, the very serious risk that, like in the 1990s, IU’s new voters are left-wing voters parking their votes with IU in protest against the PSOE and who will be ready to bolt from IU whenever the PSOE appears viable again – that what was happened in 2000 and 2004. UPyD also did surprisingly well, winning a very strong 4.7% and 5 seats – up from just 1.2% and 1 seat in 2008. It has been an unexpectedly major beneficiary of the PSOE’s collapse, but also popularity with some centre-right voters. It won its best result (10.3% and 4 seats) in Madrid but also won one seat in Valencia in the person of Toni Cantó, a popular actor.
In Catalonia, CiU defied all expectations and shocked observers by outpolling the traditionally hegemonic PSC for the first time in a general election. The CiU, which had not been expected to perform particularly spectacularly, did quite spectacularly with 29.4% and 16 seats – the best showing since 1996 – against 26.6% and 14 seats for the PSC. Consider that only three years ago the PSC had won 46%… Outpolling the PSC in a domain (general elections) where it has usually been the dominant party is quite a feat for the party and a major boost for the governing party in Catalonia. It is also a particularly big blow to Carme Chacón, who was a bit the PSC’s top candidate as the PSC top candidate in Barcelona. We are quite a way away from the 38% the CiU won in last year’s regional elections but the CiU always performs way better in regional elections anyhow. The ERC, the other main referent of Catalan nationalism, won 7.1% (down a bit from 7.8%) but managed to keep its 3 seats. It could be in the process of slowing down its pretty bad decline started around the time of the Catalan statute’s ratification in 2006. Its leaders have patted themselves on the back for the success of the party’s rebuilding process which began following the quasi-rout of the 2010 regional election.
The PP will be a bit let down by its ultimately unimpressive performance in Catalonia. Sure, 20.7% and 11 seats is above their 2008 results (16.4% and 8 seats) and it is their second best result after 2000 (23%). The PPC was probably hoping to place second ahead of CiU as some polls had indicated, and such a result would have been an historic success for the españolista right in Catalonia. Ultimately, it will need to settle for a somewhat distant third. As in 2010 and May 2011, the PPC’s success came on the heels not of fellow right-wingers who would otherwise vote CiU but rather non-Catalanist discontent PSC voters. Again, as in 2010 and May, the PPC won its best results and most impressive gains in the traditionally heavily Socialist working-class hinterland of Barcelona: Badalona, L’Hospitalet and so forth. In 2010, a campaign particularly focused on criminality and immigration had been behind the PPC’s success in those historic strongholds of the PSC. Indeed, the PPC, unlike any other regional branch of the PP, is particularly concerned about checking the rise of the only viable far-right movement in the country, the PxC – which won 1.7% of the vote in Catalonia.
The other major news of this election was Amaiur’s success. Amaiur is the abertzale left (Basque nationalist left) coalition founded in succession of Bildu, a similar coalition which had done well in May’s local elections. Amaiur includes EA, abertzale independents and Aralar. With 7 seats, it is the biggest party in “Euskal Herria” (CAPV+Navarre). While in Euskadi, in terms of votes, it is behind the PNV (24.1% vs. 27.4%), by the workings of the electoral system it won 6 seats in Euskadi to the PNV’s 5. In Navarre, with 14.9%, Amaiur won one seat. But what was more surprising in Navarre was Geroa Bai’s ability to hold it seat with 12.8% of the vote. Geroa Bai is the makeshift electoral alliance backed by the PNV (locally worthless in Navarre) and led around Uxue Barkos, the independent moderate deputy elected for the nationalist coalition NaBai in 2008. The combined 27.7% of the two Basque nationalist forces in Navarre is far superior to NaBai’s 18.4% and is certainly a record high for Basque nationalists in general elections in Navarre.
The results in Euskadi are at odds with those in the rest of Spain. The PNV, with 27.42% and 5 seats, a result slightly above its 27.11% result in 2008 (but one seat less) emerged on top, followed by Amaiur with 24.12% and 6 seats. The PSE-EE, which had won a crucial victory in 2008 with 38%, collapsed to a mere 21.5%. The PP was equally shunned: it held its 3 seats, but won 17.8% – less than the already poor 18.5% it had won in 2008. A far cry from the PP’s record of 29% in 2000. The real victor in Euskadi is Basque nationalism, with a combined strength of 51.5% – a record high since the late 80s.
Just like in the 1998 Basque regional elections, the abertzale left has benefited from the final cessation of ‘hostilities’ with ETA. Amaiur, with ETA dead, has become an even less polarizing and even more attractive political option for nationalists and other left-wingers. But the rebirth of Basque nationalism, which had been quite seriously shaken in 2008 and 2009 (when the PNV lost control of the CAPV’s regional government for the first time in history), is more than just that. Part of it probably comes from a rebuke of the PSE-PP pact which gave Patxi López the Ajuria Enea in 2009, but as some Spanish analysts have suggested, it could be a rebirth of nationalism as an attractive political and institutional option in one of Spain’s most affluent regions during one of the worst economic crises in recent Spanish history. Amaiur’s result is another big success for the abertzale left, which comes on the heels of Bildu’s success in May.
In detail, the Basque vote was a different story depending on the province. In Biscay, the birthplace and impregnable fiefdom of the PNV, the jeltzales won 32.62% (31% in 2008) against 21.4% for the PSE and 19.2% for Amaiur. In Gipuzkoa, the most nationalist and traditional base of the abertzale, Amaiur dominated the field with 34.8% against 22.4% (1 seat) for the PNV (down from 23.8% and 2 seats in 2008) and 21% for the PSE (39% in 2008). In Álava, the least Basque of the Basque provinces, the PP won 27.2% (up from 26.5%) against 23% for the PSE and some 19% apiece for the PNV and Amaiur. In terms of party politics, the PNV’s strong showing in Biscay strengthens the position of the moderate Josu Erkoreka for lehendakari in 2013, while the anemic showings in both Gipuzkoa and Álava weakens the weight of these federations but most notably that of Joseba Egibar, the more radical PNV leader in Gipuzkoa. In the long term, it will be worth watching whether the PNV continues its worrying (for them) isolation back into Biscay while losing Gipuzkoa and Álava – a trend seen back in May as well.
Amaiur polled its new votes from non-voters: logically, turnout increased in Euskadi (another break from the rest of Spain) from 64% to 69.2% this year (and up 10% in the abertzale stronghold of Gipuzkoa). A good number of solid more radical abertzale or Batasuna voters had not voted in 2008 for lack of such an option. Similarly, blank votes (envelopes deposited in the ballot box without any party ballot inside) fell from 1.8% to 1.1%. It also won, logically, some votes from EB-B (the local IU) which, in Euskadi unlike in the rest of Spain, fell back from 4.5% to 3.7%. EB-B has always acted as some sort of prop-up for nationalists in Basque governments without being fully nationalist itself. But Amaiur’s success did not have all that much of a detrimental effect on the PNV. It certainly did pull some votes away from the PNV in those places, like Gipuzkoa and eastern Biscay, which are the most rural and ethnically Basque areas, but on the overall raw numbers both throughout the CAPV and the constituent provinces don’t show a strong link between Amaiur and the PNV’s results. Instead there seems to have been a significant growth in support for Basque nationalism which ended up being positive to both parties.
Certainly some PNV voters might have voted Amaiur in bigger numbers than raw data makes us presumes, because those loses were compensated for gains with more moderate 2008 Socialist voters. It happened, but to what extent it is hard to judge. Amaiur seems to have grown quite a bit on the heels of the PSE’s collapse. It makes sense: in 2008, the PSE, which has always had (especially after its defeat in the 2001 regional elections) some elements of soft-regionalism, was an attractive option for some left-wing nationalist voters either through anti-PP strategical considerations or approval of Zapatero’s softer policy (in the first term, initially) with ETA. It had won 39% in Gipuzkoa, the most nationalist province, and had performed quite well in places like Arrasate/Mondragón which are otherwise abertzale strongholds. This year, a combination of national conditions (the PSOE’s unpopularity, the certainty of a PP majority) and local conditions (the PSE’s pact with the PP in 2009) probably doomed any chances for PSE resistance with more nationalist Basque voters.
Amaiur as a major political actor (with its own parliamentary group: parties need 5 members to form a unique group) and one of the largest political forces in Euskal Herria, alongside Euskadi’s unique set of results (with the nationalist landslide) makes the next four years interesting in Euskadi – both in terms of regional politics looking to the 2013 regional elections – but also in terms of the PP’s interaction with Euskadi and the PNV-Amaiur. Amaiur will be shunned and stigmatized by the PP, and there is fear that, like in 2000-2004, there could be a fistfight between the central PP government and the nationalists – especially if the nationalists reconquer the Ajuria Enea in 2013. Rajoy has already made public his intention to repeal the fourth transitory clause from the Constitution (the clause which sets the procedure for the union of the CAPV and Navarre) and this symbolic move could be symbolic for a tense relationship between the Basque nationalists/PNV, which is increasingly nationalist in its rhetoric again, and the PP. In the same context, the relationship between the CiU government in Barcelona, which is taking some more stridently nationalist tones at time, and the new PP government in Madrid will be interesting to follow. It is unlikely to be as bad as any relationship between a Basque nationalist government in Euskadi and Rajoy, but with questions of spending cuts on both sides and Catalan demands for fiscal autonomy, things can be interesting.
Third parties in general now form the biggest caucus since the early 90s – a clear break away from the pattern of increased polarization, unchecked ever since 1996. Beyond the aforementioned ‘biggies’, the BNG and CC both held their two seats. In the BNG’s case, with 11.25%, it won about 0.25% less than what it had won in 2008. In CC, the big loses in Santa Cruz de Tenerife (from 29.2% and 2 seats to 19.8% and 1 seat) were compensated by gains in Las Palmas (from 6.1% to 11.3% and 1 seat) – gains made possible by the alliance with NCa, the left regionalist party which had crippled CC in Las Palmas. In the Valencian Community, the coalition of the left-nationalist CC with the greens (Equo) won 4.8% and 1 seat – from Valencia where it won 6%. In the Balearic Islands, a similar coalition between the local left-nationalists (PSM-EN) and Equo won 7.2% but could not conquer a seat. In Cantabria, Miguel Ángel Revilla’s attempt to win a seat for his PRC fell quite a bit short with only 12.5%, victim of a PP campaign linking him closely to Zapatero. In Asturias, however, Francisco Álvarez-Cascos’ governing FAC (a right-wing party founded by former Aznar cabinet minister Álvarez-Cascos for the purposes of his fistfight with the local PP), won 14.75% and one seat. It is a pretty nice result for them, though in Madrid the FAC won only 0.2% and totally failed to catch any voters from the PP’s hard-right. In Asturias, it cost the PP some 5-6% (it fell from 41.6% to 35.4%).
Equo, Spain’s nascent green party, ultimately failed to elect anyone on its one. In Madrid, where all of Equo’s chances laid, it managed a pretty poor 1.92% and fell short of a single seat. Nationally, it won just 0.88%. Equo had never been widely predicted to do well on its own outside the Valencian Community and the Balearic Islands where it benefited from its alliance with the much stronger local nationalists, but it is still a pretty significant setback for the country’s nascent green movement and shows that there is still much work to be done on their behalf if Spain is ever to have a strong green party. The first task would be to find unity, given that even with Equo some local green movements supported IU, notably in the Valencian Community.
There was also a less noticed good night for the tiny parties. The green/animal rights PACMA won 0.4%, double what it had won in 2008. A party calling for the recognition of blank votes in the seat allocation won 0.4%. Some small parties on the hard-left did well, by their standards.
El Mundo has a nice interactive map of the results by municipality, and allows for comparison with demographic and economic variables pretty nicely. The most striking aspect is of the course the blue wave, which is really massive and only leaves out Euskadi, Catalonia and the remnants of the Spanish “Solid South”. The PSOE is basically relegated to a handful of its strongholds: the poor inland rural areas of Andalusia especially in the provinces of Huelva and Sevilla, a remaining handful of towns in Extremadura and Aragon, the rump of the old working-class mining areas in León (interestingly, the PSOE vote dropped by only a bit more than average – 16% in Zapatero’s native province) and Asturias (inflated because of the division of the right-wing vote), and the Socialist fief of La Gomera in the Canaries (by a small margin at that). The PP dominated by wide margins in the conservative strongholds of the Castiles, the Levante, Cantabria and Galicia but even Extremadura and the Canaries. It won its best results in its history in Andalusia (45.6%!), the Canaries (a huge 48%), Castile-La Mancha (55.8%), Extremadura (over 50% for the first time ever, a decimated PSOE at 37 %), Murcia (64.3% against 21% for the PSOE…), La Rioja, Ceuta, Melilla (66% in both North African enclaves) but also the Valencian Community (53%) despite the Caso Gürtel. In Galicia, the long-term trend away from the PP is likely to continue: with 52.5%, the PP’s performance is quite a bit below the 54% won in 2000.
Outside Euskal Herria and Asturias, the swing to the PP was really quite universal despite a few under-performances here and there, so finding links between unemployment rates and stronger PP performances is a bit tough – but all these regions save La Rioja which saw the best PP performances are those regions were unemployment is above the national average of 21.5%. The shocking victories in Andalusia but also the Canaries have something to do with the 30% unemployment rate in those regions. But conversely, voters in those regions with lower unemployment were not more ready to support the PSOE – proof that economic pessimism is not regionally concentrated. I wouldn’t necessarily link the two, but it is interesting that coincidentally (?) the two regions where the PP vote dropped since 2008 for ‘normal’ reasons (aka, not because of vote-splitting like in Asturias) – Euskadi and Navarre – have the two lowest unemployment rates in Spain (12.2% and 11.7%).
The victory in Andalusia was one of the most notable aspects of the PP’s electoral results. Andalusia is really the bedrock of the PSOE, where a lot of its national leaders hail from, where it has built up full institutional control and where it has maintained a loyal electoral clientele in ways, some say, reminiscent of patronage or clientelism. In this regards, the PP’s victory there on 20-N and earlier in May was really a major blow to the PSOE. Because of this, the March 2012 regional elections in Andalusia will be crucial for both the PP and PSOE. If the PP, despite having the weight of having been in government for a few months, wins the elections (even moreso if it wins a majority, like it would on present numbers) then it will be a crippling blow for the PSOE made all the more crippling by it being out of government nationally. If the PSOE manages to hold on, it would mean a general sigh of relief for the PSOE and a very encouraging boost for it. Nonetheless, José Antonio Griñán’s PSOE trailed Javier Arenas’ PP by nearly 15% (49-35) in the last poll for the regional elections.
In the Senatorial contests, the PP won a huge majority (65% of seats) – the largest majority ever achieved in fact (bigger even than the PSOE’s senate majority in 1982). No province voted differently in the Senate elections, and only one province – Tarragona – resulted in a 2-2 split between the top two parties rather than the usual 3-1 split. The PP won seats in all provinces but the 4 Catalan provinces and the two coastal Basque provinces, and won the three seats in all other provinces but Sevilla. In turn, the PSOE won only 48 seats – one in every four-seat province besides Gipuzkoa where it won none and Sevilla where it won three. The Senate-level only coalition in Catalonia between the PSC, ICV and EUiA (ERC left this year) won three seats in Barcelona, two in Tarragona and only one seat in Girona and Lleida. On the islands, the PSOE won its impregnable kingdom of La Gomera 44-36, but besides that it was limited to no seats in the other small islands and one seat in the three-seat islands. In El Hierro, the incumbent senator from AHI (an insular regionalist party allied with CC) was reelected.
The Guide will likely be updated, sometime, with this analysis, full results and perhaps further analysis if time permits.
Regional and municipal elections were held in Spain on May 22, 2011. I previewed all the races in a preview post earlier this week. These elections, a key test for the parties a year out from general elections, came at a bad time for Spain and its Socialist government. Spain is crumbling under 20% unemployment, a huge deficit and teetering on the verge of total bankruptcy. The government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero is very unpopular and trails the opposition conservative Popular Party (PP) by a huge margin in all opinion polls. Zapatero’s retirement ahead of the general elections due in a year could help the PSOE, but for now the Socialist’s situation is extremely poor.
These elections are also held in the wake of a large, youth-led popular mobilization called either “15-M”, los indignados or the “#spanishrevolution”. The crux of these protests are the unpopular austerity programs and massive youth unemployment (45% with u-25), but the protests also evoke frustration at Spain’s entrenched two-party system, the electoral system and pervasive corruption on both sides. Spain has always had high unemployment, with the usually impressive 20% unemployment levels being not all that abnormal in Spain since the 1970s; as well as low growth rates even when the economy was doing well. These indicates bottlenecks in the Spanish economy which no party addresses. The 15-M protests basically called on voters to abstain out of protest.
Surprisingly, 15-M’s effects on the elections are hardly discernible. Firstly, turnout actually increased by 2%, from 63.97% in 2007 to 66.23% this year. Perhaps the increase in blank votes from 1.97% to 2.54% are a side-effect of the 15-M movement. Invalid/null votes also increased from 1.17% to 1.69%.
Results of municipal elections, as given by the Ministry of the Interior. Only parties winning over 0.3% of the vote are included
PP 37.53% (+1.91%) winning 26,499 seats (+3,151)
PSOE 27.79% (-7.13%) winning 21,767 seats (-2,262)
IU 6.31% (+0.83%) winning 2,230 seats (+196)
CiU 3.45% (+0.2%) winning 3,862 seats (+475)
UPyD 2.06% (+2.06%) winning 152 seats (+152)
EAJ-PNV 1.45% (+0.06%) winning 882 seats (-161)
Bildu-EA-Alternatiba 1.39% (+1.39%) winning 1,138 seats (+1,138)
ERC 1.2% (-0.36%) winning 1,399 seats (-192)
BNG 1.16% (-0.26%) winning 590 seats (-71)
ICV-EUiA 1.07% (-0.09%) winning 398 seats (-53)
PA 1.02% (-0.04%) winning 470 seats (-55)
CC-PNC-CCN 0.9% (-0.08%) winning 391 seats (-13)
BNV-CC 0.8% (+0.8%) winning 345 seats (+345)
FAC 0.54% (+0.54%) winning 158 seats (+158)
UPN 0.39% (+0.39%) winning 322 seats (+322)
PAR 0.34% (-0.08%) winning 992 seats (+9)
PRC 0.31% (-0.02%) winning 322 seats (+19)
Others 9.72% winning 6,304 seats
The UPN won Navarra. This is not shown on this map for the sake of colours.
The PSOE and PP have won roughly the same amount of votes and seats in all local elections since 1999. In fact, since then, both parties have been within 1% of one another. You need to go back to the PP’s 1995 landslide to find a wider gap: 4.43% separated the PP from the PSOE. This year’s gap, 9.74% is the widest gap in local elections since 1991. This marks an undeniable “blue wave” of the PP, which shows up very pronounced on the above map which shows the party winning the most votes by provice, unlike the Ministry’s maps which show the party winning the most seats by province. From this perspective, the sound defeat of the PSOE is pretty much undeniable and the victory of the PP is similarly undeniable.
But one thing which hasn’t been noted amongst the euphoria and Y-M-C-A singing hoolala at the PP’s victory rally last night is that the PP’s vote only increased by 1.9%. As we’ll in the autonomous communities, the PP’s vote did not increase by as much as the PSOE’s vote decreased and in regions where the PP was the incumbent most of the PP gains were modest if even significant. This is not to act as a Socialist stooge and grasp at straws to forget the mud you’re in. It is only an interesting observation which might say a bit about how the PP’s victory is not a win for the PP’s platform but rather a default win for the “other main governing party”. But before jumping too high, it is noteworthy to say that several factors might hold down the PP’s vote in these calculations. In Asturias, the PP’s vote dropped by 15.6% thanks to the concurrency of FAC. In Navarra, votes cast for the UPN-PP in 2007 were counted with the PP while this year only the PP’s 5.99% showing in the Foral Community shows up. It might be more instructive to look at what happened to the PP’s vote outside Asturias and Navarra where unusual circumstances were at work.
In 1995, the IU had benefited a lot from the PSOE’s rout and saw its vote increase from 8.4% to 11.7% between 1991 and 1995. The IU vote did increase this year, which was probably inevitable as left-wing voters who voted PSOE in the past voted IU out of protest at the austerity measures and so forth. But from 6.64% for IU-ICV in 2007, 7.38% for IU-ICV this year is a rather modest increase. It is worth remembering though that Bildu hurt EB-B and Aralar considerably in Euskadi, which might skew the figures around a bit. But there were no spectacular increases anywhere for IU.
The seat distribution seems to weigh disproportionately towards rural areas and small municipalities. Like France, Spain has a truckload of small villages with a handful of people living in them who are overrepresented compared to larger towns and cities. This plays to the advantage of regionalist parties like the CiU, ERC, PNV and Bildu which are strong in small villages but also to the PSOE’s advantage which is strong in rural areas of Andalusia, Extremadura or Aragón. The map on the Ministry’s website show the party with the most seats in each province, which, as you can see by comparing my map with theirs, plays out to the PSOE’s advantage in Andalusia and Extremadura but also to CiU and the PNV’s advantage. Note that in Euskadi, Bildu emerged as the party with most seats while trailing the PNV by 5%. Bildu, for example, swept the small villages of rural Gipuzkoa.
PP 39.72% (+8.67%) winning 30 seats (+7)
PSOE 28.98% (-12.16%) winning 22 seats (-8)
PAR 9.17% (-2.9%) winning 7 seats (-2)
CHA 8.24% (+0.09%) winning 4 seats (nc)
IU 6.16% (+2.08%) winning 4 seats (+3)
UPyD 2.3% (+2.3%) winning 0 seats (nc)
Governed since 1999 by the Socialists, Aragón saw a major shift as the PP’s Luisa Fernanda Rudi, former President of the Chamber of Deputies, led the PP to its best result ever in Aragón. With 39.7% against 29% for the Socialists, the PP did much better than polls had predicted – and the PSOE quite a bit worse. The PSOE was led by Eva Almunia, aiming to succeed Marcelino Iglesias, the PSOE incumbent in office since 1999 who was not running for reelection this year. The PAR maintained its positions but lost two seats, probably the fallout of the coalition with the PSOE since 1999. The IU saw its support grow considerably, from one seat to four seats.
The PP lacks four seats to form a governing majority, with the centre-right regionalist PAR as the key to any coalition. While the PAR has governed in coalition with the PSOE since 1999, the PAR governed or supported PP governments until 1999. Furthermore, relations between Socialists and PAR have deteriorated in recent years, rendering a new coalition of the two improbable. The most likely outcome seems to be a return to PAR’s right-wing roots through a coalition with the PP.
FAC 29.75% (+29.75%) winning 16 seats (+16)
PSOE 29.77% (-12.27%) winning 15 seats (-6)
PP 19.92% (-21.57%) winning 10 seats (-10)
IU 10.3% (+0.62%) winning 4 seats (nc)
UPyD 2.46% (+2.46%) winning 0 seats (nc)
Last night’s winner in Asturias was Francisco Álvarez-Cascos, the former Vice-President of the Aznar government, at the helm of a new right-wing party – the FAC – created after the local PP and Mariano Rajoy denied him the leadership of the PP’s list in his home province. Even despite the division of the right, the FAC came out with one more seat than the PSOE, in power since 1999 in this old mining region. More significantly, nearly 10% separated his party from his former party – the PP. IU held its ground, but gained no seats.
Nobody has the 23 seats necessary to govern, but Francisco Álvarez-Cascos must be counted to have the advantage. Unless relations between him and his old gang are so bad that they make any cooperation impossible – unlikely – then he has the upper hand given the overall dominance of right-wing parties.
PP 46.37% (-0.08%) winning 35 seats (+6)
PSOE + PSOE-Pacte + PSOE-GxF 24.86% (-7.65%) winning 19 seats (-1)
PSM-IV-Entesa 8.61% (-0.37%) winning 4 seats (-2)
PSMen-EN 0.89% (+0.1%) winning 1 seat (nc)
Lliga Regionalista de les Illes Balears 2.93% (+2.93%) winning 0 seats (nc)
CxI 2.84% (-3.89%) winning 0 seats (-3)
For sanity’s sake, I’ve taken the ease of grouping stuff together here. The PSOE result is the sum of three PSOE-led lists, including one in Eivissa (which includes smaller leftie parties) and another in Formentera. The sum of PSM-IV-Entesa is compared to the 6 seat caucus formed by the PSM, EU, ERC and Greenies in 2007 even though the ERC and EU ran alone this time (1.27% and 2.29% respectively). CxI, Convergència per les Illes, is the old Unió Mallorquina under new clothes.
The Balearic Islands are a right-wing stronghold, with the PP/AP winning the most votes since 1983. But relations between the PSOE and various left-wing Catalan parties and, until now, the centre-right UM have been strong enough to allow for left-wing coalition governments when the PP does not hold a majority. This happened in 1999 and again in 2007, with the PSOE’s Francesc Antich taking the reins of power both times. The issue at stake here was whether the PP could get a majority, which it did. With 34 seats, the PP easily won its majority and the PP’s José Ramón Bauzà will become the next President.
The PSOE fell back in all islands besides Formentera. The small left-wing regionalists held their ground well, compensating for the loss of ERC and EU since last time. However, the centre-right UM regrouped in the CxI was swept out. The small UM had been a kingmaker in the past, allying in the 1990s with the PP and since 1999 with the left. Its alliances with the left probably sealed its fate in a year like this.
PP 31.84% (+7.8%) winning 21 seats (+6)
CC 24.89% (+0.75%) winning 21 seats (+2)
PSOE 20.98% (-13.53%) winning 15 seats (-11)
NCa 9.08% (+3.66%) winning 3 seats (+3)
A little nightmare for the right emerges in the Canaries. The CC, a centre-right regionalist grouping, has governed in coalition with or with support from the PP since 1993. Even in 2007, after major Socialist gains, the CC-PP deal continued although the PP left the coalition after the CC supported the Zapatero budgets, making for a one-party CC government. Now, after the PP won its best result ever and the PSOE its worst result ever, both traditional allies – CC and PP – are left tied in terms of seats. The gap between both parties in terms of votes is 6.9%, but the workings of the insular electoral system allowed the CC – with its strongholds in various islands – to hold its ground in terms of seats and limit PP gains. But the tie in terms of seats makes for a tough situation. Paulino Rivero of the CC, in power since 2007, will try to hold on to power. The very moderate-regionalist CC is always key to governments, and while it leans with the PP since 1993, it works well with other parties when it comes to bringing pork to the islands. If bets were to be taken, the bookmakers would place their bets on the CC continuing in power – at least until 2012 – working with the PSOE or NCa.
The success of Nueva Canarias, a centre-left regionalist party strong in Gran Canaria led by ex-CC member Román Rodríguez, is the other notable result of the 2011 elections in the Canaries.
PP 46.12% (+4.66%) winning 20 seats (+3)
PRC 29.15% (+0.62%) winning 12 seats (nc)
PSOE 16.31% (-8.22%) winning 7 seats (-3)
IU 3.31% (+1.43%) winning 0 seats (nc)
UPyD 1.72% (+1.72%) winning 0 seats (nc)
The charismatic and popular Miguel Ángel Revilla of the regionalist PRC has been at the helm of traditionally conservative Cantabria since 2003, in coalition with the PSOE which fell behind Revilla’s PRC in the 2007 elections. The key to power in Cantabria is not winning the most seats – it is winning the 20 seats needed to form a majority government. No party has done that since 1983, but the PP did it last night winning 46% and 20 seats. These gains came entirely at the PSOE’s expense, which fell further, winning its worst result ever. The PRC itself actually did well, holding its ground, sign of Revilla’s personal popularity. The PP’s Ignacio Diego will govern Cantabria.
PP 48.13% (+5.75%) winning 25 seats (+4)
PSOE 43.38% (-8.57%) winning 24 seats (-2)
IU 3.77% (+0.35%) winning 0 seats (nc)
UPyD 1.75% (+1.75%) winning 0 seats (nc)
Castilla-La Mancha was the symbolic contest of this election and it was the race which stood out of all other 12 contests in the autonomous communities. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, Castilla-La Mancha has been held steadily by the PSOE ever since 1983 and until 2004 it was the stronghold of José Bono, one of the ‘regional barons’ of the PSOE. Bono had managed to hold on even in the 1995 landslide, largely because of his skillful play back then on water resources (at issue was sending regional water into Murcia). A feat made even more impressive when considering that Castilla-La Mancha has voted for the right consistently in general elections since 1996. The region itself has, like Andalusia, a big number of large land tracts which traditionally makes a region left-leaning. But landless peasants aren’t a problem in Castilla-La Mancha’s cereal fields, which employ only a few seasonal employees. This might explain why Castilla-La Mancha is traditionally conservative.
This year, the contest featured José Maria Barreda, the PSOE incumbent and María Dolores de Cospedal, the secretary-general of the PP. Barreda is popular here, but Zapatero isn’t. Who was to win? Cospedal, perhaps unsurprisingly given the region’s conservatism and the blue wave nationally, won. The PP won its best result since 1983, the PSOE its worst result. The election, played out by one seat, was won by the PP in Guadalajara, the most conservative and sociologically different province, where the PP emerged strong enough to break out of deadlock in other provinces.
Castilla y León
PP 51.59% (+2.42%) winning 53 seats (+5)
PSOE 29.61% (-8.12%) winning 29 seats (-5)
IU 4.89% (+1.81%) winning 1 seat (+1)
UPL 1.85% (-0.87%) winning 1 seat (-1)
UPyD 3.29% (+3.29%) winning 0 seats (nc)
Castilla y León is the old conservative heart of Spain, and has been ruled since 1987 by the AP/PP. Juan Vicente Herrera, the PP President of the region since 2001, was easily reelected with an increased majority with results eerily similar to those of 1995. The IU also made its return to the Castillian legislature, from which it had been shut out of in 2003 and again in 2007. The Leonese regionalists fell back by 4.5% in León, where they won 8.9% and were left with only one seat in that province. León, the PSOE base in the region and Zapatero’s home region, narrowly won by the PSOE in 2007, saw the Socialists fall back by eight percentage points and a full 13 points behind the victorious PP.
PP-EU 46.21% (+7.5%) winning 32 seats (+5)
PSOE-Regionalists 43.49% (-9.5%) winning 30 seats (-8)
IU-V-SIEX 5.57% (+1.06%) winning 3 seats (+3)
UPyD 1.06% (+1.06%) winning 0 seats (nc)
Extremadura’s large landholdings, big landowners and rural proletariat has made it a stronghold of the PSOE, which has been in power ever since 1993 and won less than an absolute majority only once – in 1995 – and even then it remained as the largest party. Extremadura was also the holdout of Juan Carlos Rodríguez Ibarra, another PSOE regional baron who presided the region until 2007 when he was succeeded by the incumbent, Guillermo Fernández Vara. Winning by far its best result ever, the PP broke through to emerge as the largest party in this Socialist stronghold while the Socialists receded to their worst result ever. But with 32 seats, the PP falls one short of an absolute majority. The IU, shut out since 2007, returned to the regional legislature with three deputies holding the keys the power. If everything plays out as it should, the IU’s deputies should support Fernández Vara and allow the PSOE to hold on – by a string – to its old stronghold. It would be the only region out of the 13 voting this year with a Socialist president, and would be – with Andalusia and Euskadi – one of the three remaining Socialist autonomous communities.
PP 51.87% (+3.06%) winning 20 seats (+3)
PSOE 30.30% (-10.11%) winning 11 seats (-3)
PR 5.44% (-0.56%) winning 2 seats (nc)
IU 3.69% (+0.63%) winning 0 seats (nc)
UPyD 3.57% (+3.57%) winning 0 seats (nc)
La Rioja makes wine, but doesn’t make suspenseful elections. The PP’s Pedro Sanz has been in power since 1995, the year which the PP became the largest party. Sanz grew his majority by three seats and won the PP’s best result ever. The PSOE receded by over 10 points and won its worst result ever, being left with a mere 11 seats. The regionalist Partido Riojano, which has held two seats ever since 1983, held both of them but the PR won its poorest result to date.
PP 51.74% (-1.55%) winning 72 seats (+5)
PSOE 26.23% (-7.34%) winning 36 seats (-6)
IU-LV 9.61% (+0.75%) winning 13 seats (+2)
UPyD 6.30% (+6.3%) winning 8 seats (+8)
Esperanza Aguirre, a bigwig within the PP, was easily reelected in conservative Madrid but her share of the vote fell back by 1.6% after having won the best PP result in Madrid in 2007. The PP’s slight decline did not benefit the PSOE, which fell below the 30% and won its worst result ever in Madrid. The 2007 election had already marked a very bad Socialist showing, but this year’s rout made 2007 look like an historic success. IU held its vote, but the election was marked by the entry of UPyD, the centre-left liberal anti-regionalist party of former PSOE member Rosa Diez which won one seat in the Cortes from Madrid in the 2008 general election.
PP 58.82% (+0.30%) winning 33 seats (+4)
PSOE 23.86% (-8.14%) winning 11 seats (-4)
IU-RM 7.83% (+1.58%) winning 1 seat (nc)
UPyD 4.50% (+4.5%) winning 0 seats (nc)
Murcia is the most conservative region of Spain, a region where the PP’s support has only increased in recent years since gaining control of the region in 1995. The small and unremarkable region of Murcia has a lot of seafront properties and attracts much foreign residents from other European countries, which probably explains Murcia’s conservatism. The PP’s president in power since then, Ramón Luis Valcárcel, has seen support for his party and his majority in the Regional Assembly grow unchecked since 1995. This continued this year, as the PP won its best showing ever as the PSOE collapsed to an all-time low.
UPN 35.4% (-7.47%) winning 19 seats (-3)
PSN-PSOE 16.24% (-6.47%) winning 9 seats (-3)
NaBai 15.83% (-8.28%) winning 8 seats (-4)
Bildu 13.63% (+13.63%) winning 7 seats (+7)
PP 7.46% (+7.46%) winning 4 seats (+4)
Izq-Ezk 5.86% (+1.43%) winning 3 seats (+1)
CDN 1.48% (-2.95%) winning 0 seats (-2)
In a way, it seems as if the traditions of foralism and Carlism reared its head again this year in Navarra. Navarra is a conservative region, but it is not a Spanish conservatism in the Castillian sense which pervades here. It is rather a localist conservatism with regionalist backdrops, rooted in Navarra’s Carlist tradition and its attachment to the old fueros (Navarra still has considerable and unusual financial autonomy) which dominates. This regionalism, which has no inclination of any kind towards Basque nationalism, is expressed by the UPN. The UPN was the local branch of sorts of the PP until 2009, when the PP established itself independently from the UPN after the UPN supported the Zapatero budget. Proof of Navarra’s distinctive conservatism, the UPN dominated the elections emerging as the strongest force in the Foral Parliament. Interestingly, it lost 7.47% compared to the UPN-PP in 2007. The PP won 7.46% running alone…
Basque speakers make up between 10 and 20% of the Navarrese population and form an old minority pushing for integration in the Basque country. The Basque parties grouped themselves into one big outfit, Nafarroa Bai, in 2007. NaBai included the centre-right PNV, the centre-left EA and the left-wing Aralar and Batzarre. NaBai won 23.62%, a major success, in 2007. NaBai fell apart a bit this year as EA grouped with Alternatiba to form Bildu, a party with alleged links to Batasuna – ETA’s old political wing. Though NaBai lost considerably this year, all of its loses and more were to the benefit of Bildu, which emerged with 13.6% – a major success. The two parties weigh 15 seats and nearly 30% – probably a record high for Basque nationalism in Navarra. In addition to that, IU, refounded as a coalition of IU and Batzarre, won three seats and nearly 6% of the vote.
The CDN, the UPN splitoff of Juan Cruz Alli, finally kicked the bucket as it lost all of its remaining seats. Interestingly, the success of Basque nationalists renders a wobbly Socialist-Basque nationalist-IU coalition possible. All four groups have 27 seats to themselves, with the PSN as the largest party. But such a deal also had a potential majority in 2007, but it fell apart. It is even harder to replicate this year, as it would involve the PSN working not only with the moderates in NaBai but the more radical Abertzale nationalists in Bildu which is very hard to envision given how Bildu has been pilloried by all Spanish parties (and given the historic tensions between PNV and Abertzale). The more likely outcome is an unstable UPN minority supported or tolerated by PP.
PP 50.70% (-1.82%) winning 55 seats (+1)
PSPV 28.73% (-5.76%) winning 33 seats (-5)
Coalició Compromís 7.34% (+7.34%) winning 6 seats (+4)
EUPV 6.05% (-1.97%) winning 5 seat (nc)
UPyD 2.55% (+2.55%) winning 0 seats (nc)
Francisco Camps of the PP, in power since 2003 in conservative Valencia – governed by the PP since 1995 – increased his majority by one seat but the PP’s vote share actually fell back by 1.8%. There is apparently much corruption in the Valencian Community, which serves to explain why the PP went backwards when going forward almost everywhere else. Interestingly though, turnout increased in Valencia since 2007. The Socialists did not benefit any, as they fell below 30% to win their worst result ever. Coalició Compromís, a regionalist coalition which includes the regionalist Bloc Nacionalista (BNV) which was allied with EUPV in 2007, benefited the most as they performed surprisingly well with 7.3% and 6 seats. EUPV also did well, considering the loss of the BNV and other Valencian regionalist outfits compared to 2007.
Ceuta and Melilla
PP 65.20% (+0.02%) winning 19 seats (-1)
Coalición Caballas (UDCE-IU-PSPC) 14.34% (-6.58%) winning 4 seats (nc)
PSOE 11.65% (+3%) winning 3 seats (+1)
UPyD 2.65% (+2.65%) winning 0 seats (nc)
PP 53.93% (-2.07%) winning 15 seats (nc)
Coalición por Melilla 23.70% (+1.96%) winning 6 seats (+1)
PSOE 8.53% (-9.61%) winning 2 seats (-3)
PPL 6.82% (+6.82%) winning 2 seats (+2)
Ceuta and Melilla are conservative strongholds, and remained true to their roots. In Ceuta, the Caballas Coalition composed of the UDCE – the local branch of the IU – maintained itself in second place but did not win the sum of the 2007 votes of the UDCE and PSPC. The PSOE narrowly improved its showing. In Melilla, the CPM – a local ally of IU – kept a distant second as the PSOE lost over 9% of its 2007 vote. A new centrist liberal party, the “Partido Populares en Libertad” won 2 seats. IU’s surprising strength in both these North African enclaves seems due to the support of the Muslim minority in both these Spanish enclaves.
I had previewed the races in Spain’s ten largest cities in my preview post. El Mundo has also updated its fantastic map of all the municipalities, though they have a colouring problem with the PSdeG-PSOE in Galicia which makes it seem as if the Socialists won nothing there which isn’t the case. I’ll run through, with less detail than above, the main results. The reason I do this is because I don’t have all my life and all the results are easily accessible here.
In Madrid, Alberto Ruiz-Gallardón (PP) won his sixth successive majority but saw his majority reduced from 34 seats to 31 seats and his vote share fell from 55.7% to 49.7%. This didn’t advantage the PSOE, whose 23.93% in the city is an all time low which reduced it to 15 seats. IU’s vote increased from 8.7% to 10.8%, but the major success story was UPyD which won 7.85% and 5 seats.
Barcelona has formed, since 1979, a sort of redoubt for the PSC in Catalonia which could count on the power of the municipality of Barcelona to counterbalance the CiU control of the Generalitat (until 2003, when the PSC won the Generalitat). It has always been the largest party in Barcelona and has ruled since 1979. So Jordi Hereu’s defeat last night was one of the major stories of the night. The CiU, led by Xavier Trias, won 15 seats and 28.7% (25.5% in 2007) against 22.14% and 11 seats for mayor Jordi Hereu’s PSC. The PP increased its support in the Catalan capital from 7 seats to 8 seats, and will probably form the support block for Xavier Trias. ICV, with 10.4% and 5 seats, also increased its support. ERC was the other major scalp in the capital, whose alliance with other nationalists failed to convince and halved the ERC caucus from 4 to 2 and from 8.8% to 5.6%.
In Catalonia, after a disastrous result (18%) in the regional elections of November 2010, the PSC did well (but not that well) taking 25% to the CiU’s 27.1% (which might/will begin to take the brunt of the tough austerity needed in Catalonia as well). It still lost first place to CiU and receded by 7%. The ERC (9%) and ICV (8%) suffered loses but did better than in November, as did the PP (12.7%). CiU also gained Girona, a longtime Socialist-controlled city, taking 10 seats to the PSC’s 7 and enough to govern with the PP (3). The PSC held an overall majority in Lleida and a plurality in Tarragona though CiU-PP has enough seats to govern there. It lost nearly 14% in its working-class Barcelona suburban stronghold of L’Hospitalet de Llobregat (also Spain’s 16th largest city) where the anti-immigration PxC won 7%, but should hold power.
The PP won another huge majority in Valencia with 20 out of 33 seats. But Rita Barbera’s support as mayor fell slightly from 56.7% to 52.5% and 21 seats to 20 seats. The PSPV’s 21.76% is the worst Socialist showing ever, and reduces the party to a 8-seat rump. CC-BNV and EUPV, with 3 and 2 seats respectively, made their entry (or re-entry) into the local council.
Sevilla and Andalusia are the other major story of the night. Sevilla, the largest city in Andalusia, ruled by the PSOE since 1999, fell to the PP which won its best result by far. The PP won an overall majority, taking 20 seats – a net gain of 5 since 2007 (its vote increased from 41.8% to 49.3%) while the PSOE receded from 15 seats to 11 seats (and from 40.5% to 29.5%). Apparently holding up the PSOE since 2007 didn’t do IU any favours, as it too suffered with a loss of one seat (from 3 to 2) and a loss of 1.2% in vote share.
In the rest of Andalusia, the PP controlled 5 out of 8 provincial capitals in 2007 and was aiming to take the last three: Sevilla, Jaén and Córdoba (held by IU). It was not all that hard, given that the PP was the largest party in all 8 capitals four years ago. In the five it controlled, it held its ground in Granada, it won a majority in Almería, increased its majority in Málaga, though it lost support in Huelva and Cádiz. In Jaén, it gained 3 seats to win an overall majority while the PSOE and IU fell. In Córdoba, not only did it gain two seats to get a majority the governing IU fell into third with 15% – a loss of over 20% of the vote and a loss of 7 seats. A new party, Union Cordobesa, took second with 15.23% and 5 seats.
In the autonomous community of Andalusia, a stronghold of the PSOE which has been the largest party in all elections except the 1979 locals (where the UCD was the largest by a hair), the PP won 39.36% against 32.22% for the PSOE (lowest since 1979). I don’t know what to attribute this rout in the Andalusian stronghold to. It could be a mix of national situations and unusual regional circumstances (the PSOE is corrupt here). I would gather unemployment is at record highs in poor Andalusia, which was also at the heart of the construction/housing boom with all those condos on the beach.
In Zaragoza, the PP increased its support considerably from 34% to 41% and from 12 to 15 seats. But while the PSOE fell back by 11%, and lost 3 seats, it still has enough seats to hold on with the support of CHA (which held all 3 seats) and IU (which gained 2 seats to win 3 overall). The PP has no likely allies as PAR got routed, losing both seats in the Aragonese capital. In Huesca, the PP gained four seats and could govern with the support of PAR which until now supported the PSOE. In Teruel, a city led by a PAR-PSOE administration, the PP picked up 4 seats to win an overall majority and 12 seats while PAR lost nearly 10% of its vote and 3 seats (leaving it with 1).
The PP held its huge majority and its 19 seats in Murcia while UPyD entered the assembly. The PSOE lost three seats, and IU gained one. Boring.
In Palma de Mallorca, the PP gained 2% and 3 seats (for a total of 17). But it allows the PP to gain control of a city ruled by a PSOE-PSM-UM coalition since 2007. The PSOE lost 2 seats, the PSM held both while UM/CxI got swept out both (and finished sixth with 1.5%).
In Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, the PP gained 4 seats and 7% to gain control of the largest city in the Canaries, controlled since 2007 by a PSOE-led coalition. The Socialists lost a full 19% of the vote, losing 6 seats. Its ally – a local party (CPGC) defended both seats while Nueva Canaria won 6% and 2 seats (it had fallen 0.5% short of one in 2007). In Tenerife, the CC’s Miguel Zerolo Aguilar finds himself tied 9 seats apiece with the PP (which gained 3). He could hold on with 5 Socialists (who lost two of their colleagues) or 3 members from two local parties.
The PNV won its first overall majority since 1979 in Bilbao, the Bizkaian capital controlled by the Basque Nationalist Party since 1979 and mayor Iñaki Azkuna since 1999. Its 44.12% and 15 seats make for the largest success of the PNV in Bilbao. The PP placed second, with 6 seats – a loss of one. Bildu won 14.21% and 4 seats, while the PSE-EE lost 8.6% and won 13.47%. This is a record low even in the unimpressive results sheet of the Socialists in local elections in Bilbao. But while Bilbao has a strong PNV local machine, the PSE-EE is strong at other levels: it won 36.78% in the 2008 general election. A fourth place showing is disastrous by any measure for the Socialists here.
The story in Euskadi is the success of Bildu, the new Abertzale (the ‘patriotic left’, or leftie Basque nationalists) party composed of EA, Alternatiba and some will say Batasuna, reformed ETA militants and other unsavoury types. Bildu, however, has pretty publicly renounced both violence and ETA and there is little danger that Bildu is anything close to a new political front for ETA. A belief shared even by Socialists such as Lehendakari Patxi Lopez. Bildu won 25.45% of the vote, one of the strongest showings for any abertzale party in Euskadi. The PNV won 30.05%, 1% less than in 2007. The Socialists lost 8.1% and won a distant third with 16.34% while the PP lost 2% and won 13.53% (the lowest for the PP since 1991 in any election). Bildu won 953 councillors against 872 for the PNV. It won 96 municipalities in Euskadi, including 74 with a majority. PNV won 97, 59 with a majority. These results, giving over 58% to Basque nationalists, is certainly a success given how the Basque nationalist option seemingly fell back in 2008 (the PNV came second to the Socialists in Euskadi) and 2009 (the PNV lost control of the Basque government in favour of a PSE-PP pact).
Bildu’s eruption is a sign of the continued strength of the abertzale left and how strong it can be when it is allowed to participate. It is also, perhaps, in part a reaction to the way the Spanish state has pilloried the abertzale outfits in recent years (banning most of them) and a strong vote against the Lopez regional government which is apparently unpopular. My guess, uneducated, is that the pact between the Socialists and PP which gave the Socialists the control of the Basque government in 2009 has revitalized Basque nationalism – apparently the most radical version. It has also hurt the Socialists, perhaps dangerously so, considering that the Basque Socialists can draw votes – especially in general elections – from lite-nationalists and anti-PP strategic voters. After all, the ‘EE’ part of the PSE-EE refers to an old party, merged with the PSE in 1993, which was founded as the political party of ETA-PM (the politico-military/moderate wing of ETA at the transition). The PNV itself has not been all that convincing in opposition to the Basque regional government and might appear outdated or tame to some Basque nationalists awaken from dormancy by the PSE-PP pact (which is a campaign point for both Bildu and PNV).
Bildu won 56 municipalities in Gipuzkoa, including 43 with an overall majority, representing nearly half of all municipalities. It won 34.6% of the vote and took 22 seats in the Juntas Generales of the province. Gipuzkoa is the most nationalist and left-leaning of the three provinces, with its mountainous Basque-speaking working-class villages providing a strong militant base for ETA and for abertzale forces. In the Juntas Generales of the province, the PNV won 14 seats (-2), the PSE 10 (-6), the PP 4 (-2), Aralar 1 (-1) and EB-B lost all four of its seats. In Donostia/San Sebastián, Bildu has probably ending the 20-year rule of the PSE’s Odón Elorza, taking 24.3% and 8 seats in the Gipuzkoan capital against 22.6% (7 seats) for Elorza’s Socialists who lost nearly 15%. The PP held all 6 seats and the PNV gained one to win 6. Bildu will need to ally itself with somebody, which is tricky. Elorza, however, has indicated that only the largest party should govern. He could, if he wants to lie, govern with the PP. But Bildu could govern easily with the support of the PNV. The PNV would look bad if it were to deny fellow nationalists such a prize.
The PNV failed to win an overall majority in the Juntas Generales of Bizkaia, losing one of its 23 seats (it now holds 22) and winning 37.2% of the vote. Bildu took 21% and won 12 seats, PSE took 9 (-5) and the PP 8 (nc). EB-B and Aralar were thrown out, losing their three seats. In Araba’s Juntas Generales, the PP is the largest party with 16 seats (+1) with the PNV winning 13 (-1) and Bildu 11. The Socialists won 9 (-5) and EB-B 2 (+1).
In Galicia, the PP has not gained enough to throw out all the biparty PSdeG-BNG coalitions governing in all six major cities. In A Coruña the PP did win enough seats to wrestle control of this old PSdeG stronghold. In Lugo, despite loses, the Socialist-BNG bloc can continue in power. In Pontevedra, the incumbent BNG-led administration picked up four seats including one from the PP and allows it to rule with the Socialists. The Socialists made some major gains in Ourense (over 10% and 3 seats) at the PP and BNG’s expense and asserts its power. The Socialists also gained at the BNG and PP’s expense in Vigo where it can continue governing. In Santiago de Compostela, it was a tight affair (only a handful of votes) but the PP won an overall majority gaining 2 seats at the expense of the BNG and PSdeG and finally takes control of a city held by the Socialists since 1987. But somewhere Franco is smiling as the Socialists lost control of El Ferrol as the PP made major gains (+18%).
Other PP gains include León, Palencia, Vitoria-Gasteiz (though it lacks a majority, with PNV, Bildu and PSE tied with 6 seats apiece to the PP’s 9), Albacete, Mérida, Cáceres, Logroño and perhaps Segovia (the PSOE needs IU to govern, being tied 12-12 with PP). The PSOE won an increased majority in Soria and increased its presence in Toledo (where it governs with IU). I don’t want my Socialist readers to commit suicide after reading this whole lot of bad news, so I’ll say that the PSOE gained Cuenca from the PP. Somebody would do well to explain how the PP managed to lose that.
If you’re a right-winger or Basque nationalist, you’re probably dancing around in joy; and if you’re a Socialist you’re looking for the next time the train passes to commit suicide. Some final conclusions of these elections…
The overall and universal conclusion is that the PP won these elections and the PSOE lost them. Nobody can contest that. The economy is down the hole, the government is taking the blame for it and the necessary austerity which accompanies recessions. Spanish youths are disillusioned, have little job opportunities and are looking to immigrate abroad. Many Spaniards are struggling to make ends meet as they lost their jobs. Such things spell disaster for most governments. It did spell disaster for the Socialists on 22-M.
But lest we forget that Mariano Rajoy’s popularity ratings are only slightly less ghastly than Zapatero’s ratings. There is silenced rumblings against him in the PP which he managed to silence in 2008 and won the rights to quell it all with this victory. But though Rajoy-Zapatero would be a Rajoy victory, Zapatero is retiring. The PSOE will be led by a new figure in 2012, just as the PP was led by a new figure (Rajoy) in 2004 when Aznar retired (though he apparently didn’t if you went by the overpaid stupid foreign journalists). That new figure will either be Interior Minister and government #2 Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba or Defense Minister Carme Chacón. The PSOE’s establishment favours Rubacalba and are pushing for a victory by acclamation for him, which, to me, would be a bad idea. But polls have shown that Rubacalba and Chacón are popular – more than Rajoy at least – and could at least narrow the PSOE-PP gap to the PSOE’s advantage. They will, however, need to break away from Zapatero and convince voters that though they hate Zapatero and probably the PSOE, that the Socialists should be given a third term over the PP. It requires running away from your record, basically. It is a very hard thing to do, even if your opponent is unpopular personally, but everything is possible in politics – which also move very fast, of course.
There is also much more strategic voting in general elections, where regionalists and IU do poorer than in local elections. The electoral system practically calls for it, but there is also deep polarization of Spanish politics – the left overs of the Civil War – between left and right. There a whole lot of voters who would vote for the right in a lot of other places who would rather drink battery acid than vote PP (who is seen by the left and opponents as a fascist Francoist party). And vice-versa (the right and opponents see the PSOE as red atheists). Conceivably, a number of IU and regionalist voters (especially those who voted for the smaller, non-nationalist ones like the PRC, CHA etc; but even some lite Basque and Catalan nationalists) would/will comeback to the PSOE. The PP will also get votes from those who favour local parties in rural areas, it might mend brides with the UPN and I doubt the FAC will run in the general elections (or if it did, it would do poorly).
2012 still favours the right in any case, but I would bet on something much closer than what happened on 22-M. After all, the 1995 PP landslide was followed by a close race (though a PP victory) in 1996. Felipe González had tapped into the Civil War side of politics in Spain to achieve that save-face result in 1996 for the PSOE. In 2012, the PSOE could either tap into that or Rajoy’s personality to achieve if not a victory then a save-face result.
If you want more results, there is the Interior Ministry (which has a downloadable results program for your computer) in addition to RTVE and El Mundo.
I will have forgotten something or made a stupid mistake(s) somewhere. But if you’ve read all these ramblings, you deserve a big cookie.
Liveblogging Spain 2011
WordPress does not allow for liveblogging feeds such as this one, but feel free to join in the conversation below.
Some tips for those following the results:
- Most media outlets will not be releasing exit polls. Regional exit polls will only be available for Aragón, Madrid and Valencia and municipal exit polls will only be available for the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia.
- The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for municipal, provincial and insular council elections. Those results should start flowing in at 20:30 and be nearing completion two hours later. Check out the results here.
- Individual autonomous communities are responsible for elections in their autonomous communities. Check out their individual websites here.
- Municipal elections are counted first
- Low-turnout or low-population areas will come in first, high-turnout and densely populated urban centres come in late.
- The Canary Islands close an hour later than the rest of Spain
Election Preview: Spain 2011 (22-M)
Spain holds local and regional elections on May 22. The municipal councils of all 8112 municipalities in Spain, the Parliaments of 13 of Spain’s 17 autonomous communities and the Parliaments of both autonomous cities (Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa) are up for election. There are also direct elections to the Juntas provinciales of the three Basque provinces and the insular councils of each island in the Canaries and Balearics.
In elections to autonomous parliaments, proportional representation is used universally but threshold and constituencies depend from community to community. In all multi-provincial communities, provinces serve as constituencies and have a specific number of seats based on their populations. Asturias and Murcia, communities composed of only one province, are further subdivided into multi-member constituencies. In the insular communities, each island serves as a constituency. The threshold is either 3% or 5%. In Aragón, Asturias, the Balearic Islands, Castilla-La Mancha, Castilla y León and Navarra the threshold is 3% in each individual constituency (there is only one constituency in Navarra). In the Valencian Community, which uses provincial constituencies, parties must win 5% throughout the community to qualify for seats. In Cantabria, Extremadura, Madrid, Murcia, La Rioja, Ceuta and Melilla the threshold is 5% by constituency (Extremadura and Murcia have more than one, all others form a sole constituency to themselves). In the Canaries finally, a party must win 6% throughout the islands or 30% or first place in one island.
Held a year out from the general election since 1995, these local elections are widely seen as a pretty good indicator of the political mood but also a pretty good predictor of the results of the big election in the next year. Except for 2007, the party which won the local elections went on to win the general election.
These elections couldn’t come at a worst time for the governing Socialists (PSOE). Spain is struggling under nearly 20% unemployment, a huge budget deficit and until recently on the brink of bankruptcy a la Greece/Ireland/Portugal. The government has been compelled to adopt tough austerity measures which have succeeded in bringing Spain back from the brink but at the cost of severe budget trimming which have caused social disruptions. Budget trimming is especially difficult in a decentralized country such as Spain, where regional communities (always clamoring for more financial powers) account for 37% of public spending. Hounded for his initially sluggish response and then his austerity-minded budgets, the Socialist President of the Government, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, in office since 2004, has won some of the worst approval numbers of any Spanish head of government and finally announced in April 2011 that he would not stand for reelection in 2012. The governing PSOE has taken the brunt of the blame for the crisis and its effects, and trails the opposition conservative Popular Party (PP) by roughly 15 points. Hardly inspiring numbers for a government a year out from the elections.
But the PP is winning by default. Its leader, Mariano Rajoy, has never been inspiring to anybody and his leadership ratings aren’t anything to boast about. He faced some internal opposition within the PP after he lost his second election in a row in 2008, but managed to hold his position. At any rate, Zapatero’s announced retirement is probably bad news for the PP. The two most prominent successors to Zapatero, the 4o-year old Defense Minister Carme Chacón and the Interior Minister and Vice-President of the Government Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba are both more popular than Rajoy and polls show they could manage to cut into the PP’s lead rather significantly.
But as of now the cards are placed unambiguously in the opposition’s favour. The PP is eying a win as significant as the PP’s landslide victory in the 1995 local elections. But though that victory presaged Aznar’s election 1996, the PP’s victory in 1996 was much narrower than its 1995 landslide in regions and municipalities. Below, I preview the races in all autonomous communities and in the major cities.
Aragón: The PSOE has held Aragón since 1999 with Marcelino Iglesias, who is retiring this year. His government’s number two, María Eva Almunia Badía, will be aiming to succeed him. The PP will be led by former President of the Chamber of Deputies, also a woman, Luisa Fernanda Rudi Úbeda. Since 1999, the PSOE has governed in coalition with the centre-right regionalist Aragonese Party (PAR), which had previously governed the region between 1987 and 1993. Polls indicate that the PSOE is holding its ground quite well, maintaining a narrow lead or a statistical tie with the PP which has nonetheless gained ground. The PAR is slightly down, while the left-wing regionalist Chunta Aragonesista (CHA) is at its 2007 levels. The IU might increase its presence from one seat to 3-4 seats. In any case, unless the PAR has a change of allegiance to its former right-wing roots, the PSOE at this level is in good position to retain the presidency of the region with the CHA and PAR as potential allies and the IU as a backer. Somebody closer to the ground would be in better position to explain why the PSOE has held up comparatively well in Aragón.
2007: PSOE 30, PP 23, PAR 9, CHA 4, IU 1
Asturias: The old mining region of Asturias has been held, with one exception (1995-1999) by the PSOE since 1983. Asturias will probably be one of the more interesting communities to watch, if only because of the division on the right. Last year, Francisco Álvarez-Cascos, the Vice-President of the Aznar Government between 1996 and 2000, made clear his intention to return to elective politics after his retirement in 2004. But the Asturian PP is somehow not fond of him and shoved him aside in favour of Oviedo municipal councillor Isabel Pérez-Espinosa. Snubbed, Álvarez-Cascos sent a letter to Rajoy explaining that he was quitting the PP after “insults” from the Asturian PP. He proceeded to set up his own party, the Foro Asturias (FAC). The division of the right between the official PP and Álvarez-Cascos’ rebels grouped in the FAC has given the PSOE a Pyhrric first place in polls even though its vote is down significantly from the 43% it won in 2007. The PP and FAC are left fighting for second place, with the FAC’s position wildly oscillating between a strong second and a more distant third. The IU, which retains nearly 10% of the vote in Asturias, is at its 2007 levels. Even if the PSOE does win first place, it is hard to see it retaining power unless Álvarez-Cascos’ hissy fit is at the point which makes differences between his outfit and the PP irreconcilable.
2007: PSOE 21, PP 20, IU 4
Balearic Islands: The right has been the strongest party in the Balearic Islands since 1983, but the left led by the PSOE’s Francesc Antich governed between 1999 and 2003 and again since 2007 in coalition with various left-wing parties and the fledgling Unió Mallorquina (UM). If the right wants to govern, it needs an absolute majority. The PP fell just short of keeping its majority in 2007, winning 29 of the Parliament’s 59 seats. Polls indicate that the PP is now extremely likely to gain at least one more seat and take back government. Interestingly, such gains would not be made at the PSOE’s expense if recent polls are to be believed: the PSOE has managed to increase its standing from the 28% it won in 2007 to roughly 30% and 20-21 seats. Instead, the PSOE’s ally, the Catalan PSM-IV-Entesa and the UM refounded as the Convergence for the Island (CxI) will suffer loses. The former will have minor loses, the CxI-UM could be swept out of Parliament altogether. At any rate, the PP has its best chance at a sure gain here.
2007: PP 29, PSOE 20, UM 3, PSM-EN 2, EU 2, ERC 1, Els Verds 1, PSMen 1
Canaries: The PSOE gained 9 seats in 2007 and became the largest political party on the islands, but was left out of government which has been held by the centre-right regionalist Coalición Canaria (CC) whose governments always began as coalitions with the PP but seem to invariably end up as CC-only governments. Polls vary rather wildly, but the bottom lines seems to be a general three-way tie between the CC, PP and PSOE. The PSOE will probably fall back to where it was in 2003 (25% and 17 seats), while the PP could gain enough to become the largest party on the islands. CC is at its 2007 levels. The Canarian nationalists of Nueva Canarias, well implanted in Gran Canaria, had narrowly missed out on representation in 2007 but has seemingly now cleared that 6% threshold to gain representation. If the PP becomes the biggest party, it could form a coalition with the CC (or vice-versa).
2007: PSOE 26 seats, CC 19 seats, PP 15 seats
Cantabria: Cantabria has been governed since 2003 by Miguel Ángel Revilla of the Cantabrian Regionalist Party (PRC) whose regionalist party has been the senior party in a coalition with the PSOE. The PRC was actually smaller than the PSOE in 2003, but Revilla’s popularity allowed the PRC to become the second largest party behind the PP which has topped the poll in the region since 1995. Revilla and the PRC remain popular and it is unlikely to suffer major loses, polls giving it roughly what it has today (11-12). The PSOE, however, will likely take a drubbing and fall below the 10 seats it currently holds to 8 or so and allow the PP to potentially win the 20-seats it needs for a majority. Revilla’s government likely hinges – like in Galicia in 2009 – on whether the PP wins an absolute majority.
2007: PP 17, PRC 12, PSOE 10
Castilla-La Mancha: Castilla-La Mancha is an interesting region and its closely contested election this year has become the symbol of these elections. The PP has been the largest party in general and European elections since 1994, but the region has been governed without interruption by the PSOE since 1983. Until 2004, it was governed by José Bono, one of the powerful PSOE regional barons and today the President of the Chamber of Deputies. Bono had narrowly held on in the PP-landslide of 1995, but grew his majorities in 1999 and 2003 although the PSOE – now led by José María Barreda lost 3 seats in 2007. Today, Barreda is fighting to hold on against the secretary-general of the PP, María Dolores de Cospedal. Polling shows that the race is in a statistical tie and has barely budged in any direction since the campaign kicked off. The PP seems to have a one-seat edge in most polls. If you watch only one region on May 22, make it this one.
2007: PSOE 26 seats, PP 21 seats
Castilla y León: There is absolutely no contest in the heartland of Spanish conservatism, governed by the PP since 1987 and which has had a PP absolute majority since 1991. The PP’s Juan Vicente Herrera will consolidate his majority with some small gains, at the expense of the PSOE. The Leonese regionalist UPL will likely hold its two seats. Somebody will inevitably make the symbolic comment that the PSOE will do badly in León, Zapatero’s home province, which the PSOE had narrowly won in 2007.
2007: PP 48 seats, PSOE 33 seats, UPL 2 seats
Extremadura: Extremadura is a Socialist stronghold and has been governed by the PSOE since 1983, and, until 2007, by the powerful PSOE baron Juan Carlos Rodríguez Ibarra. It is thus very bad news for the PSOE to be in a tight race in its stronghold. The PSOE is either tied or narrowly trailing the PP, while IU – which lost all seats in 2007 – could return to parliament if it clears the 5% threshold. A very dire situation for the PSOE, but certainly a region to watch on May 22.
2007: PSOE-Regionalists 38 seats, PP-UEX 27 seats
La Rioja: Another snoozer in a conservative stronghold. The PP’s Pedro Sanz will sail to another majority in the region he has governed since 1995. Neither the PP nor the PSOE seems to be budging much from their 2007 levels, and it is unlikely that the PP will have major gains or the PSOE major loses. The regionalist Riojan Party (PR), which has held two seats since 1983, will either keep both or lose one. At any rate, it isn’t a contest to lose sleep over.
2007: PP 17 seats, PSOE 14 seats, PR 2 seats
Madrid:The interesting contest in Madrid was last year – the PSOE primary. The PP’s Esperanza Aguirre, at the helm of the region since 2003, won a record-breaking super-majority in 2007 taking 67 out of 120 seats. Aguirre, a top figure within the PP and a potential leader if Rajoy ever leaves, will likely re-edit – and build upon that impressive feat. The interesting contest, the PSOE primary last year, saw Zapatero’s favourite candidate – Foreign Minister Trinidad Jiménez defeated by a rebel, Tomás Gómez. The PSOE’s wranglings certainly didn’t help their case much. IU could make some gains, but eyes will be on UPyD which hopes to break the 5% threshold required to win seats. Madrid’s legislature will now have 129 seats (+9).
2007: PP 67 seats, PSOE 42 seats, IU 11 seats
Murcia: Murcia is a conservative stronghold, one of the most conservative autonomous communities in Spain. The PP’s Ramón Luis Valcárcel has governed the region since 1995 with increasingly solid majorities (29/45 in 2007). Polling shows that the PP could gain two seats at the PSOE’s expense – such a result would be the PP’s best result in a region which has trended heavily towards the right in recent years.
2007: PP 29 seats, PSOE 15 seats, IU 1 seat
Navarra: From its days as a Carlist stronghold, Navarra has kept a strong conservative regionalist streak which is expressed by the Navarrese People’s Union (UPN), which was allied to the PP until 2008. The UPN has governed the region since 1996 in coalition, until 2009, with the Convergence of Navarrese Democrats (CDN), a 1995 split in the UPN by the more nationalist and moderate wing of the party. There were high hopes for a left-wing government in 2007, which had the sufficient seats, but all finally fell through. Since 2007, the second largest block in the Foral Parliament is Nafarroa Bai (NaBai), a Basque nationalist electoral coalition now composed of Aralar and the PNV. Eusko Alkartasuna , the dwindling left-wing non-violent nationalist party has been taken over by alleged Batasuna (ETA’s political wing) militants who have driven EA into a new electoral coalition, Bildu, whose legality was recently upheld by the courts over the traditional fears that it was the latest front for Batasuna/ETA. Polls show a stronger right-wing vote, with the UPN losing less (from 22 to 18-19 or so) than the PP is gaining (7-10). The PSN-PSOE will suffer some rather important loses, and the CDN is fighting for survival. Pollsters disagree on Bildu’s strength, but the combined weight of NaBai and Bildu seems to be equal to or slightly superior to NaBai’s successful showing of 23.6% in 2007.
2007: UPN-PP 12 seats, NaBai 12 seats, PSN-PSOE 12 seats, CDN 2 seats, IU 2 seats
Valencian Community: Valencia is a conservative stronghold, governed by the PP since 1995 and with an absolute majority since 1999. All that is unlikely to change, as Francisco Camps remains far ahead. The PP could increase its comfortable majority at the PSOE’s expense. The United Left (EU), now separated from its nationalist allies, will likely hold most if not all of its seats. The nationalists grouped in the Coalició Compromís oscillate a bit below the 5% threshold.
2007: PP 55 seats, PSPV-PSOE 37 seats, EU 7 seats
Ceuta and Melilla: The Spanish North African enclaves are both PP strongholds and any change is extremely unlikely. In Ceuta, the PP won 65.2% in 2007 and could win up to 70% this year. The real race is for second, which was taken in 2007 by the UDCE, a local party allied to IU. The PSOE could improve on its 2007 standing a bit at the expense of the UDCE, now united with a smaller left-wing local party in a new coalition. In Melilla, the PP won 56% in 2007 and could improve either a bit or a lot on that showing. The Coalition for Melilla (CPM), allied to IU, had taken second with 22% in 2007 but seemingly could now lose that second place to the PSOE. UPyD, apparently, could also be looking at seats.
2007: Ceuta – PP 19 seats, UDCE-IU 4 seats, PSOE 2 seats; Melilla – PP 15 seats, CPM-IU 5 seats, PSOE 5 seats
The run-through (which is certainly very incomplete and extremely brief) shows the dire straits the left is in. The PSOE could realistically lose all regions and be left with Andalusia and Euskadi. It could, perhaps more realistically, be reduced to just one or two regions such as Aragón, Extremadura or Castilla-La Mancha.
El Mundo has a fabulous map of the 2007 municipal elections which also includes some interesting demographic information. Particularly interesting is the municipal survival of IU in a good number of towns, the regionalist presence of the Andalusian PA in rural Andalusia, and Navarra’s dominance by local parties.
Much more could be written, but for time’s sake I’ll go through the laundry list of major cities:
Madrid: the mayor of Madrid since 2003 is Alberto Ruiz-Gallardón, a prominent moderate within the PP. The PP will hold its solid majorities, with little movement elsewhere aside from UPyD’s potential entrance into the municipal assembly.
Barcelona: The traditional core of the Catalan Socialists (PSC), Barcelona has been ruled by the PSC since 1979 and though CiU has come close at times – most recently in 2007 – the PSC has always been the largest party. Polls have shown that this may change, as the CiU is narrowly but consistently ahead of the PSC’s incumbent Jordi Hereu in polls. All other parties represented would remain roughly at those levels. Jordi Hereu could still hold on, of course, with the support of ICV and the ERC.
Valencia: Boring stuff again in a city ruled since 1991 by the PP’s Rita Barberà who will likely hold all her seats and perhaps gain some more while the PSPV-PSOE remains predictably weak.
Sevilla: Something is weird in the state of Andalusia. The eternal stronghold of the Spanish left is apparently seeing a major shift towards the right, with the PP on the road to governing all 8 provincial capitals (it currently holds 5). Sevilla is the major target, with the PP on track to win an absolute majority (17 seats). Both PP and PSOE had won 15 seats in 2007, the PSOE governing thanks to the support of two IU councillors.
Zaragoza: Held by the right between 1995 and 2003, the Aragonese capital is held by the PSOE since 2003. The PP could gain an extra councillor or two, but not enough for a majority. This could save the PSOE, which, though on track to some significant loses (from 13 seats to 10-11), could yet hold on thanks to the CHA, IU or PAR.
Málaga: The famous vacation resort is held by the PP since 1995 and that is unlikely to change. Mayor Francisco de la Torre will hold and perhaps increase his majority.
Murcia: I’m sorry, but this is getting very boring. The PP will hold this stronghold, governed by the right since 1995, with another predictably huge majority.
Palma de Mallorca: Similarly to what happened in the region as a whole, the PP won the most seats in Palma in 2007 – as it has done since 199 – but the PSOE’s Aina Calvo formed a governing coalition with the UM (2) and the Bloc per Mallorca [PSM-EN and EU] (2). The PP is quasi-certain to win an absolute majority and win back control. The PSOE will suffer loses, as will the PSM-EN, but seemingly UM will be shut out.
Las Palmas de Gran Canaria: On the back of that impressive Canarian PSOE surge in 2007, the PSOE’s Jerónimo Saavedra won control of a city governed by the PP since 1995. The PP could see some small gains, but insufficient for an overall majority, while the PSOE will likely lose 3 to 5 seats. Nueva Canarias could hold the balance of power, and would probably back the left.
Bilbao: Bilbao is the birthplace of the PNV, but it isn’t a stronghold of Basque nationalism by any means although the party has governed the capital of Vizcaya since 1979. It is unlikely that any of that will change, with the PNV set to hold on or gain marginally. The PSE-EE and PP could lose seats or remain where they are. Bildu, finally, will make its entrance with somewhere between 2 and 4 – roughly HB’s weight in the city before it was banned. Bildu’s showing will be worth watching in Guipuzcoa (and San Sebastián), the province most favourable to left-wing Basque nationalist movements and to Batasuna.
The image in the top 10 cities of Spain is very bleak for the left. They currently govern five of the ten, and they could very well be left with 0 (or, more realistically, a pitiful 1-2). The map of Spain’s provincial capitals could end up similar to what it was in 1995: 39 PP, 5 PSOE. In that election, the PSOE had topped the poll only in Andalusia and Extremadura. It isn’t inconceivable to imagine the PSOE doing even poorer than that.
Updates on Austrian and Spanish elections last weekend
The seat count in last weekend’s Austrian and Spanish regional elections has changed a bit since last weekend, due to absentee and mail-in votes.
In Carinthia, postal votes have pushed the Greenies over the 5% threshold, and have prevented the BZÖ from winning an overall majority alone.
BZÖ 44.93% winning 17 seats (+2 on dissolution)
SPÖ 28.77% (-9.66%) winning 11 seats (-3)
ÖVP 16.78% (+5.14%) winning 6 seats (+2)
Greens 5.13% (-1.58%) winning 2 seats (±0)
FPÖ 3.76% winning 0 seats (-1)
Little change in Salzburg, where postal votes made up only 6% of votes. They split 42-36 for the ÖVP, with the Greenies doing well with mail-in voters as they always do (students, mostly). In coalition news, a new Grand Coalition (SPÖ-ÖVP) is almost guaranteed.
SPÖ 39.4% (-6.0%) winning 15 seats (-2)
ÖVP 36.5% (-1.4%) winning 14 seats (±0)
FPÖ 13% (+4.3%) winning 5 seats (+3)
Greens 7.4% (-0.6%) winning 2 seats (±0)
BZÖ 3.7% (+3.7%) winning 0 seats (±0)
In Euskadi, the PSE-EE has picked up an additional seat in Araba on the back of EA, which nows holds only one seat. However, I haven’t seen any major coalition-building news.
EAJ-PNV 30 seats (+8 on EAJ 2005)
PSE-EE 25 seats (+7)
PP 13 seats (-2)
Aralar 4 seats (+3)
EA 1 seat (-6 on EA 2005)
EB-B 1 seat (-2)
UPyD 1 seat (+1)
Euskadi and Galicia 2009
Final, or at least very close to final results in both Euskadi (Basque Country, if thee English-firster prefers) and Galicia have come in.
In Galicia, the PP has defied polls and exit polls and has won back the state with an overall majority in the legislature. Corrected results after overseas ballots tallied:
PP 46.68% (+1.66%) winning 38 seats (+1)
PSdeG-PSOE 31.02% (-2.05%) winning 25 seats (±0)
BNG 16.01% (-2.56%) winning 12 seats (-1)
UPyD 1.41% (+1.41%) winning 0 seats (±0)
Turnout was 70.46%, up from 68.1% in 2005. The PP has won also won a plurality of the votes in all provinces. Alberto Núñez Feijóo, the PPdeG’s leader, will become President of Galicia, ending the PSOE-BNG coalition in power since 2005.
Now for Euskadi.
EAJ-PNV 38.56% (-0.11%) winning 30 seats (+8 on EAJ 2005)
PSE-EE 30.71% (+8.03%) winning 24 seats (+6)
PP 14.09% (-3.31%) winning 13 seats (-2)
Aralar 6.05% (+3.72%) winning 4 seats (+3)
EA 3.68% winning 2 seats (-5 on EA 2005)
EB-B 3.51% (-1.86%) winning 1 seat (-2)
UPyD 2.14% winning 1 seat (+1)
Invalid votes are calculated at 8.84%, and around 97% of those (8.63%) are estimated to be D3M votes. If they were valid, D3M would have won approximately 7 seats (-2 on EHAK 2005).
The EAJ-PNV has won the two northern provinces, Gipuzkoa/Guipúzcoa and Bizkaia/Viscaya, while the PSE-EE has won Araba/Álava, the southern province of Euskadi and the “least Basque” one. The PP and UPyD got their best results, by far, in Araba/Álava. In Gipuzkoa/Guipúzcoa, the D3M took around 13%. Aralar and EA also got their best results there, Aralar even broke 10%. In Bizkaia/Viscaya, which holds half of the Basque population, the EAJ broke 40%.
The current coalition (EAJ, EA, EB-B) and Aralar have won approximately 52% but do not have a majority of seats (more on this later on in this post). They have 37 seats (49%), one short of a majority. All anti-nationalist parties put together have around 48% of the votes but 51% of the seats, or 38. Thus, as you can imagine, the vote may be over, but the coalition stuff has just begun. A few ideas to throw out there, excluding the silly ones (like EAJ-PP “We both rabidly hate hate each other and would like to kill each other now” coalition). As mentioned before, a nationalist+EB-B coalition has 37 (-1 of majority) and a grand anti-nationalist coalition (PSE, PP, and UPyD) has 38 seats. However, the PSOE and PP are two politically opposite parties and it’s far from certain they’d work together. On top of that, the PSE-EE is not rabidly anti-nationalist as the PP or UPyD are. They’re anti-independence yes, but not anti-autonomy or whatever. I’d rule out a PSE-PP-UPyD coalition, so best not listen to the media meatheads who discuss it. Another coalition with a majority is a grand coalition between EAJ and PSE (ala Wales, which has a Labour-Plaid coalition) with 54 seats. Apart from that, it’s pretty much empty. EB-B would eat their right arm before working with the PP anywhere, UPyD would probably eat their left arm before working with the nats, and so forth.
Euskadi’s regional legislature has 75 seats, with each province having 25 seats. However, the provinces are far from equal in population. Bizkaia holds 53.2% of the Basque population alone, Gipuzkoa holds 32.5%, and Araba a mere 14.4%. I decided to simulate the same results (d’Hondt 3%) on a purely proportional allocation of seats by province: Bizkaia would have 40 seats, Gipuzkoa 24, and Araba 11.
Araba (11 seats)
Gipuzkoa (24 seats)
Araba (40 seats)
Which gives us a new legislature (with change on actual allocation)
EAJ-PNV 33 (+3)
PSE-EE 25 (+1)
PP 11 (-2)
Aralar 3 (-1)
EA 1 (-1)
EB-B 2 (+1)
UPyD 0 (-1)
Now, the nats+EB-B have 39 seats and a majority. Lastly, allocating all 75 seats from a region-only constituency (and not provinces) gives us EAJ 31 (+1), PSE 25 (+1), PP 11 (-2), Aralar 4, EA 2, EB-B (+1), UPyD 0 (-1). 5% regional threshold gives EAJ 32 (+2), PSE 26 (+2), PP 12 (-1), Aralar 5 (+1). Anyways, that’s all for now. Maybe some maps and electoral analysis later on.
Until then, eskerriak asko, gau on edo egun on!
That’s Basque for thank you, good evening or good morning.
This blog isn’t dead, to all those watching this space anxiously. Just that we’ve been in a major dull for elections these past few weeks since Sardinia (talking about them, those goons still haven’t finished counting. A Corsican-style election would be nice). However, fear not! We have four very interesting regional elections coming up this Sunday. Two of them in Spain, two of them in Austria.
An election will be held in the southernmost Austrian state, Carinthia. You may know it as the state of the far-right leader Jörg Haider, who died last October. Indeed, he was Governor of the state since 1999, and had also served briefly from 1989 to 1991. In 2004, Haider was still a member of the largest Austrian far-right party, the FPÖ. In the Carinthian elections that year, Haider’s FPÖ resisted spectacularly despite a bad period nationally. The FPÖ won 42.4%, ahead of the Social Democrats (SPÖ), who won 38.4%. The mainstream right, the ÖVP won only 11.6% and the Greens won 6.7%, earning them 2 seats. Carinthia has a small declining Carinthian Slovene population, making up around 2% of the population. Slovenes tend to be heavily SPÖ, although the Greenies or Liberal Forum also does very well because a small Slovene party makes alliances with either of the two. See the village of Zell, 89% Slovene, for example. However, Carinthia, like most Austrian states has a Grand Coalition government composed of the BZÖ, SPÖ, and ÖVP.
However, in disagreements with some other FPÖ members, he formed a new party in 2005, the BZÖ, or Alliance for the Future of Austria. 15 of the 16 Carinthian FPÖ MPs joined the BZÖ. Shortly before his death in October 2008, Haider’s BZÖ won 10.7% of the votes and 21 seats in the September 2008 federal election. In Carinthia, he won 38.5%, placing ahead of all other parties.
Since Haider’s death, the new Governor of Carinthia has been Gerhard Dörfler, also a member of the BZÖ.
Current polling (Gallup)
Alternatively, a Market poll from the 22nd. As a bonus, a seat simulation on these figures.
BZÖ 39% (15 seats, ±0)
SPÖ 37% (15 seats, +1)
ÖVP 12% (4 seats, ±0)
Greens 7% (2 seats, ±0)
FPÖ 5% (0, -1)
Elections are also being held in the traditionally conservative but SPÖ-ruled state of Salzburg. In 2004, the SPÖ 45.4% and won 17 seats, placing ahead of the ÖVP, which had won all elections since 1945. The ÖVP won 37.9% and only 14 seats. The FPÖ, which had won nearly 20% in 1999, was reduced to 8.7% and only 2 seats. The Greens made some gains, winning 8% and keeping their 2 MPs. Gabi Burgstaller (SPÖ) become Governor, the first SPÖ Governor of Salzburg. The current government is another grand coalition, SPÖ-ÖVP.
Burgstaller has maintained positive approval ratings throughout, though some polls have indicated that the race will be close.
The latest polls, first from IGF (seat projection in brackets)
SPÖ 41% (15 seats, -2)
ÖVP 35% (13 seats, -3)
FPÖ 14% (5 seats, +3)
Greens 8% (3 seats, +1)
BZÖ 2% (0 seats)
Gallup, however, is seeing a much closer race:
The Spanish autonomous community of the Basque Country will be holding elections, four years after the last elections. The Basque Country, which speaks Basque (though a large majority speak Spanish as a mother toungue) , not related in any ways to Spanish or French, has a very strong nationalist sentiment, as you might know. And also a strong terrorist nationalist group, ETA. However, Basque nationalism, in opposition to Catalonian nationalism or most other European nationalists, is right-wing and not left-wing. Indeed, Basque nationalism was historically very close to the Catholic Church and was founded as a response to the influx of progressive/socialist ideas in the south of the Basque Country from ethnic Spanish workers. The main Basque nationalist party, founded in 1895, is the Basque Nationalist Party, commonly known as EAJ-PNV, which stands for Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea-Partido Nacionalista Vasco (in France, EAJ-PNB). EAJ, generally centre-right/Christiandem, is a member of the European Democratic Party (along with the French MoDem and Italian PD), and formerly a member of the Christian Democrat International (CDI). EAJ stands for Basque independence, but has rejected violent means of attaining it (ETA). All Basque regional Presidents since the Statute of Autonomy have come from EAJ-PNV. In past elections, however, it has often sided with left-wing Basque nationalists, because the EAJ is also a kind of a large tent for Basque nationalists (the ETA was formed out EAJ in the ’50’s). For example, in 2005, it ran a common list with Basque Solidarity (Eusko Alkartasuna, EA, which split from the EAJ in 1987). Other Basque nationalist parties are smaller and socialist: EA, Aralar. Batasuna, ETA’s now-illegal political arm, has run in most elections since 1980 under various names, most recently as the Communist Party of the Basque Lands (EHAK or PCTV) in 2005, which won 12.5% and 9 seats. Batasuna’s support fluctuated from 8% to 15%. The Spanish Socialists, PSOE, are known as the PSE-EE, which stands for Partido Socialista de Euskadi – Euskadiko Ezkerra. Euskadiko Ezkerra, or Basque Left, was a Basque nationalist party which merged with the PSE in 1991. The Popular Party, PP, the party most strongly opposed to the Statute of Autonomy and Basque nationalism, is considerably weaker in the Basque Country (likewise in Catalonia). The local section thingy of the United Left, the Spanish communist/ecosocialist front, is known as Ezker Batua – Berdeak (Basque United Left-Greens) or EB-B.
The 2005 results. EHAK is compared to the 2001 result of Euskal Herritarrok, which was how ETA Batasuna called themselves then.
EAJ-PNV + EA 38.67% (-4.05%) winning 29 seats (-4) [22 EAJ, 7 EA]
PSE-EE 22.68% (+4.78%) winning 18 seats (+5)
PP 17.40% (-5.72%) winning 15 seats (-4)
EHAK 12.44% (+2.32%) winning 9 seats (+2) banned 2008
EB-B 5.37% (-0.21%) winning 3 seats (±0)
Aralar 2.33% (new) winning 1 seat (+1)
The resulting government was formed by 9 EAJ, 3 EA, and 1 EB-B. Juan José Ibarretxe, incumbent lehendakari (President) was re-elected.
In the 2008 Spanish elections, the PSE-EE made important gains in the Basque Country, placing 11% ahead of EAJ (PSE-EE 38%, EAJ 27%).
The situation ahead of these elections seems very tight, and there is a real possibility that the EAJ could lose the office of lehendakari for the first time since the Statute of Autonomy. EA will be running alone this election, and there is a new party running: Union, Progress and Democracy (UPyD), a centrist party which merges social liberalism and secularism with anti-nationalism and opposition to the current autonomies system. UPyD was founded in 2007 in the Basque Country, but it did best in Madrid in the 2008 elections (winning 1 seat). UPyD is currently polling quite well nationally. As for Batasuna-ETA, which had its front, EHAK, banned in 2008, they have called on voters to vote for Democracy 3 Millions (D3M), which they organized but was later banned in February 2009. However, D3M will appear on the ballot and votes cast for them will be counted as invalid votes. One poll on February 16 projected around 10% of invalid votes (aka 10% for ETA). The latest poll is from February 23 by Público.
EAJ-PNV 34.1% winning 26-28 seats (+4/+6)
PSE-EE 29.1% winning 23-25 seats (+5/+7)
PP 10.9% winning 9-11 seats (-6/-4)
Aralar 8.4% winning 6 seats (+5)
EB-B 6% winning 4 seats (+1)
EA 5% winning 3-4 seats (-4/-3)
UPyD 3.1% winning 1-3 seats (+1/+3)
On most calculations, a EAJ-EA-Aralar-EBB government would have an absolute majority (38 seats out of 75).
Taking all seat projections, the average forks are EAJ 26-30, PSE 22-28, PP 9-15, EB-B 3-5, EA 0-4, Aralar 1-6, UPyD 0-3.
On a totally unrelated note, I’ll try setting up a quick poll with the poll option on here for the Basque elections. VOTE!
There will also be elections in the farwestern Spanish autonomy of Galicia, the birthplace of Franco and an early nationalist stronghold in the Civil War. For that reason, Galicia is quite a PP stronghold, though there is a sizeable nationalist sentiment. Indeed, a near majority speak Galician, a language close to Portuguese. The PP held an absolute majority from 1989 to 2005, and from 199o to 2005, the Galician President was Manuel Iribarne, a former Francoist cabinet minister and known admirer of Franco. His popularity took a hit after his government failed to respond to the 2002 Prestige oil spill off Galicia. He was also hurt by divisions within the Galician PP. Apart from the PSOE, known as the PSdeG in Galicia, there is a local centre-left nationalistic/devolutionist party, the Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG). The BNG includes some outright nationalists, most of them commies, but the BNG abandoned its separatist rhetoric in 1990. That helped them quite a bit electorally. Otherwise, all other parties, such as the IU, are totally inexistent in Galicia.
The 2005 election results. The PP won 37 seats, one short of an overall majority, and the PSOE formed a coalition government with the BNG. The current government includes 9 Socialists, and 5 Galician Nationalists. The President is Emilio Pérez Touriño (PSdeG)
PP 44.9% (-6.7%) winning 37 seats (-4)
PSdeG-PSOE 32.5% (+10.7%) winning 25 seats (+8)
BNG 19.6% (-3) winning 13 seats (-4)
Current polling from February 22 from El Mundo
PP 44.5% winning 36-38 seats (-1/+1)
PSdeG-PSOE 33.1% winning 25-26 seats (±0, +1)
BNG 18.3% winning 12-13 seats (-1/±0)
The forks taking into account all projections say PP 33-38, PSOE 22-27, BNG 11-16. Obviously, if the PP wins 38 seats tomorrow, it’s all over and the PP wins. Gah. If not, then the current PSdeG-BNG coalition could continue.
Ikusi arte bihar!