Monthly Archives: June 2015
Guest Post: Denmark 2015
David J. Barrett contributed this excellent guest post covering the Danish election, held on June 18, 2015.
A general election took place in Denmark on June 18th 2015 in order to elect the 179 members of the Folketing (the Danish Parliament).
Background
Denmark has a parliamentary unicameral system elected with a rather complex form of proportional representation. Essentially the country is divided into nine constituencies and voters get to vote for a candidate in that constituency. All of the votes for candidates for that party in that constituency are added up, and if a party wins for instance enough votes that they would be proportionally entitled to two seats from that constituency the two candidates with the most votes would be elected. As there are a number of regional constituencies proportionality is not guaranteed, so there are a number of ‘top-up’ seats that are allocated to parties so that all parties receive the number of parliamentary seats that they are proportionally entitled to. There is a 2% threshold for allocation of top-up seats, but if a party won a seat in a constituency while failing to clear the threshold they would get to keep that seat. In practice, bar the unexpected election of an independent joke candidate in 1994, winning a constituency all but guarantees that a party will clear the threshold of 2% of votes nationally.
Denmark was one of the countries most strongly affected by the 1848 Revolutions – in spite of little unrest actually happening within its borders. The newly crowned King Frederick VII acceded to demands for a new constitution almost immediately and established a constitutional monarchy. Subsequent Danish political history in the 19th century was marked by a series of conflicts between supporters of the monarchy, Hojre (Right), which predominantly seemed to be the aristocracy, and those advocating a more democratic government. These tended to be predominantly rural initially and called themselves Venstre (Left). The 19th century was marked by a series of elections won by Venstre, but after which the King would appoint a government led by Hojre until Venstre ultimately achieved office at the start of the 20th century. Venstre had by this point moved gradually rightwards when faced with the new threat of the Social Democratic Party, who were explicitly a socialist force. Ultimately Venstre split in 1905, with the left of the party forming a new party called Radikale Venstre (Radical Left, or RV), which was much more sympathetic to the social and political reform favoured by the Social Democrats than Venstre had proved to be.
In 1913 RV leader Carl Theodor Zahle became Prime Minister, supported by the Social Democrats. When World War I broke out he pursued a policy of strict neutrality between the combatants, along with strict economic controls that were unpopular with business. Following the war there was serious debate about whether Schleswig, the border region between Denmark and Germany, should be returned to Denmark. A series of plebiscites resulted in the Northern portion of the region opting to become Danish, while the rest decided to stay German. This was unacceptable to many Danish nationalists, including King Christian X, who dismissed Zahle’s government and prompted a constitutional crisis, as Zahle had retained the confidence of parliament. After a period in which it appeared likely that the monarchy would be overthrown Christian X relented, accepted a role as a pure figurehead monarch and called fresh elections, which were won by Venstre. The triumph of the ideological right was short lived however, as the Social Democrats became the largest party in 1924, a position they would hold for the next 77 years and would use to profoundly transform Danish society. They created a very strong welfare state based on high taxation that delivered extremely good public services based on universal provision, similar to policies pursued by Norwegian and Swedish governments at the same time.
Campaign posters
Unlike their Scandinavian colleagues the Social Democrats were not universally dominant, and periodically opposition coalitions led by Venstre or RV could assemble parliamentary majorities. These governments tended to be short-lived and accepted the fundamental premises of the virtues of the welfare state, and did little to it. However in 1973 the so-called ‘earthquake’ election occurred, with heavy losses for all established parties and with the newly founded Progress Party, an anti-tax and anti-immigrant party, finishing in second place, four other parties winning parliamentary representation either for the first time or after decades of absence and rendering any stable government majority all but impossible. The party system never quite recovered. A series of short-lived Venstre and Social Democrat governments followed until the parliamentary right finally achieved a stable government coalition, led by Poul Schutler, the leader of the Conservative People’s Party (CPP), the successor of Hojre. Eventually by 1994 the Social Democrats under Poul Nyrup Rasmussen finally won back office with a government predominantly supported by RV, and pursued third way policies popular globally in that time, before being defeated in 2002, by Venstre, led by Anders Fogh Rasmussen – which notably overtook the Social Democrats to become the largest party.
Fogh Rasmussen’s government was, mostly, a minority coalition with CPP that was supported outside the cabinet by the Danish People’s Party (DPP), the populist right successor party to the Progress Party. He pursued a variety of tax freezes and immigration restrictions that proved popular with the Danish electorate, winning three successive terms and remaining the largest party throughout. In 2009 Fogh Rasmussen resigned to become Secretary-General of NATO and was succeeded by his Finance Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen (none of the three Rasmussens are related!). This government was less popular than its predecessor due to a faltering economy, and soon entered a consistent polling deficit behind the Social Democrats, led by former MEP Helle Thorning-Schmidt, and its allies. Its primary political achievement was a controversial pension reform that raised the retirement age to 67 that was supported by RV.
Campaign posters
Nonetheless despite this the 2011 election the election proved to be unexpectedly tight, with Venstre actually gaining a seat and the Social Democrats losing one and coming second for the fourth consecutive election, and with the government primarily losing owing to heavy losses for CPP and corresponding gains for RV, who supported the Social Democrats. Thorning-Schmidt set up a minority coalition government with RV and the Socialist People’s Party (SF), a party to the Social Democrats’ left and supported outside the government by the Red-Green Alliance, a small but clearly growing far-left force. She largely governed as a centrist and was concerned predominantly with unemployment and the deficit. SF soon entered into a period of crisis with the government’s unexpected centrism, where a leadership election resulted in the heavy defeat of Astrid Krag, backed by most of the party’s hierarchy, to left-winger Annette Vilhelmsen in spite of warnings that this might endanger the stability of the government. Vilhelmsen’s leadership did not last long, as she failed to achieve party support for the selling of part of Danish energy company DONG to Goldman Sachs, resulting in her resignation as leader and SF leaving the government, but continuing to support it from outside. Four members of parliament, including Krag and Environment Minister Ida Aukun, left SF in protest with this decision, and joined the Social Democrats or RV. The government’s poll rating were consistently poor mostly owing to SF’s weakness, and consistently showed that parties who supported to the Social Democrats would fail to achieve another parliamentary majority. Local and European elections confirmed this trend, with the left as a whole, and SF in particular, doing rather badly.
RV split in 2013, when former Minister for Culture Uffe Elbaek, who had been forced to resign over a scandal involving placing departmental functions at his partner’s business, formed the Alternative, a new Green party, which polled reasonably well. The backbone of the left became the Red-Green Alliance, which unlike all of the other established parties had actually gained support – likely due to it not actually sitting in the government formally.
Among the right Venstre started to falter owing to accounting scandals when Lars Lokke Rasmussen was PM, mostly to the benefit of DPP, which rose in polls until it was just behind Venstre – and actually became the largest party in the European Parliament election. They were increasingly the only relevant parties of the traditional right – although it remained questionable whether DPP would actually participate in a government or support it from the outside. CPP, after losing more than half of its seats in 2011, was increasingly floundering and indistinguishable from Venstre, and was soon only barely polling above the parliamentary threshold, a situation which a change of leadership did nothing to alleviate. Benefitting from this disintegration was the Liberal Alliance (LA), a right-wing splinter of RV from 2007, which was formed to stop the influence of DPP on Danish politics. They argued that be consistently aligning with the left RV had ensured a situation where the right would have to rely on DPP to win office, and intended to provide a counter-weight. They had quite libertarian policies however, and soon aligned themselves to the right. LA throughout most of this parliamentary term outpolled CPP easily.
Thorning-Schmidt called the election for June 18th, with parties supporting her to continue serving as Prime Minister being her own Social Democrats, RV, SF, the Red-Green Alliance and the Alternative (the Red Bloc). Supporting Lars Lokke Rasmussen were Venstre, DPP, LA and the CPP (the Blue Bloc). Nearly as soon as the election was called Thorning-Schmidt began to poll competitively with the Rasmussen, and the two blocs began to swap very narrow poll leads throughout the election campaign. Notably the Social Democrats as a party entered a consistent poll lead of 4-7% over Venstre, which likely reflected Rasmussen’s own unpopularity and financial scandals and the Social Democrats focused much of their attack literature on him personally. The election was sufficiently tight that which bloc would actually triumph remained in doubt right up until polling day
Results
| Party | Votes | % | Seats | +/– |
| Denmark | ||||
| Social Democrats | 924,940 | 26.3 | 47 | +3 |
| Danish People’s Party (DPP) | 741,746 | 21.1 | 37 | +15 |
| Venstre | 685,188 | 19.5 | 34 | –13 |
| Red–Green Alliance | 274,463 | 7.8 | 14 | +2 |
| Liberal Alliance (LA) | 265,129 | 7.5 | 13 | +4 |
| The Alternative | 168,788 | 4.8 | 9 | New |
| Radikale Venstre (RV) | 161,009 | 4.6 | 8 | –9 |
| Socialist People’s Party (SF) | 147,578 | 4.2 | 7 | –9 |
| Conservative People’s Party (CPP) | 118,003 | 3.4 | 6 | –2 |
| Others | 32,143 | 0.9 | 0 | 0 |
| Invalid/blank votes | 41,073 | – | – | – |
| Total | 3,560,060 | 100 | 175 | 0 |
| Registered voters/turnout | 4,145,105 | 85.9 | – | – |
| Faroe Islands and Greenland | 43,880 | 4 | 0 | |
| Total | 3,603,940 | 100 | 179 | 0 |
Ultimately the Blue Bloc won the election with 90 seats compared to 89 won by the Red Bloc and representatives from the Faroe Islands and Greenland – all of whose victorious candidates supported the Red Bloc.
The biggest news story was undoubtedly the second place finish of DPP, which was not forecast by any poll (including the exit poll). While the party was expected to do well this result was beyond all expectations. In particular the party performed exceptionally well in the South of the Jutland peninsula on the border with Germany – the political base of their leader Kristian Thulesan Dahl, where the party won 28.6% – a swing of 13.6% towards them that predominantly came from Venstre. In some places in this region the swing between the two parties was even greater than this, and DPP essentially stole votes from across the political spectrum. In Aabenraa, a rural area directly on the border, DPP won 31.6%, and bar small vote gains from the Red-Greens and LA, every single other party lost votes. South Jutland was the most dramatic but far from the only region where DPP made big gains. In North Jutland they gained 9.8% to leave them with 21.6%, in Zealand they gained 9.5% and won 25.6% across the region. Their advance was less pronounced in urban areas across the board however. In Copenhagen they only gained 3% and won 11.4% in total. In Aarhus – the largest city in East Jutland, a region where they won 18.9% on a 8.5% swing, they won 10%, 11.4% and 16.7% in the city’s three districts, and never achieved a swing greater than 6.5% in any of them.
% vote for the DPP
While the election was a clear triumph for the DPP it was a disaster for Venstre, which won their worst result since 1990 – when, at least, they made gains relative to the CPP. Their losses were most severe in South Jutland, where the DPP’s gains were greatest, and in North Zealand, where they lost 11.3% to leave them with only 20.2% – a greater loss than the DPP gained. The party seems to have shed votes both to the DPP in rural areas, but also among the wealthy right wing voters to LA, who certainly do not want to vote either for DPP or for the Red Bloc. Venstre held up best in North Jutland, where the party only suffered a 4.2% swing against them – but still finished well behind the Social Democrats, and in Copenhagen and its environs, where Venstre has been historically weak and likely reflects that there are simply fewer Venstre voters for other parties to poach there, as well as the more limited appeal of such populist rhetoric there. In its traditional rural strongholds on Jutland the party did not have a particularly good showing. While it remained the largest party in West Jutland the swing against it was proportional to the national average – and Venstre’s victory reflects how dominant it has been over opposition in the region in the past.
The Social Democrats made small net gains – but this was not distributed very evenly around Denmark, although the party was the largest in every region but West Jutland and South Jutland. In Copenhagen – the main left stronghold in the country and where there was considerable competition from all other parties in the Red Bloc – the party gained 3.4% to win 22.3%. In parts of the inner city the swing towards the party was even greater. In Indre By – the heart of the city centre including the royal palace – the party gained 5.4%. In Falkoner, containing some of the city’s wealthier neighbourhoods, the party gained the same percentage. What these areas have in common is the local strength of their last remaining formal coalition partner RV, who suffered disproportionally there, where it is likely easier to credit the larger coalition partner for achievements in government. By contrast in South Jutland the party actually lost votes, continuing the slow erasure of the party’s traditional working class base to the DPP.
Among the small parties the biggest losers were RV and SF, which both suffered from similar problems. Both were explicitly supporters of the coalition, and both suffered from prominent members of the party leaving their ranks, and finding it difficult to express what exactly they had accomplished in government. Both parties leaked support to others in the Red Bloc that could better express what their supporters valued. RV, as a socially liberal party interested in good governance, the perceived responsibility of the Social Democrats hurt them among their core voters. SF, for its part, was hurt considerably by the Red-Greens and the Alternative. Both parties could reasonably claim to be a better repository for left wing protest voters than the more moderate SF, with its disastrous and brief government foray under its belt, could be. While both parties lost everywhere, their losses were most severe in Copenhagen where their main competition was also strongest. Notably, while Vilhelmsen will not be in the next parliament, defectors Krag and Aukun were re-elected for the Social Democrats and RV respectively.
The Red-Green Alliance had a good election, although a gain of two seats was slightly below expectations. The party actually lost votes in their Copenhagen stronghold – although they still won second place in the capital. The party did however gain votes in areas less friendly to the party. The party for instance won two seats in Fyn – Denmark’s central island, picked up roughly 1% of the vote across Jutland, and consistently defeated SF. However controversial MP Rosa Lund was defeated. The new Alternative’s support base looked quite similar geographically to that of the Red-Greens. It was very strong in Copenhagen – even managing second place in the Norrebro municipality, but polled similarly, if not slightly behind RV, in the rest of the country.
The small parties of the right had contrasting fortunes. LA had reason to very pleased with their result, in spite of the defeat of MP Thyra Frank. They won two seats in Copenhagen and in several of the more left areas of the city they emerged as the largest party of the Blue Bloc. The swing towards the party was starkest in North Zealand, where party leader Anders Samuelsen is based and where he received a very large number of personal votes. The party did best in the wealthy areas where Venstre’s vote had fallen. In Rudersdal for instance the party gained 6.9% of the vote to win 16.9%, gaining more new votes than DPP did in the area and being the primary beneficiary of Venstre’s collapse. In Gentofte, in Greater Copenhagen, the party even managed second place with 17.5%, only 3.8% behind Venstre as the largest party. The party however did gain votes in areas less hospitable to them, just to a lesser degree. In North Jutland the party won 5.9%, a gain of nearly 2%. In the more rural Zealand Proper beyond the pull of Copenhagen the party won 6.2% – a gain of 1.7%. Their victory means that the party will undoubtedly seek to impose their views on the Blue Bloc to a greater degree.
The CPP continued their slow slide into oblivion, which shows no sign of abating any time soon. The party has only gained seats in one election since 1984.In that election the party won 42 seats and the Prime Ministry. In 2015 it won 6 seats and is the smallest party in Parliament. Notably the party failed to return an MP from Copenhagen, resulting in the defeat of former party leader and Deputy Prime Minister Lars Barfoed. The party’s results were nearly uniformly dismal. The one bright spark was in West Jutland, where current party leader Soren Pape is based and where the party’s vote increased marginally. This was entirely due to a big swing towards the party in Viborg, where Pape is mayor, as the party’s vote decreased in nearly every other municipality in the region. In the two Viborg municipalities the CPP won 11.8% and 8.6% – gains of 8.3% and 5.2% respectively. These were easily the best results for the party nationwide. In recent years the party has been nearly indistinguishable from Venstre apart from sitting in different groups in the European Parliament, and it is difficult to see how that will change if the party enters another government as a junior coalition partner to them.
In the Faroe Islands the Union Party, a partner of Venstre, lost its seat to the pro-independence Republic Party. This meant that as the Faroese Social Democrats held their seat, and the pro-Greenlandic independence party Inuit Ataqatigiit and Social Democrat ally Siumut held their representation in Greenland, every single overseas representative will belong to the Red Bloc. Greenland in particular has been trending left for some time now, so the easy victories of Inuit Ataqatigiit and Siumut was unsurprising. The Faroe Islands was closer, but both the Republic Party and Social Democrats increased their share of their vote. Nonetheless having essentially no representation in the government ranks is unlikely to ease pro-independence sentiment in either place.
Aftermath
Rasmussen was called to form a government, in spite of Venstre not finishing as the lead party of the Blue Bloc. He managed this by repeatedly pointing out that the DPP, LA and CPP had promised to support his candidacy, and successfully out-manoeuvred the stunned DPP, who, like everyone else, had not been expecting their success. The exact composition of his government is yet unknown, although it is likely to be minority government.
Thorning-Schmidt announced her resignation the evening of the vote, and other party leaders in the Red Bloc will also find their positions precarious.
The election must be understood as part of the broader trend towards the populist right across Europe that has been going on for a number of years – and has been particular prominent in the Nordic countries. Both Norway and Finland now have populist right parties in government and the Sweden Democrats continue to show strong and growing poll numbers. In Germany, France, Austria and the UK populist parties have also grown. Denmark is very much on trend.
The only EU government likely to be particularly pleased with this result is the UK, as the new Danish government will likely support their demands to renegotiate their terms of EU membership – as the DPP are interested in this area and in particular on the provisions for the free movement of people.
Guest Post: Italy (Regional and municipal) 2015
As a follow-up to his preview of the Italian regional and local elections (May 31, 2015), here is a guest post from Giovanni Rettore detailing the results of the regional and municipal elections, including municipal runoffs held recently.
As written in my post last month, Italy went to the polls to elect seven governors and regional councils and several mayors and municipal councils. The results of the regional elections have been somewhat mixed, and local issues, which influenced heavily some outcomes, make it difficult to establish a national trend. Although Renzi and his party certainly didn’t perform very well, they didn’t perform awfully bad. It’s a setback from last year’s incredible result at the European elections, but it’s not even a disastrous defeat. As for oppositions, the 5 Star Movement performed so and so, while on the right of the political spectrum, the Northern League emerged as a clear winner, while Forza Italia collapsed. I’ll try to give readers a quick resumé of the seven regional races and try to trace an outcome. There’s however a certainty among the doubts, the turnout was extremely low. Only 52.2% of eligible voters showed up to the polls, a 10 points decline from the 2010 elections. Probably a sign of the electorate’s tiredness with the ongoing scandals that marks the Italian political system, and the inability of the political class to face the severe economic crisis and the rising unemployment. The fact that almost half of eligible voters chose not to vote is a worrying sign for Italy’s fragile political system.
To analyze the results I think that the comparison should be done with last years European elections. I know many will point that comparing those results with last year’s European elections, and not to previous regional election is incorrect, due to local issues and candidates strength (or weakness) influencing the outcome. It’s a fair argument, I recognize. But five years ago the national mood and political climate was completely different. Five years ago Berlusconi was still Prime Minister and his approval ratings were still decent averaging around 40-45%, the League had half of the votes it has now, the 5 Star Movement was still a fringe party with around 3% of national voting intentions, Monti was an obscure technocrat unknown to 99% of Italians, Renzi was a little known mayor of Florence and the economic crisis wasn’t as harsh as today, with unemployment five points lower than current data. So comparing with a regional election held under a completely different political and economical contest will likely led to incorrect conclusions, in my opinion. Although I’m open to critics on this point.
Regional elections
Campania
Governor
Vincenzo De Luca (PD, UDC, Others) 41.2%
Stefano Caldoro (FI, NCD, FDI, Others) 38.4%
Valeria Ciarambino (M5S) 17.5%
Salvatore Vozza (Far-left) 2.2%
Marco Esposito (Indipendent) 0.7%
Regional Council
De Luca’s Coalition 40.4%
PD 19.5% winning 15 seats
De Luca’s List 4.9% winning 4 seats
UDC 2.4% winning 2 seats
Others 13.6% winning 9 seats
Caldoro’s Coalition 39.9%
FI 17.8% winning 7 seats
Caldoro’s List 7.2% winning 2 seats
NCD 5.9% winning 1 seat
FDI 5.5% winning 2 seats
Others 3.5%
5 Star Movement (Ciarambino) 17.0% winning 7 seats
Sinistra al Lavoro (Vozza) 2.3%
Campania Civic List (Esposito) 0.6%
Turnout 51.9% (-11.1%)
Campania was the closest among the seven regions voting on Sunday. Former mayor of Salerno Vincenzo De Luca won a tight rematch against incumbent governor Stefano Caldoro. Doing so, De Luca had to ally with the Union of the Centre, led in the region by old Christian Democrat crook Ciriaco De Mita, and with supporters of former state secretary Nicola Cosentino, a former Forza Italia member now serving in jail. Due to his alliance with an old Christian Democrat crook and a former Berlusconi state secretary who is now a convicted felon, De Luca has been heavily criticized by his own allies of the left-wing pole, leading the far left to break with the Democratic Party and run their own candidate. De Luca himself was subject of controversies. A court declared him ineligible and now he will likely be forced out of office as soon as he is sworn in, unless the government will change the anti-corruption law that prevents convicted felons like De Luca to held elected offices.
The campaign has been afflicted by polemics surrounding the legal troubles of De Luca and councillor candidates of both left and right. Two days before the election the Anti-Mafia Parliamentary Commission released a “blacklist” of unpresentable candidates running on party lists from both sides, due to their legal troubles and suspicious links with organized crime. The “blacklist” included De Luca himself.
This “blacklist” created vehement polemics inside the Democratic Party. The president of the Anti-Mafia Commission, Rosy Bindi, has been accused of using commission for political ends. Rosy Bindi has been one of the most notable vocal critics of Renzi, since the current Prime Minister started to raise his national profile.
Bindi and Renzi have a long history of feuds and mutual public offences. Renzi often targeted Bindi has one of the old PD politicians who should be dumped because of their ineffectiveness both while in government and opposition. Bindi vehemently answered to Renzi’s repeated offences accusing him of sexism.
Renzi’s loyalists accused Bindi of using her personal power as chairwoman of the commission to influence the outcome to lead to De Luca’s defeat thus giving herself and her faction within the party an excuse to overthrow Renzi in the wake of a defeat. Bindi responded to the accusation, pointing that all parties in the commission, including the PD, upheld her job and the decision of publishing the “blacklist” was unanimous. Maybe the “blacklist” contributed to the extremely low turnout, just 51.9% of eligible voters showed to the polling station, down 11% from five years ago
In spite of the polemics and his ineligibility, De Luca was able to win the election, avenging the defeat of five years ago. De Luca perform very strong in his home province of Salerno and in the province of Avellino, the historical stronghold of his ally De Mita. De Luca won Avellino and Salerno with almost twenty points margin. Additionally De Luca won Benevento province by a razor-thin margin. The victory of Caldoro in Naples province, the most populated of the five province, and in Caserta were not enough to overcome De Luca’s margin in the other three provinces.
However the issue of the eligibility of De Luca remains, and will likely spark a heated debate. If Renzi tries to change the Severino law, either in parliament or by decree, he will likely clash with the left-wing faction of his party, and encounter the furor of the opposition and public opinion.
As for parties’ performance, the PD performance was fairly mediocre compared to last year results. One year ago the PD obtained 35% of votes, while now the Democrats obtained less than 20%. Certainly the presence of almost ten lists in support of De Luca hurt the PD. As usual, civic lists behind gubernatorial candidates, drained votes from the biggest parties, leading them to mediocre results. Forza Italia performed better than in other regions, but still showed a decline from last year’s European elections, losing almost seven points. The New Centre Right (NCD) retained the result of last year, though, considering the fact that last year NCD ran a joint list with UDC, who now endorsed De Luca, its result might be considered moderately positive. The Brothers of Italy (FDI) performed moderately well, increasing their result from last year by 1.4%.
The 5 Star Movement performed so and so in the region. Something that might surprise due to the the polemics surrounding legal troubles of candidates, something that a staunch anti-corruption movement should exploit in his advantage. However M5S fell by seven points from last year’s election. Though, as probably people will correctly point out, M5S has often troubles repeating national results in local contests, being a new party that lacks the territorial strength of its competitors.
The far left performed poorly, as they did nationwide, losing two points from last year’s election, where the “Other Europe” list obtained 4.1%
As I said in the preview, election in southern regions since the beginning of the so-called “Second Republic” have become increasingly unpredictable and linked to the consensus of powerful local bosses who swings from one party to another, depending on the national mood. In this particular case, De Mita and Cosentino have likely been the crucial factors in De Luca’s victory, helping him winning in Avellino (De Mita) and containing Caldoro’s margin in Caserta (home of Cosentino, where Caldoro’s margin over De Luca passed from 23 points of 2010 to just 4 points in 2015).
It’s a victory for the centre-left, but it’s not a victory I’d be proud of, honestly. And we’ll see if the citizens of Campania will be called again in dew months, due to De Luca’s conviction and ineligibility.
Veneto
Governor
Luca Zaia (LN; FI; FDI; Others) 50.1%
Alessandra Moretti (PD; SEL; Others) 22.7%
Jacopo Berti (M5S) 11.9%
Flavio Tosi (NCD; Others) 11.9%
Alessio Morosin (Venetian Independence) 2.5%
Laura Di Lucia Coletti (Other Veneto-Far Left) 0.9%
Regional Council
Zaia’s Coalition 52.2%
Zaia’s List 23.1% winning 13 seats
Northern League 17.8% winning 10 seats
Forza Italia 6.0% winning 3 seats
Noi Veneto (separatist) 2.7% winning 1 seat
Brothers of Italy 2.6% winning 1 seat
Moretti’s Coalition 23.4%
PD 16.7% winning 8 seats
Moretti’s List 3.8% winning 2 seats
The Greens-SEL 1.1%
Others 1.8% 1 seat
5 Star Movement (Berti) 10.4% winning 5 seats
Tosi’s Coalition 10.7%
Tosi’s List 5.7% winning 3 seats
New Centre Right 2.0% winning 1 seat
Others 3.0% winning 1 seat
Venetian Independence (Morosin) 2.5%
The Other Veneto (Di Lucia Coletti) 0.8%
Turnout 57.2% (-9.3%)
As I pointed out in the preview, Veneto had probably witnessed the most bizarre race of the cycle. Incumbent governor Zaia (Northern League) started has a heavy favourite, as a result of his high personal popularity and as his centre-left opponent, MEP Alessandra Moretti looking increasingly as something like a clownish candidate. Then in January a schism in the League led by Verona’s mayor Tosi, seemed to re-open the race, with Moretti benefitting from Tosi’s siphoning votes away from his former party mate. However, with Moretti’s enduring gaffes and Tosi’s campaign looking not strong enough to help Moretti pull the upset, Zaia took back the lead.
The final outcome was a Zaia landslide, similar to the one of five years ago. In 2010 Zaia won with a 60-29 margin over PD’s candidate Bortolussi, while now Zaia won with a 50-23 margin. So, despite everything that happened during the race, Zaia was able to win re-election with a huge margin, thanks mainly to his personal popularity and his opponent awful campaign. Although probably even the strongest potential candidate, like p.e. Vicenza’ mayor Achille Variati, would have been defeated by Zaia, Moretti’s campaign was a train-wreck from the beginning. If one year ago, in the wake of the European’s election result, that saw the PD winning almost 38% of votes, led leftist dreaming about a potential takeover of Italy’s most conservative region, this was a bad wake up. Not only did Zaia win a second term in spite of the Tosi schism, but Moretti’s result was catastrophic, even lower than the awful 29% the left-wing candidate took five years ago. Zaia also gained the notable result of being the lone gubernatorial candidate to win a majority of votes and not just a plurality in this election cycle. Turnout was the lowest ever, although Veneto still ranked as the region with highest turnout among the seven that voted a week ago, and the one where the growth of abstentions was low, although still impressive (-9.3%).
As for parties result, Zaia’s popularity have been likely confirmed by the success of his personal civic list. Zaia’s List won a plurality of votes, surpassing even Zaia’s party, the Northern League. Summed together, the League and Zaia’s list amassed more than 40% of votes, 5 points more than the League’s 2010 result, and 25 points more than the League result one year ago. Forza Italia however performed badly, winning just over 6% of votes, 18 points less than in 2010 (when it was named PDL) and almost nine points less than one year ago. The Brothers of Italy performance here was barely weaker than one year ago. Zaia geographically performed better in Treviso and Vicenza provinces. The weakest Zaia’s performance was in Verona province where Zaia won “only” 38% of votes. This result was mainly due to Tosi taking 27% of votes in his home province siphoning votes mainly from Zaia’s camp.
Moretti’s result, as mentioned, was catastrophic. Yet five years ago the 29% of Bortolussi was awful, her result was even worse. The PD, summed with Moretti’s personal list, only took 20.5% of votes, down 17 points from last year’s European election and equal of five years ago’s weak result. The joint list between what’s left of the Green Party, and the far-left “Left Ecology and Freedom” (SEL), barely won 1% of votes. Moretti’s best performance came in Belluno, where she won 28% of votes, while her worse performance was, ex-aequo in Vicenza and Treviso, where she only won 20% of votes. Worth noting that Vicenza is Moretti’s home province, and that until two years ago she was deputy-mayor of Vicenza. So, her weak performance in her home province highlight her weakness. Worth noting also that Zaia bested Moretti even in the city of Venice, with Zaia winning 43% to Moretti’s 31%. Five years ago Zaia lost Venice by one point, in spite winning the region by 31 points, now he won it by 12 points, marking the first time a conservative gubernatorial candidate has won in the region’s capital.
Jacopo Berti of the 5 Star Movement came distant third with almost 12% of popular votes. His result was 8 points lower than last year’s European election. His best performance was in Venice province, maybe as a result of the public opinion disgust for the “MOSE” scandal. His worse performance was in Treviso, home of Zaia, where he finished below the double digit threshold. As I said before, it’s hard to judge the M5S result in local elections, due to their lack of territorial rootage. In the specific case of Berti, the fact of being against someone like Zaia might have hurt him even more.
Tosi’s result was not very good. Despite being the region’s second most popular politician until few months ago, he finished distant fourth, not only behind Zaia and Moretti, but also behind the little known Berti. Tosi built around himself a coalition made by a series of civic lists, including his own personal list, and the centrist New Centre Right. Usually if a candidate outside the two main coalitions obtained almost 12% of votes in a regional election, this is saluted as a good result, but in this case it’s not, and possibly this slump marks the end of Tosi’s political career. Even more resounding, in his own city, Verona, Tosi came third behind both Zaia and Moretti, not a stunning result for someone who polls claimed to be “Italy’s most popular mayor”. Tosi strongest performance came in Verona’s province where he took 27% of votes, however his results outside his home province were far weaker. I honestly don’t know what political future Tosi might have. There were whispers that pointed towards a ministerial nomination in case he helped the left defeat Zaia. Those rumors were denied, and, in the wake of the outcome, they have no chance at all of becoming real. Tosi is now seen as a pariah by most conservative voters, who considered him a traitor and a sore loser, while, given his inability to siphon much votes away from Zaia, he is useless for the left. He will maybe follow the sad fate of all the “Third pole leaders” that preceded him, like Casini, Fini and Monti, and will quickly descend into irrelevance both nationally and locally. Once again the centrist dream of resuscitating the Christian Democracy has abruptly failed in the polling stations.
Apulia
Governor
Michele Emiliano (PD; UDC; SEL; Others) 47.1%
Antonella Laricchia (5 Star Movement) 18.4%
Francesco Schittuli (Fitto’s List; Brothers of Italy; New Centre Right) 18.3%
Adriana Poli Bortone (Forza Italia; Us with Salvini) 14.4%
Riccardo Rossi (The Other Apulia) 1.0%
Gregorio Mariggiò (The Greens) 0.5%
Michele Rizzi (Party of Communist Alternative) 0.3%
Regional Council
Emiliano’s Coalition 46.0%
PD 18.8% winning 14 seats
Emiliano’s List 9.3% winning 6 seats
Left Ecology and Freedom (SEL) 6.5% winning 4 seats
UDC 5.9% winning 3 seats
Others 5.5% winning 3 seats
5 Star Movement (Laricchia) 16.3% winning 7 seats
Schittulli’s Coalition 17.6%
Fitto’s List 9.3% winning 4 seats
New Centre Right 6.0% winning 4 seats
Brothers of Italy winning 2.3%
Poli Bortone’s Coalition 13.8%
Forza Italia 10.8% winning 6 seats
Us With Salvini 2.3%
Others 0.7%
The Other Apulia (Rossi) 0.9%
The Greens (Mariggiò) 0.4%
Party of Communist Alternative (Rizzi) 0.2%
As widely expected, former Bari mayor Michele Emiliano was easily elected as governor of Apulia, securing the region for the left for the third time in a row. Partially thanks to the right’s suicide, in presenting two different candidates, and partially to his own personal popularity, Emiliano won in a landslide in a region that the centre-right has always carried quite easily in parliamentary elections since the beginning of the so called second republic.
Despite the scandals that marked the second term of incumbent governor Vendola, Emiliano was able to win easily being personally not touched by Vendola’s troubles and his party’s poor performance. The PD performance in the region was actually not good, winning less than 19% of votes, down 15 points from last year’s European elections. Emiliano’s strongest performance came in the province of Foggia, where he took almost 52% of votes. His weakest, somewhat strangely, came in his home province of Bari where he took less than 45%.
Since anyone knew that Emiliano would have carried the region easily, the real reason for interest was who will be the runner-up. The 5 Star Movement flag bearer, Antonella La Ricchia was able to surpass both conservative candidates, earning the silver medal. Although the Movement result was more than eight points lower compared to last year’s result, it could be considered a positive result for grillinis, having surpassed two powerful conservative local bosses. La Ricchia’s best performance came in Bari’s province, where she took 22% of votes, her weakest came in Brindisi, where she got only 14%.
Both conservative candidates performed poorly. It’s an easy guess that many conservative voters supported Emiliano, instead of Schittulli and Poli Bortone. Even summed, Schittulli and Poli Bortone would have taken less than 33% of votes, so even a united centre-right would have lost badly to Emiliano. Overall the conservative pole would have performed even worse than in last year European elections, where parties on the right of center obtained 35% of suffrages. In the conservative pole a reason of interest was how Salvini’s personal list will perform in a southern region. “Us with Salvini”, the League’s southern spinoff that supported Adriana Poli Bortone, obtained 2.3% of votes. Not enough to obtain seats in the regional council, but it was an interesting start. We’ll see how Salvini’s project to expand in the south will pursue.
As I said Apulia is a tricky region, it usually votes conservative when it comes to elect the national parliament, but in the last ten years has preferred to support left-wing governors and mayors, and seems willing to continue its awkward electoral behaviour.
Tuscany
Governor
Enrico Rossi (PD; Others) 48.0%
Claudio Borghi (Northern League; Brothers of Italy) 20.0%
Giacomo Giannarelli (5 Star Movement) 15.1%
Stefano Mugnai (Forza Italia; others) 9.1%
Tommaso Fattori (Far Left) 6.3%
Giovanni Lamioni (Centrist) 1.3%
Giovanni Chiurlì (Independent) 0.3%
Regional Council
Rossi’s Coalition 48.0%
PD 46.3% winning 24 Seats
Others 1.7%
Borghi’s Coalition 20.1%
Northern League 16.2% winning 6 seats
Brothers of Italy 3.9% winning 1 seat
5 Star Movement (Giannarelli) 15.1% winning 4 seats
Mugnai’s coalition 9.1%
Forza Italia 8.5% winning 2 seats
Others 0.6%
Yes Tuscany’s Left (Fattori) 6.3% winning 2 seats
Passion For Tuscany (NCD-Lamioni) 1.3%
Direct Democracy (Chiurlì) 0.3%
Tuscany, once again, has renewed its traditional loyalty to the left. In spite of the economic crisis and the scandals surrounding the regional banking system, which is heavily linked with local politics and with the PD, incumbent centre-left governor Enrico Rossi won handily.
The lone true chance to defeat Rossi was force him to a runoff, Tuscany being the lone region where a runoff is possible if no candidate reaches 40%. However Rossi was able to pass the threshold easily, winning 48% of votes. As I said in the preview, the true interest of this race was who will be the runner up. Claudio Borghi, of the Northern League came second with a strong performance, bringing his party to results that it had never even come close to achieving in this traditional left-wing stronghold. The PD suffered a 10 points loss from last year’s spectacular 56%, although the party’s margin over its opponents is still extremely comfortable. Rossi’s best performance came in the province of Siena, where he took more than 55% of votes. His weakest performance came in the province of Lucca, as usual the weakest province for the PD, where he obtained 41% of votes
Borghi performed better than expected, and better than the League has ever dreamed in this region, winning 20% of votes in the gubernatorial race and leading his party to an historic 16% of the vote. The League has become the region’s second largest party, and now is the main party on the right of centre in the region. Just one year ago the League only won 2.6% in the region. The Brothers of Italy, who endorsed Borghi slightly improved last year performance winning 3.9%, up 0.7% from the European election. Borghi’s best performances were in the provinces of Grosseto and Lucca, where he took 24% of votes. His weakest in the province of Florence where he took 16% of votes. Though he has been actually defeated, this result meant a lot for the League, who may finally start to make inroads in Central Italy. Borghi centred his campaign on the financial scandals in Monte dei Paschi and Bank of Etruria, which involved indirectly the Democratic Party.
Giannarelli’s performance was so and so. Due to the last year’s shocking victory in the town of Livorno, many expected M5S to perform well. Instead, as usual, the 5 Star Movement suffers a lot in local elections, due to their inability to run credible and competitive candidates. Given the scandals surrounding Monte dei Paschi and Bank of Etruria, you’d expect the Movement to take advantage, but instead Borghi was able to steal them the protest votes against the banking scandals. The Movement itself performed worse than last year’s European elections taking 1.7 point less than one year ago. However as in almost all regions, the inability of the Movement to run good candidates both for governor and regional council still hurts them. Giannarelli performed better in Livorno province, where the Movement governs the city of Livorno.
Forza Italia was perhaps the biggest loser in the region. The historical local boss of the party, Denis Verdini, has often been accused of having no interest in truly challenging the left hegemony in the region. Forza Italia’s candidate, a little known local politician, performed worse than expected, ending distant fourth. The party was doubled by the League in a region where usually the League performed weakly, down more than three points from last year’s yet weak result. Also extremely weak was the performance of the centrist candidate, Lamioni.
Liguria
Governor
Giovanni Toti (Northern League; Forza Italia; Brothers of Italy; New Centre Right) 34.4%
Raffaella Paita (PD) 27.8%
Alice Salvatori (5 Star Movement) 24.8%
Luca Pastorino (SEL; Others) 9.4%
Enrico Musso (Centrist) 1.6%
Matteo Piccardi (Party of Communist Workers) 0.8%
Antonio Bruno (Other Liguria) 0.7%
Mirella Batini (Feminist) 0.3%
Regional Council
Toti’s Coalition 37.8%
Northern League 20.3% winning 6 seats
Forza Italia 12.7% winning 8 seats
Brothers of Italy 3.1% winning 2 seats
New Centre Right 1.7%
Paita’s Coalition 30.3%
PD 25.6% winning 7 seats
Others 4.7%
5 Star Movement (Salvatori) 22.3% winning 6 seats
Pastorino’s Coalition 6.6%
Left Ecology and Freedom 4.1% winning 1 seat
Pastorino’s List 2.5%
Musso’s List 1.6%
Party of Communist Workers (Piccardi) 0.6%
The Other Liguria (Bruno) 0.7%
Sisterhood’s List (Batini) 0.2%
Liguria was considered the closest region by opinion polls, but it turned out that it was not that close actually. Conservative candidate Giovanni Toti eventually won easily, with a six points margin over center-left candidate Raffaella Paita. Paita’s performance was so awful that she risked ending third, even behind the grillini candidate, Alice Salvatori.
Paita’s defeat might be considered a severe blow to Renzi, since he heavily campaigned for her. Paita’s campaign was a train wreck since the beginning. She won the primary but was accused by her opponent in the primary of having bought votes from immigrants, causing a split in the centre-left. The runner up of the primary, Sergio Cofferati, left the party alongside several local members and built a coalition with minor left wing parties like Left Ecology and Freedom and the Communist Refoundation Party. The flag bearer of the “left of the left” coalition was Luca Pastorino, a dissident PD MP.
Then, a few weeks before the election Paita was charged for her role in the disastrous flood that last fall caused the death of a person and millions in damages in the region’s capital, Genoa. Being the regional minister of environment, Paita is accused of several heavy offences, including culprit in murder, culprit in disaster, attempted cover up and failure to properly alarm the citizens.
Paita’s indictment was the last nail in the coffin of an awful campaign in a region where the incumbent centre-left administration was extremely unpopular due to their inability of facing natural disasters in the last years. Though polls showed a tight race, conservative candidate, Forza Italia MEP Giovanni Toti, won with a comfortable margin.
Toti was able to reunite the centre-right, being endorsed by the four major right of centre parties: The League, Forza Italia, the Brothers of Italy and the New Centre Right. Although Salvini had to sacrifice its own candidate, Edoardo Rixi, he heavily campaigned on Toti’s behalf encouraging the League voters to support him. Salvini’s role in Toti’s victory is evident by the League’s great performance. The League won almost 20% of votes, an historical peak in the region and a result almost 15 points higher than last year’s European election, decisively helping Toti in his gubernatorial bid. Forza Italia’s result, despite being the governor’s party, was very poor, as was the performance of the New Centre Right.
The centre of the earthquake that led the centre-left losing one of his historical strongholds, was in city of Genoa, home of a third of the region’s population. In Genoa Paita’s result was catastrophic, finishing only third with just 24% of votes behing both Toti who won 28% and grillini Salvatori who carried the region’s capital with 30% of votes. Five years ago Burlando won the region’s capital with a 57-43 margin, helping him carry the region with a four points margin. Now Genoa, an historical stronghold of the Italian left has been crucial in the PD defeat.
Paita blamed Pastorino for her defeat, and in fact Paita’s and Pastorino’s votes summed are higher than Toti’s, however I wouldn’t be so sure that all of Pastorino’s voters would have chosen Paita. Many of them might have supported Salvatori instead of Paita. The PD performance was also awful. Renzi’s party won less than 26% of votes, down sixteen points from last year’s European elections.
The 5 Star Movement performed moderately well in the home region of his leader, Beppe Grillo. Probably, had Grillo chosen to run himself he would have a very serious chance of victory in a region where his party got 32% of votes in 2013 parliamentary elections, but Grillo is barred from running for electoral offices by the party’s statute. Salvatori was somewhat instrumental in Paita’s defeat, due to her good performance in Genoa, where she somewhat embodied the protest of Genoan citizens against the regional establishment.
Given the fact that both Salvini and Renzi heavily campaigned for their respective candidates, this might have been seen as a preview of the next parliamentary elections, and it was not a good preview for Renzi.
Marche
Governor
Luca Ceriscioli (PD; UDC; Others) 41.1%
Giovanni Maggi (5 Star Movement) 21.8%
Francesco Acquaroli (Northern League; Brothers of Italy) 19.0%
Gian Mario Spacca (Forza Italia; New Centre Right; Others) 14.2%
Edoardo Mentrasti (Far Left) 4.0%
Regional Council
Ceriscioli’s coalition 43.5%
PD 35.1% winning 16 seats
UDC 3.4% winning 1 seat
Others 5.0% 2 seats
5 Star Movement (Maggi) 18.9% winning 5 seats
Acquaroli’s coalition 19.5%
Northern League 13.0% winning 3 seats
Brothers of Italy 6.5% winning 1 seat
Spacca’s coalition 14.2%
Forza Italia 9.4% winning 2 seats
New Centre Right-Spacca’s list 4.0% winning 1 seat
Others 0.8%
The Other Marche-United Left (Mentrasti) 3.8%
As I wrote in the preview, Marche was home to what was probably the most awkward race of the cycle. Incumbent centre-left governor Gian Mario Spacca was barred by his party’s rules to run for a third term, despite the regional law allowing him to do so.
Spacca decided to split with his party and run as an independent. Forza Italia and the New Centre Right endorsed him, sensing an opportunity to pick the region from the left. However the Brothers of Italy and the League refused to endorse an incumbent governor they spent ten years opposing in regional council, and ran their own candidate, Francesco Acquaroli. The PD in coalition with what remains of the Union of the Centre and minor leftist movements supported Pesaro mayor Luca Ceriscioli, while the far left ran their own candidate Mentrasti.
Polls showed Ceriscioli running far ahead with Spacca and grillino Maggi running neck and neck for the second spot, while Acquaroli was running distant fourth. However the polling boxes revealed the catastrophic slump of Spacca’s candidacy.
The incumbent governor, was not only unable to siphon voters from his former party, but actually damaged the party that supported him (Forza Italia and the New Centre Right) that lost votes in favour of Acquaroli and his coalition (The League and the Brothers of Italy). Spacca ended distant fourth behind both Maggi and Acquaroli, with Ceriscioli winning with an extremely comfortable margin over his opponents.
The support of Spacca’s candidacy was an ill advised choice for the moderate wing of the centre-right, left wing voters were turned off by him and his betrayal and very few followed him, while conservative voters were shocked by moderate conservatives running with the governor they opposed for ten years and turned to Acquaroli instead.
Even in Marche the League surpassed Forza Italia and becomes the biggest force among the right of centre parties. The Brothers of Italy also obtained a good result, with what was the best performance of the party in the regional elections. This was likely due to an Acquaroli effect, himself a member of the Brothers of Italy.
Ceriscioli’s victory came with a wider than expected margin. Although the PD lost ten points compared to last year’s European elections, it can be viewed as a positive result, given Spacca’s schism.
The 5 Star Movement profited from the conservative’s division and ended in second place, though losing six points from last year’s European elections.
Umbria
Governor
Catiuscia Marini (PD; SEL; Others) 42.8%
Claudio Ricci (Northern League; Forza Italia; Brothers of Italy; New Centre Right) 39.3%
Andrea Liberati (5 Star Movement) 14.3%
Michele Vecchietti (The Other Umbria; Far Left) 1.6%
Simone Di Stefano (Sovereignty-Far Right) 0.7%
Amato John de Paulis (Independent) 0.6%
Aurelio Fabiani (Communist Workers Party) 0.5%
Fulvio Carlo Maiorca (Forza Nuova-Far Right) 0.3%
Regional Council
Marini’s Coalition 43.4%
Democratic Party 35.8% winning 11 seats
Left Ecology and Freedom 2.6% winning 1 seat
Others 5.0% 1 seat
Ricci’s coalition 38.5%
Northern League 14.0% winning 2 seats
Forza Italia 8.5% winning 1 seat
Brothers of Italy 6.2% winning 1 seat
Ricci’s List 4.5% winning 1 seat
New Centre Right 2.6%
Others 2.7%
5 Star Movement (Liberati) 14.6% winning 1 seat
The Other Umbria (Vecchietti) 1.6%
Sovereignty (Di Stefano) 0.7%
Reformist Alternative (de Paulis) 0.5%
Communist Workers Party (Fabiani) 0.5%
Forza Nuova (Maiorca) 0.4%
Umbria has usually been an historical stronghold of the Italian left. Alongside Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany, Umbria has usually been considered the heartland of the Italian left. However a series of corruption scandal that heavily involved the PD, the hegemonic party of the region, and the severe economic crisis that the region is facing are putting this hegemony in jeopardy.
Last year’s mayoral elections gave a worrying signal for the left. Conservatives won the city of Perugia, the region’s capital, ending seventy years of left-wing dominance in the city. Initial polls showed incumbent governor Marini ahead, but her lead over former Assisi conservative mayor Claudio Ricci, started to dwindle in the final weeks of the campaign. Initial projections on election night seemed to point towards a shocking conservative pick-up in the tiny left wing bastion. However, Marini was able to ultimately survive the conservative attempt to pull a shocking upset. This victory is however a worrying signal for the left. Conservatives for the first time seriously challenged the left’s hegemony and they came very close from pulling the upset. This is a signal that Umbria is no longer a safe region for the left and that conservatives can be competitive when they run credible candidates.
Even in Umbria the League became the first party of the centre-right, surpassing Forza Italia by a 2:1 margin. The League increased by 11 points its result from last year’s European elections, while Forza Italia lost more than six points. The PD lost 13 points from European elections, while the 5 star Movement decreased by 4.6% compared to 2014.
Mayoral elections (provincial capitals only)
Alongside elections in seven of the twenty regions, several municipalities renewed their mayor and city council, including 17 provincial capital including Veneto’s capital, Venice. Regional results were mixed at best for the governing party, but mayoral were not very good, especially runoffs gave some bad surprises for Renzi’s party.
Lecco
I Round
Virginio Brivio (Democratic Party) 39.2%
Alberto Negrini (Northern League; Forza Italia; Brothers of Italy) 26.5%
Lorenzo Bodega (New Centre Right) 20.2%
Massimo Riva (5 Star Movement) 8.6%
Alberto Anghileri (Far Left) 5.5%
Runoff
Virginio Brivio (Democratic Party) 54.4%
Alberto Negrini (Northern League) 45.6%
Centre-Left hold
Mantova
I Round
Mattia Palazzi (Democratic Party; Left Ecology and Freedom) 46.5%
Paola Bulbarelli (Forza Italia; Northern League; Brothers of Italy) 26.4%
Michele Annaloro (5 Star Movement) 7.7%
Alberto Grandi (Independent) 4.7%
Luca De Marchi (Independent) 4.2%
Arnaldo De Pietri (Independent) 2.8%
Maurizio Esposito (Independent) 2.4%
Mohamed Tabi (Independent) 1.6%
Cesare Azzetti (Far Left) 1.6%
Andrea Gardini (Independent) 1.1%
Sergio Ciliegi (Independent) 0.9%
Gilberto Sogliani (Independent) 0.2%
Runoff
Mattia Palazzi (Democratic Party) 62.6%
Paola Bulbarelli (Forza Italia) 37.4%
Centre-Left pick-up
Venice
I Round
Felice Casson (Democratic Party; Others) 38.0%
Luigi Brugnaro (Independent Centre-Right; Forza Italia; New Centre Right) 28.6%
Davide Scano (5 Star Movement) 12.6%
Gian Angelo Bellati (Northern League) 11.9%
Francesca Zaccariotto (Brothers of Italy) 6.8%
Giampietro Pizzo (Independent) 0.9%
Camilla Seibizzi (Far Left) 0.7%
Alessandro Busetto (Far Left) 0.3%
Francesco Mario D’Elia (Regionalist) 0.2%
Runoff
Luigi Brugnaro (Independent Centre Right) 53.2%
Felice Casson (Democratic Party) 46.8%
Centre-Right pick-up
Rovigo
I Round
Nadia Romeo (Democratic Party) 24.0%
Massimo Bergamin (Northern League; Forza Italia; New Centre Right) 18.6%
Paolo Avezzù (Tosi List) 15.5%
Silvia Menon (Independent) 15.4%
Ivaldo Vernelli (5 Star Movement) 10.1%
Livio Ferrari (Far Left) 5.3%
Andrea Bimbati (Independent) 4.6%
Antonio Gianni Saccardin (Independent) 3.4%
Giovanni Nalin (Left Ecology and Freedom) 2.2%
Federico Donegatti (Far Right) 0.8%
Runoff
Massimo Bergamin (Northern League) 59.7%
Nadia Romeo (Democratic Party) 40.3%
Centre-Right hold
Arezzo
I Round
Matteo Bracciali (Democratic Party) 44.2%
Alessandro Ghinelli (Forza Italia; Northern League; Brothers of Italy) 36.0%
Massimo Ricci (5 Star Movement) 9.1%
Gianni Mori (Independent) 4.6%
Maria Cristina Nardone (Independent) 1.7%
Ennio Gori (Far Left) 1.5%
Roberto Barone (Independent) 1.4%
Gianfranco Morini (Independent) 1.0%
Alessandro Ruzzi (Independent) 0.5%
Runoff
Alessandro Ghinelli (Forza Italia) 50.8%
Matteo Bracciali (Democratic Party) 49.2%
Centre-Right pick-up
Macerata
I Round
Romano Carancini (Democratic Party; UDC; Left Ecology and Freedom) 39.9%
Deborah Pantana (Forza Italia; New Centre Right) 18.0%
Maurizio Mosca (Brothers of Italy) 13.6%
Carla Messi (5 Star Movement) 13.5%
Anna Menghi (Northern League) 7.2%
Mariella Tardella (Independent) 3.8%
Michele Lattanzi (Far Left) 2.7%
Tommaso Golini (Far Right) 0.9%
Maria Adele Pallotto (Independent) 0.3%
Runoff
Romano Carancini (Democratic Party) 59.1%
Deborah Pantana (Forza Italia) 40.9%
Centre-Left hold
Fermo
I Round
Pasquale Zacheo (Democratic Party) 24.9%
Paolo Calcinaro (Independent) 22.9%
Giambattista Catalini (Forza Italia; New Centre Right) 17.4%
Massimo Rossi (Far Left) 15.0%
Marco Mochi (5 Star Movement) 10.7%
Mauro Torresi (Brothers of Italy) 9.1%
Runoff
Paolo Calcinaro (Independent) 69.9%
Pasquale Zacheo (Democratic Party) 30.1%
Independent pick-up
Chieti
I Round
Umberto Di Primio (Forza Italia; New Centre Right; UDC) 37.0%
Luigi Febo (Democratic Party) 30.3%
Ottavio Argenio (5 Star Movement) 11.1%
Bruno Di Paolo (Independent) 8.6%
Enrico Raimondi (Far Left)
Antonello D’Aloisio (Us With Salvini) 3.2%
Roberto Di Monte (Independent) 2.7%
Donato Marcotullio (Independent) 1.3%
Runoff
Umberto Di Primio (Forza Italia) 55.0%
Luigi Febo (Democratic Party) 45.0%
Centre-Right hold
Andria
I Round
Nicola Giorgino (Forza Italia; Us With Salvini) 52.2%
Sabino Fortunato (Democratic Party) 24.1%
Michele Coratella (5 Star Movement) 20.9%
Savino Losappio (Far Left) 1.7%
Sabino Cannone (Independent) 1.0%
Centre Right hold
Trani
I Round
Amedeo Bottaro (Democratic Party; Left Ecology and Freedom) 47.5%
Antonio Florio (Independent) 14.6%
Emanuele Tomasicchio (Forza Italia; Brothers of Italy) 11.1%
Antonio Procacci (Independent) 10.6%
Antonella Papagni (5 Star Movement) 9.9%
Carlo Laurora (New Centre Right) 6.3%
Runoff
Amedeo Bottaro (Democratic Party) 75.8%
Antonio Florio (Independent) 24.4%
Centre-Left pick-up
Matera
I Round
Salvatore Adduce (Democratic Party; Left Ecology and Freedom) 40.1%
Raffaello De Ruggeri (Independent Centre Right) 36.0%
Angelo Tortorelli (Independent) 13.0%
Antonio Materdomini (5 Star Movement) 8.4%
Francesco Vespe (Far Left) 1.4%
Antonio Cappiello (Us With Salvini) 1.1%
Runoff
Raffaello De Ruggeri (Independent Centre Right) 54.5%
Salvatore Adduce (Democratic Party) 45.5%
Centre Right pick-up
Vibo Valentia
I Round
Elio Costa (Independent Centre Right) 50.8%
Antonio Maria Lo Schiavo (Democratic Party; Left Ecology and Freedom) 37.3%
Cesare Pasqua (Independent) 4.6%
Antonio D’Agostino (Independent) 4.5%
Francesco Bevilacqua (Brothers of Italy) 2.8%
Centre Right hold
Nuoro
I Round
Alessandro Bianchi (Democratic Party; Left Ecology and Freedom) 29.9%
Andrea Soddu (Regionalist; Sardinian Action Party) 21.5%
Basilio Brodu (New Centre Right) 16.5%
Tore Lai (5 Star Movement) 12.0%
Pierluigi Saiu (Independent) 11.5%
Stefano Mannironi (Independent) 8.6%
Runoff
Andrea Soddu (Regionalist) 68.4%
Alessandro Bianchi (Democratic Party) 31.6%
Regionalist pick-up
Tempio Pausania
Andrea Maria Biancareddu (Independent Centre-Right) 52.1%
Antonio Balata (Independent Centre-Left) 38.5%
Nino Vargiu (5 Star Movement) 5.7%
Salvatore Sassu (Independent) 3.7%
Centre Right pick-up
Sanluri (No runoff, since the town is under 15.000 inhabitants)
Alberto Urpi (Independent) 47.2%
Giuseppe Tatti (Independent) 40.1%
Luigi Pilloni (5 Star Movement) 12.7%
Agrigento
I Round
Lillo Firetto (UDC; New Centre Right; Democratic Party) 59.0%
Silvio Alessi (Forza Italia) 14.9%
Marco Marcolin (Us with Salvini) 9.2%
Emanuele Cardillo (5 Star Movement) 8.8%
Giuseppe Arnone (Independent) 3.2%
Andrea Cirino (Brothers of Italy) 2.9%
Giuseppe Di Rosa (Independent) 2.0%
Centre-Left hold
Enna
I Round
Mirello Crisafulli (Democratic Party) 41.0%
Maurizio Di Pietro (Independent Centre Right) 24.4%
Davide Solfato (5 Star Movement) 17.5%
Angelo Girasole (Far Left) 17.2%
Runoff
Maurizio Di Pietro (Independent Centre Right) 51.9%
Mirello Crisafulli (Democratic Party) 48.1%
Centre Right pick-up
Before this electoral cycle the centre-left coalition held 10 of the 17 provincial capitals that went to the polls, but lost four of them, including Venice, the biggest of the towns that went to the polls.
As I wrote in the preview Venice has always been something of a “Red Sheep” in an overwhelming conservative region. Even in its darkest days the centre-left always held the Venice municipality with good margins. But recent corruption scandals that heavily involved the centre-left local establishment, including incumbent mayor Orsoni who was arrested for corruption, and polemics on issues like the obscene Bridge of Calatrava, the passage of cruise ships in the lagoon, urban decay and rudeness of the tourists led to a surprising upset, with independent conservative Brugnaro defeating the Democratic Party nominee, former prosecutor turned politician Felice Casson. After losing the first round by almost ten points, Brugnaro was able to coalesce behind him all the voters from right of center and also part of Grillini’s voters, thus becoming the first centre-right mayor of Venice since direct mayoral elections began in 1993, ending 22 years of centre-left dominance in Veneto’s capital.
Another spectacular upset came in Arezzo, the home town of Constitutional Reform minister Maria Elena Boschi, who is usually considered Renzi’s de facto number 2. Conservative candidate Alessandro Ghinelli upset centre-left candidate Matteo Bracciali by a razor thin margin, returning the city to the right after nine years. The centre-left also lost Matera and Tempio Pausania to independent conservative candidates, and lost Fermo and Nuoro to independents.
Not all bad news came for the Democrats as the centre-left was able to regain from the right Mantova and Trani, but the overall picture, also counting minor cities, is not a very good one for the governing party.
Few days after the regional election results, and the first round of mayoral elections, the website “Seitrezero” showed a national projection of the regional results. The PD still leads the field, however with “only” 33.4% of votes, seven points less than last year’s European election. The 5 Star Movement followed with 21.7% of votes, 0.5% more than one year ago, while the League gained more than ten points with 16.2%. Forza Italia performed poorly only 12%, almost five points down from one year ago. The Brothers of Italy obtained a bit more than 5.2%, up 1.5%, while the New Centre Right only gained 2.9%, down 1.4% and also below the 3% threshold fixed by the new electoral law. The various far left denomination, if put together, would gain 4.3%, up 0.3% from one year ago far left joint list “The Other Europe”.
What conclusion can we achieve from this local elections?
1-Regional and mayoral elections are becoming increasingly local
Though national mood and national issues have a great influence on the outcome of these elections, citizens are more and more inclined to vote for a candidate instead of his party. Results in Liguria, Venice and Arezzo, traditional left-leaning constituencies won by conservatives, and Apulia, a conservative region that a centre-left candidate won in a landslide, prove the increased tendency of Italians to choose local leadership regardless of their political party
2-The honeymoon with Renzi is over, but…
One year ago the PD’s stunning 40.8% in European elections led pundits and experts to elect Renzi as the new absolute king of Italian politics and paint the Democratic Party as something like a natural governing party, like the old Christian Democracy was. These results certainly challenge this assumption. The Democrats achieved that shocking result in the midst of Renzi’s honeymoon with the Italian electorate, however, after one year, the Florentine leader has still achieved very little, and his party have been plagued by various scandals, most notably in Emilia Romagna; Tuscany; Campania; Liguria; Rome and Venice.
The Democratic Party performance can’t be considered satisfying, but still holds a edge on a divided opposition who still struggles to coalesce around a credible alternative
3-The Centre-Right is still alive, but…
Unlike what most people thought one year ago, Italians conservatives are not dead. Actually they’re still well alive, and, if they’re able to unite around a new national leader, they can give Renzi a true run for his money. But the centre-right coalition is still well divided. The Boschi law recently approved by parliament will make it hard for one of the conservative leader to reach the runoff. The League, who is now officially the biggest party on the right, has made great inroads in central Italy, but its Southern spinoff “Us with Salvini” still has a long way to go to make the League competitive in southern Italy, and so enable Salvini to be truly competitive nationwide.
Italy’s conservatives are facing a big dilemma, divided between the radical eurosceptic and anti-immigration wing, represented by Salvini’s League and Meloni’s Brothers of Italy, and the more moderate pro-European wing represented by Berlusconi’s Forza Italia and Alfano’s New Centre Right. These elections have sanctioned a big win for the radical eurosceptic wing, but Berlusconi still claims he’s the only one able to unite conservatives, despite his party have been doubled by the League in 5 regions out of 7 and the fact that runoff polls against Renzi constantly put him under 40% in scenarios against Renzi, while Salvini will be much more competitive against the prime minister polling around 45-48% in runoff scenarios.
A reunion of conservatives on a national basis seems unlikely due to Salvini continuing clash against Interior Minister, and New Centre Right leader, Angelino Alfano often labelled by him as inept and incompetent. Berlusconi has repeatedly called for a new leader to reunite the so called “moderates”, however who this new leader will be is still a mystery, probably is Berlusconi himself or more likely one of his five sons. In spite of his party’s national meltdown, Berlusconi still thinks that his brand, maybe carried by one of his sons, is still the only one that can lead conservatives to victory.
4-The 5 Star Movement is also still alive
The 5 Star Movement performance was so and so. In regional elections they’ve been unable to repeat the results of parliamentary and European elections. Though in runoffs they’ve been able to carry some cities, most notably Gela, home of Sicily’s governor Rosario Crocetta.
As I often pointed out, the Movement has usually hard time in local and regional elections, due to their lack of experience. They’ve not been able to carry one of the seven regions, but they did place as runner-ups in two regions, Marche and Apulia. I judge their overall performance as a tie, not a win not a loss. They’re still there, with roughly 21-22% of votes nationwide, however it looks like their peak of 2013 (25.6%) is something they can’t repeat. Although they’ve not melted down like someone expected after last year’s European elections.
5-Abstention is now the first party of Italy
48% of eligible voters opted to not show themselves to polls. In countries like the USA or the UK, the fact that almost half of the population doesn’t show up for local contests won’t surprise anyone. In Italy however, who long claimed to be the country with highest voting turnout in Western Europe, the increasing party of abstention worries political parties since the rise of abstentions makes elections more and more unpredictable.
6-Runoffs might be a lethal trap for Renzi
According to the new electoral law, recently approved by parliament, makes legislative elections increasingly look like mayoral elections. If no single party list passes the 40% threshold, than there will be a runoff between the two most voted parties.
Since no parties is currently close to the threshold, in case an early election is called, there will likely be a runoff.
In the last twenty years runoffs in mayoral elections usually favoured left-wing candidates over conservatives, due to the fact that conservatives tends to be much more damaged by lower turnout in runoffs. This tendency led to some extremely notable upsets. Many conservative cities, sometimes very conservatives cities, were won by the left thanks to extremely low turnout in runoffs. This has probably led Renzi to think this kind of law that, he thought, would have favour his party.
But in the last couple of years something has changed, as 5 Star Movement voters seems to vote in runoffs with no clear partisan leaning. Due to the similarities of the Movement with the League on issues like Europe and immigration, with the 5 Star Movement being just a bit more moderate than the League on both issues, it is very likely that a runoff might be extremely dangerous for Renzi, with the League and the Movement voters will likely unite against him.
The days after the elections have been hot. The left wing of the Democratic Party is accusing Renzi for the result, with is usual arrogance Renzi is denying any responsibility for the disappointing outcome and instead is blaming his internal opponents whom he calls losers. To signal he couldn’t care less of the outcome, Renzi posted a picture of himself playing at the playstation the night of the elections. However these results are certainly a blow for him and his ambitions. To avoid losing the majority in Parliament, Renzi might ask the President of the Republic to call an early election, but the new electoral law will enter in functions only next year. The current electoral law have been modified by the constitutional court into an old style proportional system, making impossible for a single party to achieve a working majority. If Renzi is forced to call for early elections Italy will likely fall under a new caretaker cabinet, and the Florentine bully will see the precocious end of his political career.
Next months will be very interesting for Italian politics, and European institutions should watch very closely what will happen, since Italy looks as the country where parties who openly wish to withdraw from Euro, have a higher chance to conquer the national government.
Guest Post: Irish Referendums 2015
David J. Barrett contributed this excellent guest post covering the results of the two referendums held in Ireland on May 22, 2015
Two referendums and a by-election to parliament took place on Friday May 22nd in Ireland. The referendums took place in order to change the constitution to allow same-sex marriage, and to lower the age of eligibility for candidates running for President from 35 to 21. The by-election took place to fill the vacancy caused by the appointment of Phil Hogan to the European Commission.
The referendum in marriage was a long-time coming, but still moved quickly when it did. Ireland has traditionally been very far from the lead in socially progressive legislation in Europe. Homosexuality was only legalized in 1993 and divorce only won a referendum in 1995 by about 9,000 votes – less than 1%. Abortion is still one of the live-issues of Irish politics and is still effectively illegal. Nonetheless after legalization public opinion moved relatively quickly. In 2010 civil unions, with many similarities to marriage (albeit without being exactly the same) was pushed through by the then governing Fianna Fail-Green coalition, after having been repeatedly proposed by the social-democratic Labour Party in legislation while in opposition for several years prior to that. It faced nearly negligible opposition when actually brought to a vote – with only a handful of senators in the largely powerless upper house seriously expressing disquiet over the issue. Reaction to the legislation among the Irish LGBT community was generally positive, albeit not uniformly so, with the Gay and Lesbian Equality Network (GLEN) expressing their support for the legislation while Marriage Equality – an organization with an eponymous raison d’etre – pointing out the numerous legal differences between civil partnership and marriage.
In the 2011 election Ireland elected openly gay parliamentarians to the Dail – the lower house of parliament – for the first time, having long had Senator David Norris in the upper house. Norris, who led the legal fight in the courts to get homosexuality legalized, was later that year considered the heavy favourite to win Ireland’s largely ceremonial presidency in polls before ultimately faltering, but the popularity of his campaign showed how homosexuality seemed to be increasingly a non-issue in Irish politics.
Same-sex marriage was not in the programme for government of the Fine Gael-Labour coalition that took power in 2011. Instead, the issue was put to the Constitutional Convention, a joint assembly of citizen’s and politicians that would consider a variety of civic and political reforms. The constitutional convention voted overwhelmingly to recommend the issue to the government, along with a variety of other reforms, including lowering the eligibility age for presidential and lowering the voting age.
However the step from civil partnership to full marriage was always going to be more difficult. The Irish court system had previously ruled that the constitutional definition of family was limited to opposite-sex couples only. This meant that any change to the legal status of marriage required a referendum – like any other change in the Irish constitution. While the government’s poll rating had slipped since the election, the referendum began to be seen increasingly as the most inevitable of those proposed by the Convention, not least owing to the passionate support it received from the Labour Party, whose then leader Eamon Gilmore called it the ‘Civil Rights issue of our generation’. Fine Gael as well became increasingly more supportive as time went on, with motions supporting same-sex marriage being supported by the youth wing of the party, and with the foundation of an LGBT wing led by popular Cork based deputy Jerry Buttimer, who came out after the 2011 election.
On January 11th 2014 Rory O’Neill, a popular Irish drag queen who is best name as his alter-ego ‘Panti Bliss’, was interviewed by the state broadcaster RTE, in which he alleged that two socially conservative newspapers columnists for the Irish Times, a major broadsheet newspaper in Ireland, Breda O’Brien and John Waters, were homophobic. Both O’Brien and Waters sued RTE for defamation, who immediately settled and paid them a sum of €85,000. There was immediate outrage not only among the LGBT community but among politicians and wider society, which culminated in large protests and a passionate and extremely well-watched speech by Panti in the Abbey Theatre, which currently has over 700,000 views on YouTube. With the referendum very well anticipated by this point it was a seen as an early battleground between the liberal and conservative portions of Irish politics.
The Yes side spent a considerable proportion of their energy initially ensuring that large numbers of county councils passed resolutions in favour of same-sex marriage, in order to help build a sense of momentum for the idea among the body politic.
Much of the work before the referendum concerned the ‘Children and Family Relationships Bill’, which was an omnibus piece of legislation that aimed to address legal ambiguities involving all kinds of non-traditional families, including LGBT ones. While not strictly related to the referendum the passage of the bill before the vote was seen as absolutely necessary for the referendum to pass, as the bill would remove most of the issues that the No side to the referendum would likely raise regarding children and the family. In the event the bill only passed the upper house on March 20th, very close to the final date of the referendum, so much of the issues dealt with in the bill were seen by many as tied up with the referendum.
The Campaign
Both the Yes and No campaigns carefully studied previous campaigns in the US and Eastern Europe for advice over what worked and what did not for their rivals, giving the campaign a much more international than previous referendums.
Irish referendums have been dominated in recent years by the Coughlan and McKenna Supreme Court Judgments. These hold that governments cannot spend public money to promote their own proposal and that the state broadcaster must be ‘balanced’ in their coverage of the issue – which has usually been interpreted as giving exactly equal airtime to both sides.
The Yes campaign was supported by all major political parties, and a major civic society effort. Fine Gael and Labour in particular were active in promoting the government’s proposal with campaigns that emphasized the idea of equality for every citizen, with extensive and costly poster campaigns, and with many deputies running their own campaigns for the proposal in their own local area. The far-left and nationalist Sinn Fein, similarly, strongly supported a Yes vote, with their campaign invoking the 1916 proclamation, a document written by Irish rebels in 1916 declaring an Irish Republic that is considered the founding document of the Irish state, albeit without legal force, that all children of the nation be cherished equally. The centrist and populist Fianna Fail similarly ran a colourful poster campaign, but the party was noticeably more lukewarm in its support than the others and almost non-existent beyond the efforts of Senator Averil Power, based in northern Dublin suburbs, and a few local councilors. Indeed Wexford based Senator Jim Walsh resigned from the party over the party’s support for the proposal and for its support of the Children and Family Relationships’ bill. The party gave a distinct impression of being more interested in campaigning for the Carlow-Kilkenny by-election, which the party was regarded as strongly competitive in, than in the referendum.
However civic society was undoubtedly the main force of the Yes campaign. GLEN, Marriage Equality and the Irish Council for Civil Liberties, who pooled their organisations to make ‘Yes Equality’ (YE), which rapidly became a campaigning behemoth in several areas of the country. YE largely ran a conservative message, emphasizing the importance of family and stability in people’s lives, and how a yes vote would reduce stigma and improve the mental health of young LGBT people. Much of their early literature focused on well known sports and television personalities popular in rural Ireland, as it was felt that these individuals who would appeal to swing voters, rather than the outspoken liberals most associated with LGBT rights before this point.
YE’s actual strategy was similar to that of any political party – knock on as many doors as possible nationwide and speak to voters. While this has long been considered the best strategy for parties in general elections it is normally not done in referendums due to a severe shortage of volunteers. Most parties find it difficult to muster up their own members to campaign even over contentious European treaty referendums, and other volunteers tend to be extremely sparse. This means that the ‘ground war’ in most referendums is limited to things with high visibility, such as distributing leaflets at sporting occasions. However YE had no such shortage of volunteers, particularly in Dublin and Cork, where the number of campaigners in a constituency per night regularly passed fifty. YE was partially motivated in this approach by the (now utterly discredited and found to be fabricated) study of LaCour and Green, which found that people speaking to those that they know to be LGBT helps change attitudes positively significantly.
The No side ran a significantly more traditional referendum campaign. It had no political parties in support, but a number of politicians did support them, such independent Mattie McGrath and former Fianna Fail junior minister John McGuinness in the lower house, and Senators Ronan Mullen and Fidelma Healy Eames in the upper house. The Catholic Church also lent their support to the campaign. It was also supported a by a few media figures – most noticeably newspaper columnists David Quinn, Breda O’Brien and John Waters. Most of these figures amalgamated their efforts into the civic society group ‘Mothers and Fathers Matter’ (MFM). Their campaign focused little on the issue directly at hand. Their posters emphasized surrogacy and the importance of gender specific parents biologically related to the child, as well as arguing that No voters were being ‘silenced’ and discriminated against by a liberal society. The overall thrust of their campaign however focused on the ‘air war’, where their lack of volunteers on the ground (certainly relative to YE) was less noticeable and where they would be obliged to receive the same airtime as YE.
Both sides were well funded. YE in particular attracted an exceptionally large amount of small donations and also managed to make a considerable sum on the sale of campaign related merchandise. In particular YE badges became ubiquitous, with over 500,000 in circulation. The source of funding for MFM was more ambiguous – but they could clearly print posters and post literature at the same rate as YE, and also paid a considerable sum for seemingly endless advertisements on YouTube.
A selection of posters from both sides in Dublin city centre can be seen on either side.
Polling in the campaign stayed quite consistent, with support for Yes consistently high, and usually over 70%. Almost no one from either side of the campaign believed these numbers however, as it was felt that there was a strong social desirability factor in voting yes and many Irish referendums see extremely inaccurate poll numbers (with several European treaties and the abolition of the upper house being defeated in spite of no poll showing the Yes side behind). Additionally many spoke of the 1995 divorce referendum, which polled well and then saw the lead for the Yes side dwindle to almost nothing. As, arguably, the referendum most similar to it both sides planned for a similarly close finish.
Voters could be forgiven for not knowing that there was a second referendum, as the ballot on the presidential age had no campaign launched either for or against it, and received essentially no air time, which was probably related to the issue seeming almost laughably trivial compared to the other item on the ballot paper. There was essentially no polling done on it either, but almost all expected it to be heavily defeated.
The by-election in Carlow-Kilkenny, a predominantly rural constituency in the South-East of the country, was somewhat unusual, as almost every party had reason to expect to do reasonably well. FG was defending the seat and ran a local councillor, but this was also the area that FF received the highest percentage of the vote nationwide in their 2011 wipeout and were running a former parliamentarian for the area, and both Carlow and Kilkenny were among Labour’s best areas nationally in the last local election. SF was also polling exceptionally well nationally, and this was one of the few areas nationwide where the Green Party had a well-entrenched local councilor. The newly founded conservative ‘Renua’ party also managed to recruit a local councilor off FF, and hoped for a strong showing.
Results
| Results – Marriage Equality Referendum | ||
| Votes | Of total | |
| Yes | 1,201,607 | 62.07% |
| No | 734,300 | 37.93% |
| Valid votes | 1,935,907 | 99.29% |
| Invalid or blank votes | 13,818 | 0.71% |
| Total votes | 1,949,725 | 100.00% |
| Voter turnout | 60.52% | |
| Electorate | 3,221,681 | |
| Results – Presidential Age Referendum | ||
| Votes | Of total | |
| Yes | 520,898 | 26.94% |
| No | 1,412,602 | 73.06% |
| Valid votes | 1,933,500 | 99.18% |
| Invalid or blank votes | 15,938 | 0.82% |
| Total votes | 1,949,438 | 100.00% |
| Voter turnout | 60.51% | |
| Electorate | 3,221,681 | |
The Marriage Equality passed resoundingly, with only one of 43 constituencies – Roscommon-South Leitrim, in the west of the country, rejecting the proposal. By contrast the Presidential Age referendum lost resoundingly. It failed to win a single constituency nationwide and had the lowest Yes vote of any referendum in Irish history. FF won the by-election, being well clear of FG in the final count.
Results of the same-sex marriage referendum by constituency (source: Wikipedia)
While the Yes vote in the Marriage Equality was lower than most polls suggested, it was still well in line with what they were suggesting. Indeed it was the highest vote in favour of same-sex marriage anywhere in the world by nearly 10%. Based on previous form with referendums and polling this was considered extremely surprising and a result near stunning victory for YE. David Quinn effectively conceded for the No side within less than hour of the votes being counted and suggesting a near-landslide in Dublin.
The reason for YE’s near total victory can be seen in the extremely high turnout figure – which is near, albeit not quite at, general election turnout numbers in Ireland, and is the referendum with the highest turnout since divorce. While a high turnout the level of enthusiasm for actually voting surprised nearly every observer. Huge numbers enrolled on the electoral register for the first time – with nearly 67,000 voters ending up on the supplemental voting register – a resource for those who register after the deadline for the main register which is historically almost never used. Unofficial tallies of the boxes these votes were cast in suggested that they almost unanimously supported Yes. Ireland has no postal voting (which is likely related to large numbers of residents of Northern Ireland and the US who have Irish citizenship but have never actually been resident in Ireland), and in the final days of the campaign #hometovote started trending globally on twitter. With Ireland’s economic difficulties since 2008 a considerable number of young people left the country for jobs and opportunities elsewhere. A considerable number of them returned from very afield in order to vote on the proposal – with virtually all of Ryanair’s flights to Dublin the day before the vote sold out weeks in advance, and with individuals coming from considerably further afield than that (two friends of the author returned from New York and Mozambique to vote – these are extreme but not actually particularly uncommon examples).
However there was still a geographical split. Urban areas, and particularly Dublin, were noticeably more in favour of the proposal than rural ones, with areas in the North and West of the country having particularly low Yes votes compared to the national average (indeed the only No constituency was in this region, as were the next seven closest constituencies). This sort of split is not particularly unusual in Irish referendums.
What was unusual however was the internal breakdown of areas. Normally middle class Southern Dublin leads the way on issues relating to Europe and on social reform. Here the picture was much more mixed. The highest Yes constituency was indeed Dublin South East – an extremely wealthy constituency home to most of Dublin’s south city centre and the base of most of Ireland’s tech companies – making the constituency have an extremely high student and young professional population that naturally favoured a Yes. However what many of the other most favourable constituencies for Yes in Dublin share is being predominantly working class. By contrast Dublin South, a middle class area of suburban lawns and golf club memberships, which is usually very high on these measures, scoring among the lowest Yes votes in Dublin. While surprising to observers this was certainly not news to Yes campaigners, who regularly reported having a more difficult time in such more ‘settled’ areas, with an older population, more Church influence and less exposure to non-nuclear families generally. Turnout in Dublin was much more uniform than normal between middle and working class areas, suggesting that the latter was more interested in this than normal.
Cork and Limerick were also decisively favourable and above the national average, though with Yes votes below even Dublin’s lowest constituency. This is, again, normal on social issues in Ireland.
Non-urban areas however behaved somewhat differently in the details than they have in the past – again similar to Dublin. The gap between urban and rural was much smaller than in divorce. Many Dublin constituencies moved little from their Divorce vote – in spite of the liberal side winning 62% in contrast to 50.3% then. The most liberal constituency then – Dun Laoghaire in Dublin, went from 68% in favour to 71% in favour this time. Rural Ireland seems to have distinctly moved. There also in this contest a regional divide in the rural constituencies, with the North and West being distinctly less in favour than the South and East. In previous contests rural areas in Cork have been among Ireland’s most conservative – Cork North West had the highest No vote in divorce (Only 34% in favour) and returned enormous margins against abortion. This time it the liberal side of the issue won 58%. Rural areas anywhere near a commuting distance to Dublin saw enormous Yes wins (69% in Kildare North, 66% in Kildare South, 68% in Wicklow), although even areas outside of the pull of the capital were decisive.
No constituency in Connacht or Ulster were above the national average, and the only loss for Yes occurred in this region. Roscommon-South Leitrim, an inland Western constituency with a very poor economy, has traditionally not been the most conservative constituency – albeit it certainly leaned in that direction. What seems to have happened was a near total lack of support for YE among local politicians, combined with a knowledge that this was not actually Ireland’s most conservative constituency ensuring it got no special attention. Nonetheless the defeat in the area was quite narrow.
Much better bets for No constituencies actually returned a Yes vote – both Donegal constituencies in the far North-West and Cavan-Monaghan on the border of Northern Ireland, where local politicians supported YE campaigns seemingly determined the defy the conservative reputations of the area.
Results of the presidential age referendum by constituency (source: Irish Political Maps)
What the rural areas in the North and West seem to share – and that contrasts them with the rest of the country – is the near total non-existence of the Labour Party there at any level at almost any point in Irish history. Labour was for most of its existence predominantly a rural party in the South and East, and the party still has support and can return parliamentarians there even after becoming an urban force. Nonetheless this relationship is not total, and certainly does not explain the narrowing gap between Urban and Rural Ireland on social issues just as Labour has become more urban.
Another explanation is the institutional strength of the Church in certain areas, with No being stronger where they continue to have sway. This seems likely, but does not bode well for for the Church’s future sway over Ireland – particularly since, as the Archbishop of Dublin noted, 90% of Irish young people have spent nearly their whole lives in Catholic educational institutions, and these were the individuals most likely to repudiate their stance.
The Presidential age referendum had essentially the same geographical split, with the highest Yes again being Dublin South East, followed by other Dublin constituencies. The defeat was extremely heavy however, which likely reflected the perceived frivolity of the vote.
FF won the by-election – but their percentage of the vote (28%), was exactly the same as what they won in the area in the General Election, which does not strongly indicate a party in recovery and more reflects the struggles of FG, who both have reason to be disappointed. Renua did quite well – and with a vote only slightly above the 9.5% they received in a by-election perceived as a contest largely between FF and FG they would likely win a seat. One of the more striking features of the contest was the poor performance of Labour and the comparatively impressive percentages of the various minor Left parties. Labour were strongly associated with the Marriage Equality referendum that got all of these voters to the polls in the first place (and clearly carried Carlow-Kilkenny) and were certainly not rewarded by the electorate for it. By contrast first time voters seem to have rewarded the minor left parties without the established local history that Labour has, but also without Labour’s coalition baggage.
Aftermath
The result turned most of Dublin into a sort of spontaneous joyous street party for much of the day of the count. The most comparable moment in Irish history for such celebrations was Ireland winning through to the soccer world cup quarter-finals in 1990 (which also provoked the same sort of reaction and is still considered arguable the finest moment in Irish sporting history).
Following on from the referendum FF Senator Averil Power resigned from the party, saying that the party lacked the courage to stand for anything by its (effective) refusal to campaign as a party on the issue, in spite of the efforts of many party activists. This fairly quickly deflated the party after their by-election success and much of the subsequent discussion became whether the party had misread their now predominantly rural base by not engaging in the campaign.
The government has followed up the referendum victory with a gender-recognition bill for transgendered individuals. The combination of such legislation, combined with Ireland’s first ever (albeit extremely restrictive) abortion legislation means that the government can make a reasonable case for this being one of Ireland’s most socially progressive governments ever, something that both constituent parties are likely to try to capitalize on in a general election that is now likely less than a year away.
World Elections 