Category Archives: Brazil

Local elections galore: Brazil, Chile, Finland and Sicily 2012

A whole slew of local (or regional) elections were held on October 28. There were mayoral runoff elections in Brazil, municipal elections in Chile and Finland and a regional election (for governor and regional legislature) in Sicily (Italy). This post tells you everything you need to know about these elections and what they mean for each of these countries.

Brazil

The first round of municipal elections were held in Brazil on October 7, 2012. I covered the first round in lots of details here. On October 28, there were mayoral runoff elections in all those municipalities with over 200,000 voters where no mayoral candidate had won 50%+1 of the vote two weeks before. Municipal city councils (câmaras municipais) and mayors in all cities with less than 200,000 voters and a few major cities (Rio, Belo Horizonte, Recife, Porto Alegre) were elected on October 7.

Here is the updated table of parties, with mayors (after the second round) and municipal councillors across Brazil:

PMDB 1,025 mayors (-176) and 7,963 councillors (-512)
PSDB 702 mayors (-89) and 5,255 councillors (-641)
PT 635 mayors (+77) and 5,181 councillors (+1,013)
PSD 497 mayors (+497) and 4,662 councillors (+4,662)
PP 468 mayors (-83) and 4,932 councillors (-197)
PSB 440 mayors (+130) and 3,555 councillors (+599)
PDT 314 mayors (-38) and 3,660 councillors (+135)
PTB 295 mayors (-118) and 3,571 councillors (-363)
DEM 278 mayors (-218) and 3,272 councillors (-1,529)
PR 276 mayors (-109) and 3,190 councillors (-344)
PPS 123 mayors (-6) and 1,861 councillors (-298)
PV 96 mayors (+21) and 1,584 councillors (+347)
PSC 83 mayors (+26) and 1,468 councillors (+322)
PRB 78 mayors (+24) and 1,204 councillors (+423)
PCdoB 56 mayors (+15) and 976 councillors (+364)
PMN 42 mayors (nc) and 605 councillors (+15)
PTdoB 26 mayors (+18) and 534 councillors (+205)
PRP 24 mayors (+7) and 581 councillors (+177)
PSL 23 mayors (+8) and 761 councillors (+241)
PTC 18 mayors (+5) and 484 councillors (+153)
PHS 17 mayors (+4) and 544 councillors (+193)
PRTB 16 mayors (+5) and 418 councillors (+157)
PPL 12 mayors (+12) and 176 councillors (+176)
PTN 12 mayors (-4) and 429 councillors (+29)
PSDC 9 mayors (+1) and 446 councillors (+95)
PSOL/PCB/PSTU 2 mayors (+2) and 56 councillors (+16) incl. 49 PSOL, 5 PCB, 2 PSTU
Others 240 mayors (-2)

The most important mayoral runoff battle was in São Paulo, Brazil’s largest city and economic capital. The incumbent mayor, Gilberto Kassab (PSD) was retiring. The battle opposed José Serra (PSDB), a former mayor/governor/cabinet minister and two time presidential candidate and education minister Fernando Haddad (PT), handpicked by former President Lula. In the first round, Serra won 30.8% against 29% for Haddad, relegating one-time favourite Celso Russomano (PRB) into third with 21.6% support. Russomano did not endorse any candidate, while fourth-place finisher Gabriel Chalita (PMDB) backed Haddad.

Fernando Haddad (PT) 55.57%
José Serra (PSDB) 44.43%

As predicted by the polls, Haddad won by a significant margin. His victory is the result of a number of factors: Lula’s popularity, even in traditionally right-leaning  middle-class São Paulo (in this case, Haddad’s moderate image and Dilma’s large popularity with middle-class Brazilians likely helped too) and Serra’s unpopularity stemming from his inability to accept that maybe it’s time for him to leave politics. While the PT had fairly mixed results in other large cities and state capitals across the country, they did win the race which in the end mattered the most: São Paulo. Lula’s ability to get his candidate elected – because Haddad’s success is in large part due to his mentor (he started out at 5% in the polls) – is a major success for the former President who was turned into the behind-the-scenes boss of the PT.

The PSDB had good results in small and medium-sized towns in the state of São Paulo, but the loss of the state capital must still be a major blow to the party. It is a particularly severe blow to José Serra, whose presidential ambitions for 2014 were likely killed by his defeat (though he is more and more delusional that we shouldn’t put it past him to run for something again, even if under his friend Kassab’s PSD banner rather than the tucano banner). The PSDB chose a poor candidate in Serra, when they had a fairly strong and talented bench. The country’s largest centre-right opposition party will need to find new blood, new talents and new ideas if it is to stand a chance in 2014 and beyond.

O Globo has an interesting map with results by precinct in São Paulo. The patterns are unsurprising: Haddad utterly dominated the traditionally petista working-class and low-income outskirts/suburbs of the city, while Serra was strongest in the upper middle-class bourgeois areas downtown. In the first round, Russomano and Chalita’s strength in the petista outskirts of the city had held down Haddad’s vote share, but in the runoff he certainly really maximized his votes. Compared to the 2010 presidential election, he improved on Dilma’s showing in the petista areas and made sizable gains in more middle-class areas where the centre-right is usually quite strong.

Salvador (Bahia), however, was a major blow for the PT. The state of Bahia has been governed for two terms by a PT governor, which has allowed the party to gain a strong institutional base at all levels of government in the state. However, governor Jaques Wagner (PT)’s approval ratings have been down recently. Holding a narrow advantage in the first round, federal deputy ACM Neto – the grandson of the state’s former conservative dynastic boss – won the runoff by a sizable margin over PT candidate Nelson Pelegrino. This victory, however, is certainly the only source of comfort for the crippled right-wing Democrats (DEM) in this election. They suffered embarrassing defeats almost everywhere else, putting the party’s continued existence into serious doubt.

ACM Neto (DEM) 53.51%
Nelson Pelegrino (PT) 46.49%

The first round in Curitiba (Paraná) saw the surprising defeat of incumbent mayor Luciano Ducci (PSB), backed by the state’s ambitious PSDB governor Beto Richo (himself a former mayor of Curitiba). The runoff opposed Ratinho Jr. (PSC), the son of a popular talk show host and TV personality and former federal deputy Gustavo Fruet (PDT), backed by the PT (despite being a former tucano). Fruet, backed by Dilma and her popular chief of staff Gleisi Hoffmann (the PT’s likely gubernatorial candidate in the state in 2014), handily defeated Ratinho Jr. and his anti-establishment campaign.

Gustavo Fruet (PDT) 60.65%
Ratinho Jr. (PSC) 39.35%

Manaus (Amazonas) had fairly interesting results in the first round, largely because of the unexpected strong showing from former PSDB senator Artur Virgílio Neto (PSDB) who placed way ahead of senator Vanessa Grazziotin (PCdoB, backed by the PT). After a strong first round, Artur Neto – who lost reelection to the senate in 2010 – was easily elected. This is a fairly unwelcome defeat for the PT.

Artur Virgílio Neto (PSDB) 65.95%
Vanessa Grazziotin (PCdoB) 34.05%

The runoff in Fortaleza (Ceará), which opposed Roberto Cláudio (PSB) – the candidate backed by governor Cid Gomes (PSB) and his brother Ciro Gomes (PSB, a former presidential candidate/governor/mayor/cabinet minister) – and Elmano de Freitas (PT), backed by term-limited PT mayor Luizianne Lins was one of the most closely disputed battles between the PT and the PSB in Brazil. The PT and PSB, traditional allies for over twenty years, are slowly drifting away from one another. The PSB governor of Pernambuco, Eduardo Campos, is often talked about as a potential presidential candidate in 2014 – perhaps even in a super-ticket with the opposition PSDB. Strong from a big victory in Recife in the first round, this race as well as that in Cuiabá were major tests for the PSB and Eduardo Campos’ presidential ambitions. The PSB emerged victorious in a close race.

Roberto Cláudio (PSB) 53.52%
Elmano (PT) 46.98%

Boosted by the support of popular state governor Simão Jatene (PSDB), federal deputy Zenaldo Countinho (PSDB) emerged victorious in Belém (Pará). He defeated popular state deputy and former mayor Edmilson Rodrigues (PSOL) by a nice big margin.

Zenaldo Countinho (PSDB) 56.61%
Edmilson Rodrigues (PSOL) 43.39%

As mentioned above, Cuiabá (Mato Grosso) was another major PT-PSB battle with clear national implications. Again, it was the PSB, whose candidate benefited from the backing of powerful senator Blairo Maggi (PR) and senator, which emerged victorious against the PT candidate, backed by the PMDB governor.

Mauro Mendes (PSB) 54.65%
Lúdio (PT) 45.35%

As expected, former mayor Carlos Eduardo Alves (PDT) easily regained his old seat in Natal (Rio Grande do Norte). One of the countless scions of a very powerful and influential oligarchic dynasty in the state – his cousin Garibaldi Alves Filho (PMDB) is a cabinet minister and his uncle is a former governor – he was opposed to Hermano Moraes, the PMDB candidate backed by his other cousin, PMDB house leader Henrique Eduardo Alves.

Carlos Eduardo Alves (PDT) 58.31%
Hermano Moraes (PMDB) 41.69%

Teresina (Piauí) mayor Elmano Férrer (PTB), backed by the PMDB, lost reelection to former mayor and state deputy Firmino Filho (PSDB).

Firmino Filho (PSDB) 51.54%
Elmano Férrer (PTB) 48.46%

São Luis (Maranhão) mayor João Castelo (PSDB) lost reelection to Edivaldo Holanda Jr. (PTC), a result which is a good post for Embratur president and former federal deputy Flávio Dino (PCdoB), a major rival of the local Sarney dynasty.

Edivaldo Holanda Jr. (PTC) 56.06%
João Castelo (PSDB) 43.94%

In other races across the country:

The PSB’s Jonas Donizette (backed by the PSDB) defeated the PT’s Marcio Pochmann with 57.69% in Campinas, the third city in the state of São Paulo. In Ribeirão Preto (São Paulo), incumbent mayor Dárcy Vera (PSD, backed by the PMDB) narrowly defeated the PSDB’s Darcy Nogueira with 51.97%. In other cities in the state, the PT enjoyed a solid win over the PSDB in Guarulhos and gained Santo André – though on the other hand, it lost its traditional stronghold of Diadema and the PSDB won a significant victory in Taubaté.

In Florianópolis, the capital of the southern state of Santa Catarina, state deputy César Souza Jr. (PSD) – backed by PSD governor Raimundo Colombo – defeated Gean Loureiro (PMDB), the candidate backed by the city’s two-term PMDB mayor and senator and former governor Luiz Henrique da Silveira (PMDB). He won 52.64% against 47.36% for Loureiro. However, the PMDB was successful against the PSD in the state’s largest city, Joinville, where the PMDB’s Udo Dohler won 54.65%. The PSDB enjoyed a landslide over the PSD in Blumenau.

What do these results mean for the 2014 presidential and federal elections in Brazil? The PT itself comes out strong, especially with Haddad’s victory in São Paulo even though its record elsewhere is more disappointing. President Dilma retains very strong approval ratings and she would probably enter a reelection campaign in 2014, even against strong PSDB and PSB candidates, as the favourite. Lula’s hand was strengthened by the results in São Paulo, but to date there have been no public spats between Lula and his former protege (Dilma) and a Lula primary challenge in 2014 remains unlikely.

The opposition remains weak and the PSDB is in dire need of newer generations or new(er) ideas, but it does have some strong hopes for 2014. The early favourite for the opposition is Minas Gerais senator Aécio Neves (PSDB), who was boosted by the victory of his ally Márcio Lacerda (PSB) in Belo Horizonte by the first round and whose candidates were otherwise quite successful in the state (with a few exceptions). His defeat in São Paulo means that José Serra will probably not run for president in 2014, and Paraná governor Beto Richa (PSDB)’s potential ambitions took a hit with his candidates’ defeats in Curitiba, Londrina and other cities in Paraná. São Paulo’s governor Geraldo Alckmin, who ran for president against Lula in 2006, is popular but he will certainly prefer to run for reelection in his state, where he would be the favourite to win a second term.

The PSB emerged much stronger from these elections, and the party won almost all its high-profile targets: Recife, Belo Horizonte, Fortaleza, Cuiabá and Campinas. These results will serve to boost Pernambuco governor Eduardo Campos’ presidential ambitions for 2014. It is not yet certain whether or not the PSB will break all bridges with the PT in 2014 and endorse Eduardo Campos for president (or if he will prefer to wait until 2018, for example); but the odds seem to be that Campos will run in 2014. Again, there has been talk of the PSB and PSDB forming some sort of super-ticket with Campos and Aécio (though the ‘order’ of the ticket could be a source of division between the two) in 2014. Regardless, the 2014 election promises to be an exciting and closely disputed election.

Chile

Municipal elections were held in Chile on October 28. All mayors and municipal councillors are directly and separately elected to serve four-year terms, there are no term limits. Mayors are elected by FPTP, while the municipal councils – which are composed of 6, 8 or 10 councillors based on the size of the city, seem to be elected through some kind of open-list PR. There are 345 mayors and 2,224 municipal councillors.

In 2010, Sebastián Piñera became the first right-of-centre candidate to be elected president of Chile since the end of Augusto Pinochet’s military dictatorship in 1990. His election ended twenty-years of rule by the centre-left coalition, namely the broad-based and heterogeneous Concertación coalition which is composed of christian democrats, social democrats and liberals. However, more than halfway into his term (he cannot seek immediate reelection in 2013-2014), Piñera’s approval ratings languish below 40%. The successful rescue of 33 trapped miners in a mine in northern Chile back in August 2010 had made his approvals go through the roof, but over two years later, the shine has definitely worn off.

In 2011, Piñera faced a major student movement which protested the country’s free-market and for-profit secondary and post-secondary education system. Chile’s education system, which dates back to Pinochet’s regime, is dominated by the private sector which runs most high schools and universities. Government spending on education accounts for only 4.4% of the GDP (the UN recommends 7% for developed nations), the limited public education system is run by individual municipalities and the government makes wide use of school vouchers. The protests demanded the end of profit in higher education, currently banned by the law but nonetheless widespread; increased state support for universities; more state spending in education; tougher state supervision and control of secondary education and limiting the extent of the voucher system. Piñera’s government handling of the student crisis proved unpopular and he appeared hostile to the movement’s demands – in fact, he proposed to legalize for-profit post-secondary education. By now, the student movement has dissipated somewhat, though the remnants of the movement have apparently radicalized.

He also faced unexpectedly strong public discontent over the HydroAysén hydroelectric project in Patagonia. This huge energy project plans to build five new hydroelectric dams in Patagonia, aiming to meet the country’s rising energetic needs. The public has been largely opposed to this project, decrying the environmental and agricultural impacts of the huge project on the region’s fragile ecosystem and local agriculture.

However, the opposition – the Concertación coalition – is not in the best of shape. The old disparate coalition is increasingly divided and lacks new ideas. The student movement could be seen as being indicative of a larger desire for major sociopolitical change in Chile, where the negotiated transition from military rule to multi-party democracy allowed strong economic growth and development but kept intact some vestiges of the old regime: the Senate’s composition, the electoral system or the education system. Many on the left are eager for more profound change including a constituent assembly and a new “socioeconomic model”. The Concertación, while in power, proved either unable or unwilling to confront issues such as education, energy or economic inequalities.

The Concertación, as in the 2008 municipal elections, was divided going into the election. The Socialists (PS) and the Christian Democrats (PDC) remained united under the banner of the Concertación, but the two other parties of the old coalition – the liberal PRSD and the centre-left PPD – allied with the Communist Party (PCC) under the coalition Por un Chile Justo. The PRSD has openly stated that it believes that the Concertación coalition has done its time and that it is time to move on. The PPD and PRSD had already fought the 2008 elections separately from the PS and the PDC. The left, since the 2009-2010 election, must now wrestle with a new actor: the El Cambio por Ti coalition and the Progressive Party (PRO) of former left-wing independent presidential candidate Marco Enríquez-Ominami. Marco won over 20% in the first round of the 2009 presidential election, though he has largely been unable to translate his personal votes into strong support for his new coalition.

The governing centre-right coalition, the Coalición, composed of Piñera’s RN and the formerly pinochetista right-wing UDI, remained united.

This was the first election in Chile were voting was no longer mandatory. In the past, registration was voluntary but voting was mandatory; now registration is automatic (the result has been the registration of 4.5 million Chileans, largely young who had not registered to vote in the past) but voting is voluntary. Turnout was very low, around 40-45%. This low turnout reflects, again, growing dissatisfaction with politics. Few voters trust their politicians, institutions and political parties; the youth feeling particularly left out and disappointed by politics.

Results of the 2012 Chilean mayoral elections by municipality (source: uselectionatlas.org)

The government website is a horrible mess, but it appears that, nationally, the right won 37.5% of the vote and 121 mayors while the Concertación won 29% and 106 mayors. The PPD-PRSD-PCC coalition won 13.7% and 62 mayors. Enríquez-Ominami’s coalition won only 3% and 7 towns. Independents accounted for 11% of the national vote and were victorious in 40 municipalities. In 2008, the right won 40.7% against 28.7% for the Concertación and 9.7% for the PPD-PRSD.

These results are an unexpected success for the opposition, despite its disunity; and a setback for the governing right-wing coalition. The right was likely hurt by the low turnout, the opposition’s base being far more motivated to turn out. Prominent right-wing incumbents were defeated in high-profile races in major municipalities, including a lot in the Santiago metropolis.

In Santiago itself, incumbent mayor Pablo Zalaquett (UDI) was defeated by Carolina Tohá (PPD), the daughter of a former Allende cabinet minister and herself chief of staff to President Michelle Bachelet. Zalaquett, formerly mayor of the suburban town of La Florida, had won a first term in 2008. His management of the 2011 student protests in the city had been controversial. He won 43.89% against 50.63% for Carolina Tohá.

The middle-class suburb of Providencia in the Santiago metropolis had been the stronghold of Cristián Labbé (UDI), who had been a close ally of Augusto Pinochet, since 1996. Voters had backed him because of his reputation as a good administration, despite his close association with the military regimne. His defeat this year in the hands of an independent backed by the Concertación, Josefa Errázuriz, was a major symbolic defeat for the right. Errázuriz won 56.06% against 43.93% for Cristián Labbé, who was seeking a fifth term in office.

Another upper middle-class suburb of Santiago, Ñuñoa, also saw the defeat of a four-term right-wing incumbent, Pedro Sabat (RN). Maya Fernandez Allende (PS), a granddaughter of Salvador Allende, won 44.9% against 44.7% for Pedro Sabat.

In Recoleta, Daniel Jadue (PCC) defeated the incumbent UDI mayor and a former right-wing mayor, Gonzalo Cornejo, who ran as an independent.

In Concepción, the major city of southern Chile, held by a retiring right-wing incumbent, Álvaro Ortiz (PDC) won 55.15% against only 37.25% for the UDI candidate. The opposition also gained Punta Arenas in the far south of the country.

The right held Valparaíso (UDI), Puento Alto (RN), Las Condes (UDI) and La Florida (UDI). The opposition held Maipú (PDC) and Peñaloén (PDC).

Speculation about the 2013-2014 presidential election has been building up for quite some time. The Concertación, unwilling to confront its internal problems and high risk for more divisions in 2013, has been playing a game of wait-and-see until former President Michelle Bachelet (PS), Piñera’s predecessor who left office with sky-high approval ratings, decides whether or not she wants to run for another term. Bachelet remains very popular, even if some of her record is now being criticized. She would certainly be capable of holding the Concertación together for another go-through and polls indicate that she would be the favourite for the presidency. If she does not run, the opposition does have other fairly strong candidates but no clear frontrunners. Some of these other names include Andrés Velasco, an economist and Bachelet’s popular finance minister; the new mayor of Santiago Carolina Tohá and the PDC mayor of Peñaloén Claudio Orrego. Some senators are also lining up.

The right has four potential candidates: defense minister Andrés Allamand (RN), economy minister Pablo Longueira (UDI), labour minister Evelyn Matthei (UDI) and public works (former mines and energy) minister Laurence Golborne (independent). Allamand and Golborne are the two most prominent candidates in this field, and probably the two who stand the best chances in a presidential election. Golborne, an independent figure, became very popular following the rescue of the 33 miners trapped underground in August 2010, and he remains one of the most popular ministers in the government. If he did run, Golborne would likely be the favourite in a primary and could potentially stand a good chance against the opposition in the presidential race.

Finland

Municipal elections were held in Finland on October 28. There are are 9,674 seats in 304 municipalities. These elections come after legislative elections in April 2011 which saw a very strong result by Timo Soini’s right-populist and eurosceptic True Finns (PS) party, which won 19%. PS was excluded from government, but the new six-party coalition led by Jyrki Katainen from the centre-right/liberal KOK has taken a hardline in Eurozone negotiations, a clear result of PS’ growing power. Finland has gained a reputation as a “hardliner” in the Eurozone when it comes to Greece and Spain, it was the only country to demand collateral in exchange for helping to rescue Greece and Spain and it favours rigid requirements for the use of the new European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The SDP, the main junior partner in the six-party government, which had been hurt – like other parties – by PS in 2011, has now adopted a much tougher stance on the euro. Most Finns remain supportive of the EU and the euro, but there is rising frustration and dissatisfaction with European integration. Some feel that they are punished at home by austerity measures while rewarding profligate countries like Greece or Spain.

Finland’s economy remains stronger than other economies in the EU: it still has an AAA credit ranking, its deficit is much smaller than the EU’s 3% deficit limit and the country’s debt (around 45-50%) is better than a lot of other European countries. However, growth has slowed – almost to a halt in 2012 (+0.2%) – in part because of Nokia’s troubles; and it is set to remain rather low in coming years. Some have urged the government to reevaluate its austerity (spending cuts, tax increases) policy in the wake of slow growth, but the government appears unwilling to deviate from its path.

In the context of these municipal elections, the government – the KOK in particular – has been pushing a municipal reform which would greatly reduce the number of municipalities by merging a lot of them, arguing that such a reform is needed to create more efficient larger units. At the same time, however, the government parties have reiterated that there would be no forced mergers, but the threat is still lingering out there. The principle of municipal autonomy is dear to many voters, especially those in rural areas who fear that rural areas will be hollowed out by the government’s policies (which would impact local services such as healthcare). The opposition Centre Party (KESK), whose support comes predominantly from rural Finland which would probably stand to lose the most from any reform, has opposed the government’s municipal reform. However, a number of KOK mayors from affluent suburbs have opposed the mergers of their own municipalities. This indicates a small NIMBY phenomenon at work in municipal reform: politicians broadly agree that larger units would be more efficient, but few are keen on having their own municipalities be merged into a larger unit.

Turnout was 58.3%, down from around 61% in the 2008 local elections. The results table below compares the party’s results to their 2008 local election result and then their 2011 legislative election result.

KOK 21.9% (-1.6%, +1.5%) winning 1,735 seats (-286)
SDP 19.6% (-1.7%, +0.5%) winning 1,729 seats (-337)
KESK 18.7% (-1.4%, +2.9%) winning 3,077 seats (-440)
PS 12.3% (+7%, -6.7%) winning 1,195 seats (+752)
Green 8.5% (-0.4%, +1.3%) winning 323 seats (-47)
VAS 8% (-0.8%, -0.1%) winning 640 seats (-193)
SFP-RKP 4.7% (nc, +0.4%) winning 480 seats (-30)
KD 3.7% (-0.4%, -0.3%) winning 300 seats (-51)
Others 2.5% (-0.9%, +0.8%) winning 195 seats (-103)

The governing parties all won fairly good results in these elections, even if slightly down on the last local elections in 2008. The True Finns (PS), compared to the 2008 local elections, are the clear winners. While the PS is well on its way to establishing itself as a major player in Finnish politics in the years to come (if that was not already obvious), its result in these elections are a far cry from the 19% the party won in the 2011 legislative elections but also fall short of what polls had predicted. While there are grounds for calling PS the big “winners” of this election – which is what most foreign media outlets have done – it should certainly be noted that these results are quite underwhelming for the party. The party’s leader, Timo Soini, admitted that these results were not what he had hoped for though he said that he would keep fighting and that the Eurozone meltdown would eventually “prove him right.”

The country’s three traditional parties – KESK, SDP or KOK – which had all suffered (especially KESK) from PS bursting onto the scenes in 2011 – recovered some of their lost support. KESK itself reestablished itself as one of the three major parties in Finland, and it held its solid rural base. It is the largest party in around 200 of the 304 municipalities and it has – by far – the most local councillors (over 3,000), most of them from small rural municipalities. KESK’s traditional support and strength in most small towns in rural Finland likely hurt PS a bit – some potential voters (and maybe PS voters in 2011) preferring to back the traditionally dominant party in local elections.

The government’s tough (“hardline”) policies in the Eurozone, such as demanding collateral from Greece and Spain, might have successfully checked the rise of the populist eurosceptic right, for the time being. A series of controversial homophobic or racist statements by PS MPs and candidates has also been cited as a reason for PS’ relatively “weak” result this year. Again, while PS has established itself as a major player in Finnish politics, its momentum from 2011 might have been stopped by the government parties and the KESK (which has moved towards more Euro-critical stances since 2011) successfully regaining lost support.

The other, smaller, parties had fairly good results. The Greens suffered some loses but largely did fairly well, and their support did not collapse in Helsinki as it had been expected. The left (VAS) lost some ground, especially in their traditional working-class strongholds in northern Finland, but it retained over 600 councillors and did well in Helsinki. The Swedish party (SFP-RKP) managed to mobilize their base and retain their base in the predominantly Swedish municipalities on the western and southern coast. The Christian Democrats (KD) lost some ground, but they still have 300 seats.

Stability prevailed in most major cities. In Helsinki, KOK won 26.9% and 23 seats (down 3) while the Greens did not collapse as some had predicted: they remained second with 22.3% (down about 1%) and 19 seats (-2). The SDP won 15 seats (16.8%, losing 1 seat) while VAS and PS both made gains, winning 10.1% and 9.4% respectively. In Finland’s second-largest city, the affluent Helsinki suburb of Espoo, KOK won 36% against 16.7% for the Greens. The KOK and SDP tied with 18 seats apiece in Vantaa, a less affluent suburban town north of Helsinki.

Outside of metro Helsinki, the KOK was the largest party in Tampere and Turku while KESK remained on top in the northern city of Oulu. In Tampere, the KOK and SDP ended up nearly tied (17 and 16 seats respectively) with the Greens suffering some loses. In Turku, KOK won nearly 26% against a bit over 20% for the SDP, though both lost ground compared to 2008. In Oulu, KESK won 27% against roughly 20% for KOK and 14% for VAS.

You can explore results in all other municipalities on this website.

Sicily (Italy)

Regional elections were held in Sicily on October 28, 2012. Since 2001, the regional President is directly elected by popular vote. The Regional Assembly of Sicily is composed of 90 members, 80 of which are elected through the largest remainders method of PR in Sicily’s 9 provinces with a 5% thresholds. The other 10 members are elected on a “regional list” (a kind of general ticket/plurality at-large voting), the regional president gets one seat and the runner-up in the presidential ballot gets a seat – the other 8 are usually given to the winning presidential ticket as a sort of “majority bonus”; if the presidential ticket has already achieved a majority (as was the case in 2008 in Sicily), the eight seats are given to the runner-up’s presidential ticket.

Sicily is an autonomous region with a special status, granted immediately after the war in 1946 (other Italian regions without a special statute only received an elected legislature in 1970). This means that the Sicilian regional government keeps 100% of the taxes it levies, though it must fund healthcare, education and public infrastructure by itself (Sicily does get some additional central government funding to help it out). In a context of debt/economic crisis in Italy, Sicily has been pointed out as a bad example: its regional government is notoriously bloated and profligate; spending tons, paying generous pensions, employing (directly or indirectly) over 100,000 of the population’s 5 million inhabitants. Sicily’s economic situation is catastrophic, the region is teetering on the verge of default because of its huge debt. This article from the New York Times back in July is particularly interesting.

Sicily is a conservative stronghold in Italy. Since 1947, the centre-right has held the regional presidency for all but two short years (1998-2000, during a particularly divided and unstable regional legislature), and it national elections it has backed the right – most recently Silvio Berlusconi – by big margins. In the 2001 Italian elections, Berlusconi’s right-wing coalition had swept the entirety of the island’s 61 seats. In the 2008 regional elections, the right-wing candidate for president won 65% against barely 30% for the centre-left.

Sicily is a poor region, even today. Its unemployment rate, probably nearing 15% even on official records, is much higher than the national average. During the twentieth century, Sicily was a land of emigration - North Americans (and South Americans) can certainly attest to the huge number of Sicilians (and other southern Italians) who immigrated to the United States or Canada. Until the 1960s, the island’s economy was predominantly based around agriculture (fruits, wines) and structured around large estates led by distant bosses and employing throngs of poor landless labourers. After Italian unification at the end of the nineteenth century, the central government – allied with the local landowners – resisted moves towards any kind of agrarian reform. To defend themselves against rural banditry and their own landless labourers, the landowners employed local thugs to protect their property – the roots of the modern mafia.

The mafia grew in power and influence in Sicily, and they filed the vacuum between the people and the state. During Benito Mussolini’s fascist regime, the mafia was chased into hiding by Mussolini’s regime, which saw the mafia as a threat to its power. However, when the Allies invaded Sicily (and Italy) in 1943, they allied with the mafia and allowed the mafia to return to a prominent role in the immediate post-war era. The dominant force of centre-right politics during the ‘First Republic’, Christian Democracy (DC), allied itself with the powerful Catholic Church, the conservative landowners and the mafia and became the dominant party in Sicilian politics. The alliance between the DC and the mafia created a clientelistic system of political patronage which has survived to this day in Sicily and elsewhere in southern Italy. The mafia ensured the success of the DC at the polls and checked the rise of the Communist Party (PCI), which in Sicily organized restless landless peasants by demanding wide-reaching social and agrarian reform. In return, the DC state made sure that the mafia’s business interests were protected and supported. The ‘First Republic’ and the close alliance between the DC and the Sicilian mafia collapsed with the Tangentopoli scandals and Mani Pulite investigations of the early 1990s in Italy.

While the PCI had some success in coastal municipalities with fishermen and in some rural communities with more radical landless peasants, Sicily has been a conservative stronghold and has consistently voted for right-wing parties. The roots of this conservatism comes from the lack of strong communities and communitarian feelings in southern Italy. Until 1946, southern Italy had been ruled almost exclusively by autocratic regimes who maintained formal feudal structures into the early nineteenth century and which subsequently based their power on support from the rural landowning elite. This history, compounded with the emergence of the mafia as a potent force in the 1850s, diluted any feelings of society. Southern Italy society is fairly atomized and individualistic, there is a strong “anti-cooperative” mindset which has kept the PCI and other left-wing parties traditionally weak. The relation of the average Sicilian or southern Italian with corruption and the mafia is different than in other places. To a certain extent, corruption is accepted as part of the political process.

In the ‘Second Republic’ era of Italian politics, which is coming to an end as we speak, Sicily has remained true to its conservative traditions. In 1994, Berlusconi’s new right-wing anti-establishment party, Forza Italia, found strong backing in Sicily and the island has since been one of the Berlusconian right’s strongholds. However, other centre-right players are important in Sicily. The old DC tradition has not entirely died out in Sicily, which has given strong results to the various centre-right successor parties of the DC – Casini’s UDC won over 9% of the vote in Sicily in the 2008 elections, well above its national result. Between 2001 and 2008, Sicily’s regional president was a right-wing Christian democrat, Salvatore Cuffaro, who is currently living in jail (for aiding the mafia). As the ‘First Republic’ faded away, the DC and its venal allies had seen their support shift to the south, where the networks of political patronage and clientelism had built a resilient electoral clientele.

There is a small regionalist movement in Sicily, though it is debatable to what extent these parties are actually fundamentally ‘regionalist’ or autonomist and to what extent they are merely empty kleptocratic shells founded by political bosses to further their political interests. Sicily’s post-war separatist movement, the MIS, has certainly died out. Nevertheless, Sicily’s regional president between 2008 until his resignation this year, Raffaele Lombardo, is the leader of one of these confusing regionalist parties – the Movement for Autonomies (MPA). In 2008, Lombardo and the MPA were allied with Berlusconi’s centre-right coalition (the PdL) but relations quickly turned sour. The MPA left the Berlusconi government in November 2010, prior to that point Lombardo had already pushed the PdL and the UDC out of his government (in 2009). The MPA is currently aligned with the UDC and Gianfranco Fini’s FLI, as part of the vague centrist ‘pole’ which seems increasingly stillborn.

Raffaele Lombardo’s resignation because of his suspected ties to the mafia and other corruption scandals earlier this year forced this snap regional election. Sicily, again, is a conservative region where the right has dominated regional politics since World War II. However, Italy’s political system – the ‘Second Republic’ – is going through a period of radical change, similar to that period between 1992 and 1994 which saw the old ‘First Republic’ system collapse. Silvio Berlusconi and his countless run-ins with the law meant that he had no credibility in the eyes of his European partners to deal with Italy’s huge debt problem which has brought the country to the verge of bankruptcy. He resigned in November and Italy has been governed by Mario Monti, a “non-party technocrat” since then, with the lukewarm support of the left and the right until general elections in April 2013. Monti’s government has implemented stringent austerity measures and made some steps towards necessary reforms.

Berlusconi has been in-and-out of politics since November 2011. A few weeks ago, he said that he would not run in the 2013 election (after saying that he would) but shortly thereafter he denounced Monti, Germany and the judges who sentenced him for tax fraud and indicated that he would remain the playing field and threatened to bring down the government. His party, the PdL, has been ripping itself apart. Centrists including Angelino Alfano, Berlusconi’s anointed successor, are eager to get Berlusconi out of the picture. But there are rumours that Berlusconi could stage a return, leading a new anti-establishment populist/eurosceptic party along the lines of Forza Italia in 1994.

The opposition Democratic Party (PD) is hardly in better condition. It has struggled in opposition because of lacklustre old leaders who lacked charisma or even political talent; but also because of its very disparate and heterogeneous nature as a big tent anti-Berlusconi coalition uniting former communists and former left-leaning Christian democrats. To the left, it has faced a re-energized post-communist coalition – the SEL (Left, Ecology and Freedom) led by the popular and charismatic Nichi Vendola, the regional president of Apulia. The PD and the SEL will hold a primary in late November to determine who will lead the coalition into the 2013 elections, and the race is very tight between the current PD leader, Pier Luigi Bersani (ex-PCI) and the young centrist mayor of Florence Matteo Renzi.

Since this summer, Italian politics have been shaken up by the 5-Star Movement (M5S), a populist movement led by popular comedian Beppe Grillo. A popular and powerful rabble-rousing orator, Grillo has lashed out at the “corrupt political establishment” and branded all parties and politicians as crooks. In the polls, the M5S has surged to nearly 20%, often placing second ahead of the PdL (the PD retaining a lead with an anemic 25% or so). The M5S’s roots are on the far-left, but it has de-emphasized traditional ideology in favour of populism and a broad anti-establishment rhetoric. The party has also positioned itself against austerity and has taken to fairly virulent eurosceptic/anti-EU rhetoric. In the process, it has certainly attracted the votes from many unhappy right-wingers, including supporters of the Lega Nord (LN) who feel disgusted with the LN after corruption scandals touching the old boss, Umberto Bossi.

The Sicilian regional election opposed some interesting characters. The PD’s presidential candidate was Rosario Crocetta, a MEP since 2009. Crocetta is openly gay and a former communist (he was a member of the hardline PRC until 2000 and the moderate PdCI until 2008), and became famous as a courageous anti-mafia crusader. He has faced numerous threats on his life from the mafia. The PD, however, formed an alliance with the centre-right UDC rather than Vendola’s SEL in Sicily.

The PdL candidate was Nello Musumeci, a former MEP. Musumeci is not a member of the PdL, his political roots lay with the old post-fascist National Alliance (AN) and with a small right-wing autonomist party in Sicily. The candidate of the incumbent right-wing autonomist administration was Gianfranco Micciché, who is the former leader of the local branch of PdL in Sicily who decided to break with the national party. Lombardo later broke with Micciché’s party, the Great South/Force of the South, as well.

The M5S candidate was Giancarlo Cancelleri. Beppe Grillo campaigned actively, notably by swimming across the straits from Calabria to Messina. The party claimed that it spent only

Turnout was only 47.41%, down from 66.68% in the 2008 regional elections. 47% is extremely low turnout for Italian standards, and likely indicates that the right (PdL primarily) have lost a lot of former suppporters to the ranks of abstention (in addition to parties such as the M5S). The low turnout must also reflect disgust with politics from many voters, who resent the tough austerity and have seen their share of corrupt politicians lining their pockets, politicians engaging in orgies and wild festivities and old party hacks with the charisma of wet pizzas. The results in Sicily were:

President

Rosario Crocetta (PD-UDC) 30.48%
Nello Musumeci (PdL) 25.73%
Giancarlo Cancellieri (M5S) 18.18%
Gianfranco Micciché (MPA-GS) 15.42%
Giovanna Marano (SEL-IdV) 6.06%
Others 4.13%

Regional Assembly

Crocetta Regional List 30.4% winning 39 seats (30 provincial, 9 regional)
PD 13.4% (-5.4%) winning 14 seats (-5)
UDC 10.8% (-1.7%) winning 11 seats (nc)
Crocetta List 6.2% (+6.2%) winning 5 seats (+5)

Musumeci Regional List 24.4% winning 21 seats (20 provincial, 1 regional)
PdL 12.9% (-20.6%) winning 12 seats (-23)
Popular Constructions (PID) 5.9% (+5.9%) winning 4 seats (+4)
Musumeci List 5.6% (+5.6%) winning 4 seats (+4)

M5S 14.9% (+13.2%) winning 15 seats (+15)

Micciché Regional List 20% winning 15 seats
PdS-MPA 9.5% (-4.3%) winning 10 seats (-5)
Great South 6.0% (+6%) winning 5 seats (+5)
FLI 4.4% (+4.4%) winning 0 seats (nc)
Ppa – Piazza Pulita 0.1% (+0.1%) winning 0 seats (nc)

Marano Regional List 6.6% winning 0 seats
IdV 3.5% (+1.7%) winning 0 seats (nc)
SEL-PRC+PdCI-Greens 3.1% (-1.8%) winning 0 seats (nc)

All others 3.5% winning 0 seats

Results of the regional list/presidential vote by commune (source: it.wikipedia)

The Sicilian election was quite something. Rosario Crocetta’s victory means that conservative Sicily will have a gay communist (who hates the mafia) as President, which is something. On a more serious basis, Crocetta’s victory is an historic victory for the left in Sicily, which has practically never governed the island’s regional government since it was created in 1947. However, Crocetta’s victory, while still remarkable, is more a reflection of the utter disarray and chaos of the Sicilian – and Italian – right rather than the phenomenal success of the left. Crocetta’s vote share, 30.5%, is roughly on par with the 30.4% won by the PD’s Anna Finocchiaro in the 2008 election, an election which had been a total disaster for the Sicilian left (its candidate had won 41.6% in the 2006 regional election). This very underwhelming and anemic result for both the centre-left coalition and the PD in particular (it won only 13% on the party-list vote, down from an already awful 18.8% in 2008) reflects the state of the Italian left: a favourite to win the next election, but only because the right is sinking faster than the Titanic hitting the iceberg. The PD’s lackluster job in opposition, its uncharismatic leaders and its own internal divisions have meant that it has not benefited much from Berlusconi’s departure and the subsequent disintegration of the once-mighty Italian right.It has been asked by some observers if the victory of a PD-UDC rather than a PD-SEL coalition in these elections will have an impact on the direction of the PD, which is currently committed to an alliance with Vendola’s SEL rather than the UDC. It remains to be seen, but it must be noted that the UDC and the PD have practiced different alliance strategies from region to region, notably in the 2010 regional elections. In some places, the UDC allies with the right, in others it goes its own way and in other regions it allies with the PD. The PD, in some places, goes with the left and SEL but in other places it goes without SEL.

The right, particularly the PdL, was the clear loser of this election. It entered the race divided, and the division of the vote was one of the factors which allowed the left to score an historic victory which is a very, very embarrassing defeat for the right. Together, the two candidates won 41.15% – which would still be terrible for the right which had won all of 65% (!) in the 2008 regional election. The PdL suffered a huge defeat, winning only 13% on the party-list vote, which is down nearly 21 points on what it had won on the 2008 list-vote. This result reflects the collapse of Berlusconi’s once-mighty party as Berlusconi’s successive shenanigans (economic crisis/near default, style of governance, series of corruption scandal, underage sex) finally took their toll on the PdL, beginning in 2011 and accelerating to a point of no-return over the past year. The PdL’s disastrous result in Sicily probably does not help out Angelino Alfano, who is from Sicily, in these PdL primaries scheduled for December.

The M5S and Beppe Grillo, despite a shoestring campaign and a little-known candidate, were the major winners in Sicily. The M5S topped the poll in a very divided party-list vote and its candidate won third place with a very strong 18.2% (it seems like it placed first in the city of Palermo). Grillo’s party, regardless of whether one loves them or hates them, is definitely here to stay. In Sicily, they proved that their support is, for the moment, fairly deep and solid; showing up even in a regional election with very low turnout. Crocetta lacks a majority in the new Regional Assembly, which will make governing difficult for him. The M5S has refused to work with the new majority, in keeping with Grillo branding all exisiting parties as corrupt entities which should be swept away.

Italy’s economic/debt crisis has proven to be the trigger to the collapse of the ‘Second Republic’ party system as we know it. This exciting (or depressing, your choice!) era in Italian politics is similar to the previous political revolution which brought down the First Republic between 1992 and 1994: the Tangentopoli. Old parties are discredited and unappealing, the right and the left are both trying to totally revinvent themselves, old politicians are all seen in a very negative light and new parties led by inflammatory populists and powerful orators are bursting onto the scene. The M5S is following in the footsteps of Umberto Bossi’s Lega Nord in the early 90s and Silvio Berlusconi himself in 1994. It is feeding off the carcasses of the old parties, and presenting itself as a brand-new, anti-establishment/anti-corruption party which promises a radical break with the old system of Italian politics. 2013 may prove to be, nineteen years after Berlusconi’s first big victory in 1994, the birthdate of a ‘Third Republic’ in Italy.

Happy U.S. election day (and night) to all readers!

Brazil 2012

The first round of municipal elections were held in Brazil on October 7, 2012 with a runoff to be held on October 28, 2012. Mayors, deputy mayors and local councillors in all 5,568 municipalities in Brazil. Runoffs are held in direct mayoral elections where no candidate has won 50%+1 of the votes, but runoffs are only held in municipalities with over 200,000 voters. Municipal city councils (câmaras municipais) are elected through an open list system similar to that use for elections to the federal Chamber of Deputies.

Municipal elections in Brazil are the country’s “midterm elections”, they are the only elections held in between presidential elections and they are held halfway in the President’s four-year term. While on the surface the sheer amount of parties, contradictory coalitions from city to city and the vast array of personalities make the water fairly murky, and it is true that these elections are very personalized and that local political machines play a large role. However, these “midterm” local elections are nonetheless marked by complex political calculations which are tied to national and state politics. Their results have major repercussions on national and state politics, for example playing a role in boosting (or weakening) the standings of potential presidential candidates and informing the ever changing game of Brazilian coalition politics at the federal level.

It has been two years since Dilma Rousseff was elected President in 2010, riding the popularity of her predecessor and mentor, Lula. A year and nine months down the road, Dilma maintains very strong approval ratings (with less than 10% judging her performance to be downright bad, and nearly 60% judging it to be excellent or good). Economic growth remains fairly strong, but slowed down to 2.7% in 2011 and is projected to grow by only 1.5% this year. Slower economic growth has forced the government to be surprisingly defiant to the demands of federal government employees, including teachers and federal police, who had been on strike since earlier this year demanding higher salary increases (they were granted an inflation-only offer of 15.8% over three years). This is surprising coming from a party, the PT, whose roots lay in the unions, but Dilma has continued to move the PT away from its historical socialist roots towards third-way politics.

She has favoured private sector growth and promised to reduce the high cost of doing business in Brazil, for example by extending payroll-tax cuts to more industries or cutting the very high electricity tariffs in the country. While  Dilma and the PT remain instinctively hostile to privatization, she has made it clear that she supports more private investment in infrastructure. The government has already auctioned off contracts to run three airports, and it plans to auction road and railway concessions to the private sector to invite investors to build, upgrade and operate toll roads and railways.

The entire Brazilian political class has been rocked by some major corruption cases in recent months, most significantly the big Cachoeira scandal (Carlinhos Cachoeira is a businessman behind a big gambling racket, currently investigated for money laundering and running an illegal gambling network), which has implicated a number of senators, federal deputies and two governors. The impact of the Cachoeira scandal has been felt across party lines, but it has mainly hurt the opposition: a prominent opposition senator, Demóstenes Torres (DEM-GO), is one of the major politicians cited in the case, as is the embattled PSDB governor of Goiás, Marconi Perillo.

However, corruption cases have not left the government unscathed. Dilma’s cabinet has had lots of turnover in recent months, as she was forced to fire one cabinet minister after another as they got knee-deep into various cases of corruption, graft, influence-peddling, bribery or misuse of public funds. Some of those cabinet ministers, such as her former Chief of Staff Antonio Palocci (PT-SP), had been close allies of her predecessor and mentor, Lula. Others had been members of her venal allies, who have discovered the political (and financial) value of getting their own ministries. With various corruption cases, she lost her transportation minister Alfredo Nascimento (PR-AM), the agriculture minister Wagner Rossi (PMDB-SP), tourism minister Pedro Novais (PMDB-MA), sports minister Orlando Silva (PCdoB-BA), labour minister Carlos Lupi (PDT-RJ) and cities minister Mário Negromonte (PP-BA). Dilma’s tough stance against corrupt ministers in her entourage has allowed her to score points with public opinion, and it has allowed her to slowly but surely lay her personal mark on the government and differentiate it from Lula.

However, the PT is likely worried about what effects the current Supreme Court case surrounding the old mensalão scandal from 2005 (when the PT bribed congressional partners for their votes) could have on them. It apparently tried to push back the case until after the local elections; it came out that Lula had tried to blackmail a judge – Gilmar Mendes – by threatening to reveal Mendes’ links to the Cachoeira scheme. Just a few days ago, the court found Lula’s former Chief of Staff José Dirceu and former PT president José Genoino guilty on counts of bribery in the mensalão, though their sentences will not come down until later. This landmark case, among others, will at least contribute to breaking the culture of impunity which has permeated the Brazilian political elite for so long. It is unlikely to hurt or help any particular party; no major Brazilian party has a clean record, and voters recognize this.

Brazilian party and coalition politics is very complex business. Party loyalty is very weak, what matters are personalities and their individual ambitions. Nonetheless, even if most parties are venal self-interested actors with no ideologies, a few parties are major players in their own right. The Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), the ultimate big tent party which seeks only to maximize its power, is a key ally of the Dilma government but some local and state bigwigs are showing their discontent with the federal government and their coalition with the PT. Another smaller venal ally of the government, the Republic Party (PR) broke away from the government shortly after Nascimento was dumped and joined the ranks of the opposition.

The Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), led by the very popular and ambitious governor of Pernambuco Eduardo Campos, is quite tired of being the second fiddle to the PT and is slowly drifting away from the PT and turning into more of a traditional big tent, ideologically diverse or undefined party. Eduardo Campos is a potential candidate for President in 2014 or 2018.

The opposition is also being moved around. The traditional party of the centre-right, the PSDB, risks losing even more feathers as it continues to be unable to renew itself and move past its old leadership disputes. However, its main ally, the Democrats (the former PFL, the remnants of the conservative pork-barreling party of the old military dictatorship), are collapsing even more rapidly. The big news in Brazilian politics in 2011 was the maverick DEM mayor of São Paulo, Gilberto Kassab, splitting off to form his own party, the Social Democratic Party (PSD), which positions itself slightly to the left of the DEMs, closer to the centre and to the Dilma government (while not being a ‘government party’). The PSD has attracted a good number of defectors from the DEMs (but also other parties) and it has grown to 47 federal deputies, much more than the DEMs (left with 28). These defections have left the Democrats virtually on life support.

Municipal elections

The table below gives the number of mayors elected by party in the first round, compared to the 2008 municipal elections (first round); as well as the number of councillors.

PMDB 1,018 mayors (-175) and 7,963 councillors (-512)
PSDB 692 mayors (-95) and 5,255 councillors (-641)
PT 627 mayors (+77) and 5,181 councillors (+1,013)
PSD 495 mayors (+495) and 4,662 councillors (+4,662)
PP 466 mayors (-83) and 4,932 councillors (-197)
PSB 434 mayors (+126) and 3,555 councillors (+599)
PDT 309 mayors (-42) and 3,660 councillors (+135)
PTB 295 mayors (-115) and 3,571 councillors (-363)
DEM 276 mayors (-219) and 3,272 councillors (-1,529)
PR 273 mayors (-111) and 3,190 councillors (-344)
PPS 120 mayors (-9) and 1,861 councillors (-298)
PV 96 mayors (+21) and 1,584 councillors (+347)
PSC 83 mayors (+26) and 1,468 councillors (+322)
PRB 77 mayors (+23) and 1,204 councillors (+423)
PCdoB 53 mayors (+12) and 976 councillors (+364)
PMN 42 mayors (+1) and 605 councillors (+15)
PTdoB 26 mayors (+18) and 534 councillors (+205)
PRP 24 mayors (+6) and 581 councillors (+177)
PSL 23 mayors (+8) and 761 councillors (+241)
PTC 18 mayors (+5) and 484 councillors (+153)
PHS 17 mayors (+4) and 544 councillors (+193)
PRTB 16 mayors (+5) and 418 councillors (+157)
PPL 12 mayors (+12) and 176 councillors (+176)
PTN 12 mayors (-4) and 429 councillors (+29)
PSDC 9 mayors (+1) and 446 councillors (+95)
PSOL/PCB/PSTU 1 mayor (+1) and 56 councillors (+16) incl. 49 PSOL, 5 PCB, 2 PSTU
Others 240 mayors (-2)

The results did not indicate any major changes, besides a strengthening of the PT and the success of both the PSD and the PSB. The PT’s gains seem heaviest in small and medium-sized towns, with the clear influence of some strong state governments (notably Bahia) helping the PT to create a strong base at the municipal level. The results of the other parties reveal the importance of state governments as well; the PSD was rather strong in Santa Catarina because of governor Raimundo Colombo (former DEM, now PSD), the PSDB performed well in its historical base of São Paulo but also Minas Gerais, Paraná or Pará where they control the governorship and the PSB clearly dominates in Pernambuco and is in a strong position in the Northeast as a whole (notably Piauí, where it now controls the state government).

The Democrats were obliterated, the creation of the PSD sorely hurt them in Santa Catarina, Bahia but also Minas Gerais and São Paulo. At it currently stands, the DEMs are basically on life support and their continued existence as an independent political party is called into question. Would they be better off merging with the PSDB to create larger centre-right opposition party?

The PMDB, by and large, remained predominant in a lot of towns throughout the country and by coalitions and alliances it will probably partake in the governance of over half – if not more – of Brazilian municipalities. The loss of state government in Paraná and its disaffiliation with the PT machine in Bahia resulted in significant loses for the party in those states, but it made major gains in São Paulo.

São Paulo

São Paulo, Brazil’s largest city and economic capital, is the big prize in all municipal elections – especially this year. Being mayor of São Paulo has often been a trampoline to seek higher office, such as the state’s governorship or the presidency. Politically, as a predominantly white and middle-class business city, São Paulo has leaned to the right – centre-right opposition candidate José Serra won 54% in São Paulo in the 2010 runoff against Dilma.

The incumbent mayor of São Paulo since 2006 is Gilberto Kassab (PSD, ex-DEM). Kassab is retiring this year, but there are rumours that he is eyeing a run for governor in 2014 – even though governor Alckmin (PSDB) is quite popular.

The first mayor directly elected after the restoration of direct elections and multiparty democracy was none other than former President Jânio Quadros (who served as president a few months in 1961 before suddenly resigning, probably on a drunken fit), a literally insane populist clown figure. In that 1985 election, Quadros defeated Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a prominent academic who would later become President, after a campaign during which Quadros described FHC as a “pot-smoking atheist” and alleged that Cardoso would force the inclusion of marijuana into school lunches.

Following Quadros’ uneventful term, he was succeeded by Luiza Erudina of the PT – the PT had been founded in the city’s industrial hinterland (the ABC cities). She was succeeded in 1992 by former military-era appointed mayor and later governor Paulo Maluf, a corrupt conservative populist and one of Brazil’s most controversial political figures (he is currently on Interpol’s wanted list, for money-laundering and other accusations in the US). His right-hand man Celso Pitta replaced him in 1996. Seeking to return to office in 2000, Maluf was defeated by the PT’s Marta Suplicy in the runoff with over 58% for Suplicy. However, she was defeated in her reelection bid by PSDB candidate José Serra (the 2002 PSDB presidential candidate and former health minister), who won 55% in the runoff. Serra stepped down in 2006 in order to run for governor that same year, he was succeeded by his deputy mayor, Gilberto Kassab, who won a full term in his own right in 2008 with over 60% of the vote. This year, Kassab leaves office with mediocre approval ratings.

The PSDB candidate this year was José Serra – former mayor, governor and unsuccessful presidential candidate in 2002 and 2010. Serra had originally said that he would not run, but a few months later he backtracked on his statement and won a PSDB primary against two rivals, including an ally of the state governor, Geraldo Alckmin. Serra would like to run for president for a third time in 2014, but few in his party are keen on that terrible idea, first and foremost governor Alckmin and Senator Aécio Neves, the current PSDB favourite for 2014. Serra, however, can still count on the strong backing of his friend and ally Kassab, and his party (the PSD).

The PT has a long history in the state and city of São Paulo but has had limited success at both the state and municipal level in recent years. The field of potential PT candidates included former mayor and current senator Marta Suplicy, her ex-husband senator Eduardo Suplicy, science minister Aloizio Mercadante and education minister Fernando Haddad.

Since 2011, former President Lula has become the de facto leader of the party and its top power broker. While there have been no public disagreements between Lula and his protégé, Dilma, some have wondered if Lula could run for president again in 2014. In São Paulo, fully utilizing his power at the unofficial party boss, Lula moved to sideline Marta Suplicy and others in favour of education minister Fernando Haddad, who he felt could have a stronger appeal to middle-class voters (unlike Suplicy, whose base lies with poorer voters in the city’s outskirts). Haddad was very much promoted as Lula’s candidate, and Dilma publicly campaigned for him only very late in the campaign.

Haddad’s candidacy ran into problems when Interpol Most Wanted (and former mayor) Paulo Maluf and his party (the PP) endorsed Haddad. This embarrassing alliance with the arch-corrupt party boss led Haddad’s original ‘running mate’, former mayor Luiza Erudina (now affiliated with the PSB) to step down.

However, the frontrunner during a good part of the campaign – and especially for the final stretch – was Celso Russomano, a former federal deputy and popular consumers advocate. Russomano is now a member of the small Brazilian Republican Party (PRB), a non-ideological party closely linked to the evangelical United Church of the Kingdom of God (UCKG).

Russomano ran a populist campaign, especially popular with poorer, traditionally petista voters but also middle-class voters tired of the PSDB/PT back and forths in the city. He took the lead from Serra in late August and led by a solid margin until the end of September, when an onslaught from Serra and Haddad brought him back down. The last polls showed a three way tie. Serra’s candidacy was dogged by how he had ended his first stint as mayor: after being elected by saying that he would serve out the full four years, he quit 15 months in to run for governor. There is that underlying ‘fear’ that he might run for something else if he won.

Other candidates included Gabriel Chalita (PMDB), an ally of governor Alckmin and a close Serra ally, Soninha (PPS), who ran a social liberal campaign.

José Serra (PSDB) 30.75%
Fernando Haddad (PT) 28.98%
Celso Russomano (PRB) 21.6%
Gabriel Chalita (PMDB) 13.6%
Soninha (PPS) 2.65%
Others 2.41%

A map of the results is available here. The results of the first round were very surprising, with Serra and Haddad both doing well (especially Haddad) and qualifying for the runoff while Russomano placed a paltry distant third with only 22%. There was a really last minute shift away from Russomano, due to a variety of factors including revelation of personal scandals and questions about his links to the UCKG. The last polls had shown that he had been shedding support from traditionally petista lower-income voters but also middle-class voters, the bleeding continued into election day. The map shows that Russomano got the bulk of his support in the lower-income/working-class peripheral neighborhoods on the outskirts of the city, where the PT is strongest, though he did do fairly well in some more middle-class areas in the north of the city where the PT is weaker.

Fernando Haddad’s remarkable result is a success for his top backer, Lula. He started out running at 3% in the polls (like Dilma in 2009/early 2010) but has ended up qualifying for the runoff. In the runoff, furthermore, he is the favourite. Two polls have already shown him up by 10 over Serra, and he has the backing of Gabriel Chalita (even if the SP PMDB is right-wing, Chalita dislikes Serra) and will probably win most of Russomano’s voters. Serra has high negative ratings, and he is a poor candidate. He is more and more a tired politician who doesn’t seem to understand when to stop. He will try to use the mensalão scandal and some anti-homophobia school kit against Haddad, but for the moment it looks as if the PT could win an historic victory in the city.

Rio de Janeiro

Rio, Brazil’s other big city and host of the 2016 Olympics, did not have a very contested race this year. In 2008, the PMDB’s Eduardo Paes had won a very narrow victory against the Green Party’s Fernando Gabeira, replacing term-limited DEM incumbent Cesar Maia (who served as mayor between 1993 and 1997 and 2001 and 2009). Paes has been a very popular mayor, in part due to the 2016 Olympics and 2014 FIFA World Cup, which has boosted investment and economic development in the city. He ran for reelection, benefiting from the backing of the PT. His two main opponents were state deputy Marcelo Freixo (PSOL), a prominent opponent of the drug cartels and federal deputy Rodrigo Maia (DEM), the son of Cesar Maia (who failed to win a senate seat in 2010 and was running for city council this year).

Eduardo Paes (PMDB) 64.6%
Marcelo Freixo (PSOL) 28.15%
Rodrigo Maia (DEM) 2.94%
Otavio Leite (PSDB) 2.47%
Others 1.84%

A map of the results is available here. Paes won reelection by the first round in a landslide, and while Freixo did relatively decently, Rodrigo Maia (and what he represented as the scion of a prominent local political dynasty) was utterly humiliated. The map is fairly interesting, especially in relation to Marcelo Freixo’s support. Freixo is a state deputy for the small far-left PSOL, formed by PT dissidents during Lula’s first term, and he has built his political career on a courageous crusade against the powerful drug cartels which remain powerful in many favelas in the city. Ironically, however, Freixo received his strongest support in the city’s upper middle-class coastal and central neighborhoods (Botafogo but also the emblematic Copacabana, Ipanema, Leblon, Gávea), usually right-leaning areas. His crusade against the drug cartels has made him the favourite of a good part of the city’s upper middle-classes, but did poorly in the lower-income northern neighborhoods.

Other Cities

In Belo Horizonte (Minas Gerais), the incumbent PSB mayor Márcio Lacerda, elected in 2008 with left-wing support, was reelected this year with right-wing support (the PSDB, DEMs and PSD notably). He won 52.69% against 40.8% for former cabinet minister Patrus Ananias (PT). Lacerda has always been a close ally of PSDB senator Aécio Neves, the former governor (until 2010) and likely presidential candidate in 2014. Hence, Lacerda’s victory is a major boost for Aécio’s presidential ambitions but is also good news for another potential 2014 candidate, governor Eduardo Campos (PSB-PE).

In Salvador (Bahia), the fight to replace term-limited unpopular incumbent João Henrique (PP) is going to be very close between federal deputy ACM Neto (DEM) and Nelson Pelegrino (PT). ACM Neto, who is the grandson of the late Antonio Carlos Magalhães, a prominent conservative baron in Bahia, won 40.17% against 39.73% for Pelegrino. Former mayor Mário Kertész (PMDB) won 9.43% and Márcio Marinho (PRB) took 6.51%, and both candidates have endorsed Pelegrino (although some sections of the PMDB are backing ACM Neto). These results are fairly mediocre, in my eyes, for the PT, but its support has likely been hurt by the state government’s (led by PT governor Jaques Wagner) fight against two public sector strikes. The runoff will be closely fought, but Pelegrino probably has a tiny edge.

In Recife (Pernambuco), incumbent mayor João da Costa (PT) was retiring (pressured into doing so), leaving the field wide open for the very popular state governor, Eduardo Campos (PSB) to anoint his candidate. He did so, in the form of little-known Geraldo Júlio (PSB, allied, amusingly, with the PMDB). Geraldo Júlio started out with 5% in July, but the support from the governor and the state government propelled him into the lead, ahead of Senator Humberto Costa (PT) and former governor Mendonça Filho (DEM). Júlio won 51.15%, against 27.65% for Daniel Coelho (PSDB) ans 17.43% for Humberto Costa (PT). In yet another blow to the influence of the formerly dominant Democrats/PFL, Mendonça Filho took only 2.25% of the vote. Júlio’s landslide is a major victory for Campos, an ambitious politician with his eyes on the presidency in 2014 or 2018.

Curitiba (Paraná) was quite interesting, and surprising. Mayor Beto Richa (PSDB) stepped down in 2010 to run for governor (he won), leaving Luciano Ducci (PSB – the local PSB is right-wing) in the mayor’s chair. Ducci, backed by the centre-right, was running for reelection, and seemed in a decent position to at least qualify for the second round. However, with 26.77%, he placed only a close third in the first round and is out of the runoff. The runoff will oppose Ratinho Jr. (PSC), the son of a popular talk show host and TV personality, who took 34.09% on a populist independent platform, and Gustavo Fruet (PDT), backed by the PT (Fruet had run for senate for the PSDB in 2010 but lost narrowly) who took 27.22%. Ratinho Jr is probably the favourite in the runoff. Mayor Ducci’s defeat is a major blow for the state governor, Beto Richa, who is nonetheless fairly popular, and Eduardo Campos.

In Porto Alegre (Rio Grande do Sul), incumbent mayor José Fortunati (PDT, centre-right) won reelection with 65.22% against 17.76% for federal deputy Manuela d’Ávila (PCdoB) and 9.64% for Adão Villaverde (PT). Fortunati showed some signs of vulnerability earlier on, but through a shrewd campaign he strengthened his appeal to a large number of voters. Manuela, a prominent federal deputy and former student leader, was the de facto candidate of the left, given that Villaverde got only limited support from the national PT.

In Manaus (Amazonas), where mayor Amazonino Mendes (PDT) is retiring, the leader coming out of the first round is former senator Arthur Virgílio Neto (PSDB), who was defeated for reelection to the Senate in 2010. Surprisingly, he came out far ahead of the pack in the first round with 40.55% against 19.95% for Senator Vanessa Grazziotin (PCdoB), backed by the PT and the PMDB. Henrique Oliveira (PR) placed third with 16.46%, while former mayor Serafim Corrêa (PSB) won 11.64%.  Sabino Castelo Branco (PTB), a federal deputy and popular TV personality, won 7.3%. Grazziotin having been expected to have been stronger in the first round, the value of runoff polls which showed her narrowly ahead of Arthur Neto seem a bit off. However, it seems as if Dilma will campaign for her and that the PT is putting some attention into this race.

In Fortaleza (Ceará), incumbent mayor Luizianne Lins (PT) is term-limited. After the first round, Elmano de Freitas (PT), backed by the outgoing mayor, has 25.44% against 23.32% for the president of the state legislature, Roberto Cláudio (PSB), a close ally of governor Cid Gomes (PSB) and his brother Ciro Gomes (PSB). Heitor Ferrer (PDT), a state deputy, won 20.97% and former federal deputy Moroni Torgan (DEM) took a paltry 13.75%. The PSOL candidate somehow won 11.84%.

In Belém (Pará), incumbent mayor Duciomar Costa (PTB) is term-limited. This is another city where the runoff remains up in the air, after a close first round. Popular state deputy and former mayor Edmilson Rodrigues (PSOL) won 32.58% but federal deputy Zenaldo Countinho (PSDB) was close on his heels with 30.67% after receiving a late endorsement from governor Simão Jatene (PSDB). Jefferson Lima (PP), a radio personality, took 12.89% and federal deputy José Priante (PMDB) won 8.79%. The PT, whose candidate won 3.06%, is backing Edmilson. The PSOL, pushed by the candidacy of former senator Marinor Brito, also managed 4 seats on city council.

In Cuiabá (Mato Grosso), the very unpopular incumbent Chico Galindo (PTB) is retiring. Mauro Mendes (PSB), backed by “soy king” senator Blairo Maggi (PR) and senator Pedro Tasques (PDT), took 43.96% against 42.27% for Lúdio (PT), backed by the incumbent PMDB governor. The PSOL won 5.42% and the PSDB candidate won 4.59%. This race looks like a tossup, but a PSB victory here would be another strong result for the party.

Goiânia (Goiás) mayor Paulo Garcia (PT), in office since 2010, won a first term outright with 57.68% in the first round. Jovair Arantes (PTB), backed by the PSDB, took 14.25%. Ex-senator Demóstenes Torres (DEM-GO), before getting knee deep into the Cachoeira scandal, had indicated his intention to run for mayor here.

In Natal (Rio Grande do Norte), incumbent mayor Micarla de Sousa (PV) is extremely unpopular and is not running for reelection. The favourite is former mayor Carlos Eduardo Alves (PDT), who served right before Micarla (and Micarla was his deputy mayor), who took 40.42% in the first round. Carlos Eduardo is the nephew of former mayor, governor, senator and current cabinet minister Garibaldi Alves Filho (PMDB) and the nephew of former governor Aluísio Alves; his running mate is Wilma de Faria (PSB), a former governor and mayor. The clan was disunited, because PMDB’s house leader Henrique Eduardo Alves backed Hermano Moraes (PMDB), who placed second with 23.01%. Fernando Mineiro, a longtime PT activist, took 22.63% and federal deputy Rogério Marinho (PSDB) won 10.16%.

Teresina (Piauí) mayor Elmano Férrer (PTB), backed the PMDB, placed second in the first round with 33.14% against 38.77% for former mayor and state deputy Firmino Filho (PSDB). Former governor and incumbent senator Wellington Dias (PT) placed third with 14.18%, Beto Rego (PSB) won 10.69%.

The mayor of São Luis (Maranhão), João Castelo (PSDB), is in a tough race for a second term. With 30.60%, he trails Edivaldo Holanda Jr. (PTC) who won 36.44%. State deputy Eliziane Gama (PPS) won 13.81% while vice-governor Washington Oliveira (PT), the candidate of the Sarney clan, won only 11.02%.

In Campinas (São Paulo), Jonas Donizette (PSB, ex-PSDB), backed by the PSDB and the DEMs, is the big favourite in the state’s third largest city. He took 47.6% in the first round. The municipality has been rocked by scandals since 2011, which forced the PDT mayor and then his PT deputy to resign and left the president of the chamber, Pedro Serafim (PDT) in charge. The incumbent mayor, Pedro Serafim, was a distant third with 18.47% while economics prof Marcio Pochmann (PT) won 28.56%. In Ribeirão Preto (São Paulo), meanwhile, incumbent centrist mayor Dárcy Vera (PSD), supported by the PMDB and former cabinet minister Wagner Rossi (PMDB), is the favourite after winning 46.34% in the first round. The PSDB’s Darcy Nogueira took 30.38% while the PT, hurt by the stench of corruption surrounding former mayor Antonio Palocci won only 15.o6%. The PSD also has a strong chance in Florianópolis (Santa Catarina) where its candidate, state deputy César Souza Jr., backed by governor Raimundo Colombo (PSD) but also the PSDB and PSB, won 31.68% against 27.37% for Gean Loureiro (PMDB), the candidate backed by senator and former governor Luiz Henrique da Silveira (PMDB). The PCdoB-PT candidate won 25.03%, the PSOL took 14.42%. Senator Luiz Henrique da Silveira would also like to reconquer the state’s largest city, Joinville, the PMDB candidate placed second with 35.52% against 41.42% for the PSD. 

The PT and PSDB are also facing off directly in runoffs in Guarulhos (SP) where the PT is the big favourite and Rio Branco (Acre) where 2010 gubernatorial candidate Tião Bocalom (PSDB) is not far behind Marcus Alexandre (PT) with 43.9% against 48.3% for the petista backed by the Viana siblings (the PT governor and senator from the state).

The results of the second round will be closely followed in a lot of these cities and a few others (for more results, O Globo has them in a text format and Veja has a map) because of the regional and national implications they will carry for the main parties, their ambitious leaders and for the state of Brazil’s notoriously complex and unstable coalitions.

After the first round, two likely 2014 presidential candidates are strengthened. In Minas Gerais, Senator Aécio Neves got his candidate reelected in Belo Horizonte and the PSDB held up fairly well in his state, which would be a key swing state if Aécio is the tucano candidate. Governor Eduardo Campos (PSB-PE) was successful, especially with the phenomenal landslide for his candidate in Recife, and with his party’s strong showing in the whole of the Northeast. For now, the PSB governor of Pernambuco has reiterated that his party remains a supporter of Dilma’s government (where it has cabinet positions) and that it is too early to talk about 2014. But this election showed that the division between the PT and PSB, traditional partners for over 20 years, has grown quite deep as the PT pursues alliances for allegedly opportunistic and selfish reasons with other parties (firstly the PMDB) while the PSB is eager to mark its independence from the PT.

Eduardo Campos’ candidacy is still not a certainty, as there is a chance he might prefer to wait until 2018 where there is a chance that he could be endorsed by the PT. After all, Dilma is not dead in the water – far from it – she has strong approvals and it is unlikely that Lula would directly challenge her for the PT nomination (though if he did, he would be the favourite). Her policies have carried a particularly strong appeal to middle-classes which have traditionally been cooler towards the PT, and it is not clear if discontent on her left would express itself electorally. However, 2018 could be too late for Campos and he might see 2014 as an opportunity to build up his name and image ahead of a winning run in 2018, similar to what Ciro Gomes had tried to do in 1998 and 2002. On top of that, there are now rumours of a sort of “super-ticket” between Campos and Aécio for 2014, an idea which has been endorsed by FHC.

I hope that this post provided some interesting information and details about Brazil’s complex local politics to those interested.

Brazil 2010: Runoff

The second round of Brazil’s presidential election and nine gubernatorial elections were held in Brazil yesterday, Sunday October 31. The results of the first round, including the single-round legislative contests were covered here.

The presidential runoff featured Dilma Rousseff, Lula’s hand-picked successor, who was heavily favoured after the first round; and former Governor José Serra of the centre-right PSDB. Though Dilma won 47% on the first round and ran around 14 points ahead of Serra, she faced a surprisingly close race early on in the runoff, where she was cornered by Serra and external forces on the wedge issue of abortion and she had a tough time finding a winning voice. The issue of abortion, which came up right before the first round and played a big role in her performance that day, came up again to haunt her. Religious leaders, especially those in Brazil’s influential evangelical community, expressed dissatisfaction at her past support for liberalizing the country’s conservative abortion laws. Her campaign and the PT, of course, backtracked and reaffirmed that she would not liberalize any abortion legislation if elected President. This might have helped her, but Serra used the opportunity to portray her as a flip-flopper and a panderer. Furthermore, Serra’s early daily ads early on were quite strong, attacking Dilma on her lack of experience, and even on the issue of corruption, which is always a risky field in Brazil for candidates to attack each other on. Dilma’s ads, on the other hands, perhaps relied too heavily on the traditional worship of Lula and heavy publicity for his government’s social policies. Furthermore, since Serra is a stronger candidate than Alckmin was, he was able to shield himself from the PT’s usual line that the PSDB is pro-privatization. However, Dilma opened up the gap a bit from a narrow 4-6 point advantage into a 10-12 point advantage. Serra, who had worked so hard to find his voice in the campaign and finally found it right after the runoff, lost it again. First, there were rumours according to which Serra’s wife had an abortion during their exile in Chile (during the dictatorship). That killed the issue of abortion and prevented Serra from using it as a wedge issue (given the sparse ideological differences between both, wedge issues are well-liked by candidates). His campaign was also hit by small scandals, and he himself was hit in the face – by masking tape – and he overplayed the incident. The campaign in general became quite violent, and Serra was the main culprit in making it so. Perhaps it didn’t help him to be so tough, but from his point of view it was his only hope and he gave the race all he had. In the end, it was far from enough:

Dilma Rousseff (PT) 56.05%
José Serra (PSDB) 43.95%
blank and null 6.7%
abstention 21.50%

Dilma’s victory – which is also a resounding victory for pollsters (notably Ibope, who got it all correct in their exit polls and most of their final polls) is a major victory for Lula and his government’s policies. It isn’t surprising that a very popular incumbent would be succeeded by his preferred candidate, though it may be surprising for some that Dilma didn’t win a massive landslide given how high Lula’s approval ratings are. That says a lot about how class-stratified the country is, actually. Not much point in jumping on the western media’s bandwagon and placing undue emphasis on the fact that Dilma is a women, given that even though Brazil is a patriarchal society, it wasn’t an issue in the campaign and I doubt there was much sexist voting by men. In fact, as for Royal in France back in 2007, Dilma probably did better with men than with women. Some will argue, quite rightly, that Dilma is not extremely feminine and her tough style and past experiences almost make her a typical male candidate instead of a stereotypical female candidate (the myth of the women candidate being shier, not as tough and all that stupid stuff). However, one thing which is important to note now is that there’s a pattern of women office holders in Brazil (and perhaps in other Latin American countries, such as Argentina) being held to account much more than males. For example, voters have proved to be much less tolerant of corruption in governments led by a woman than in one led by a male. Given the nature of politics in Brazil and the inevitability of a winning candidate constructing not-so-clean alliances, this could become an important issue.

It is likely that Dilma will continue Lula’s policies. She campaigned openly on the fact that she was the candidate of continuity (it’s funny that at the same time in a majority of other western democracies, everybody’s going around on the theme of ‘change’). Comparisons can be drawn to Santos in Colombia, widely seen as the candidate of continuity (of Uribe’s policies). But unlike Santos, Dilma was the incumbent’s preferred candidate and unlike Santos, there is no rivalry of date between the incoming and outgoing presidents. Continuing Lula’s policies mean that Brazil’s much lauded social programs will continue and likely be built upon, while at the same time rather heavy state involvement in the economy (strict control of inflation through high interest rates, oil royalties, no privatizations, big spending) will continue. On the foreign policy level, it is widely believed that she will continue Lula’s policy of increasing Brazilian presence on the world stage (through active participation in the G20 summits and increasing foreign aid programs in Africa and especially Lusophone Africa) all with the aim of getting Brazil a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. In addition, her victory means that Brazil’s controversial (to Washington’s eyes) relations with Iran will continue. On the regional level, Brazil will remain a major player in the broad left block (which includes the likes of Chavez, Correa and Morales) and in the smaller centre-left moderate Southern Cone block (which includes Fernandez de Kirchner, Lugo, Mujica). A Serra victory would have put Brazil far more in line with Washington and would have led to worse relations with Venezuela or Bolivia.

On the topic of random factoids, this is the second time since 1994 that a retiring President’s preferred candidate wins (a case could be made that FHC wasn’t, deep down, Itamar’s preferred successor; if you discount 1994 then you’re going back a long time). It is also the second succession from an elected President to another since 2002, because before that the last transition from elected incumbent to elected incomer was in 1961 with the JK-Quadros handover.

Albeit with an overall swing to the right compared to 2006, the geographical patterns established in 2006 have stuck, and will stick. Brazil is, at its roots, a class-stratified society. A left-wing government which has undertaken policies aimed at lifting the country’s poorest out of poverty has perhaps led to make this division even more pronounced. Many middle-class Brazilians, a lot of whom will loathe Dilma, tend to look down on the poorer classes and regard the whole issue as an annoying problem, and the people who are poor as somewhat of a problem. Some will regard the Bolsa Familia and similar social programs as nothing more than the government’s attempt to bribe the poor population into voting for them and installing a Mexican PRI-like regime led by the PT in Brazil. The heavy vote of the wealthier regions in Serra’s favour tend to exemplify this division of the electorate along lines of class. As in 2006, the ‘blue states’ have a much higher HDI and GDP per capita than the ‘red states’ do. In 1989, it was almost the other way around.

Serra won 53.89% and 50.92% in the South and Centre-West regions respectively. The first in Brazil’s wealthiest (and whitest) region; including well-off cities such as Curitiba (63.6% for Serra), Florianópolis (61.5% for Serra) and Porto Alegre (55.8% for Serra) and also a rather hilly but extremely wealthy inland region stretching from northern Rio Grande do Sul all the way into the Paulista backcountry. In very wealthy and heavily white European cities such as Joinville, Blumenau and Londrina; Serra won by huge margins. That being said, parts of the three southern states sharing a border with Argentina or another country tended to vote for Dilma more heavily, a result, largely, of lesser affluence in these more isolated areas; but also of an old dying tradition of positivism in the gaucho countryside of Rio Grande do Sul (which was still alive and well as recently as 1998). In the Centre-West, the thick woods of Mato Grosso have been disappearing fast as soy farms expand and contribute to the region’s strong agrobusiness-driven economy. While agrobusiness and the whole soy industry tends to translate into a right-wing vote, it certainly cannot be said that the PT governments have not encouraged this growth. Dilma herself, as Energy Minister, was well-known for pushing through major hydroelectric projects in the region while Lula, allied with figures such as Mato Grosso’s soy king Blairo Maggi (incoming Senator), allowed the rapid growth of agrobusiness. Agrobusiness has also taken root in Acre (replacing the 1980s rubber-tapping dominated backwoods economy in favour of a pioneer front big farms economy), Roraima, Rondônia and Pará. On the other hand, the state of Amazonas and Amapá have not seen a similar growth in agrobusiness at the expense of the rainforest. In addition, federal funding and social spending is very high in Amazonas and lower in surrounding states.

In the Northeast, what we saw in the first round were repeated again on October 31. In the major urban centres, Dilma won Salvador (73%), Recife (66.4%), Fortaleza (61.8%), Teresina (63.9%) and São Luis (76.7%). Serra was victorious notably in Natal (51.7%), Maceió (60.8%), Aracaju (53.8%) and in smaller centres such as Vitoria da Conquista (55.9%) and Campina Grande (60.2%). Broadly speaking, Dilma totally owned in the sertão. She already won 70-90% in a lot of the sertão’s small towns, she won by similarly crushing margins this time.

Marina Silva (PV), who won 19.3% in the first round, did not endorse anybody though some prominent Green politicians and state parties did (Fernando Gabeira, of course, went to Serra). Her vote, it is estimated, broke around 55-60% for Serra. This isn’t surprising, given that a large part of her electorate was a young, well-educated and urban electorate who had more in common with Serra’s average voter than Dilma’s average voter. Brasilia, which she won by a strong margin, went to Dilma by a 5.6% margin. Belo Horizonte, MG; her other big win, however, went to Serra, narrowly, with 50.4% for him.

In the city of Rio de Janeiro, Dilma won 60.99% of the vote. A map of the results at the ward level can be seen here. The wealthiest areas in the city’s south facing the ocean went heavily to Serra. The well-known places: Copacabana, Ipanema and Leblon (the wealthiest place in the city) gave him over 60% of the vote. The north, which has more favelas and is generally poorer backed Dilma by large margins. In Rio de Janeiro, the core of the city is not the wealthiest area (unlike in most Latin American cities), and it went heavily to Dilma. Dilma also swept Rio’s northern faubourgs, cities such as Duque de Caxias and Nova Iguaçu. Niteroí, a well-off town on the other side of the Bay of Guanabara, which had gone to Marina, went to Dilma narrowly with 52.6%. Volta Redonda, the old heart of Brazil’s metallurgical industry, which had voted for Marina as well, gave Dilma 61.7%.

In the city of São Paulo, Serra won 53.64% of the vote. A map of the results at the ward level can be seen here. The core of the city and its surrounding areas went heavily for Serra. These areas, as is usual in a lot of cities, are the wealthiest parts. Serra won a crushing 77.5% in Pinheiros, the city’s wealthiest area (with a HDI similar to some Scandinavian countries). He took 82.5% in the Jardim Paulista, which is also extremely wealthy. The city’s outskirts, on all three sides, went to Dilma, with her margins increasing the further you got from the centre of the city. Dilma won the working-class cities of the ABC belt, where Lula’s political career kicked off. She won 56.2% in São Bernardo do Campo and 66.5% in Diadema. Serra took nearly 69% in São Caetano do Sul, the country’s wealthiest municipality.

Dilma won by nearly 17 points in Minas Gerais (59-41 or something), and this was probably crucial in the state which usually decides elections. Belo Horizonte, the state’s wealthy capital, voted narrowly for Serra although its suburbs voted heavily for Dilma. Dilma also won Juiz de Fora, a major industrial city in the south of the state, with 68.8%. She also won in Uberlândia, a major city in the west of the state, with  As expected, the state-level races on October 3 (swept by the PSDB and its allies) were a different ballgame all together and had no effect on the presidential race. Aécio Neves did some last minute and reluctant campaigning for Serra in a state where he was elected Senator in a landslide a month ago, but it was arguably in Aécio’s interest to have Serra lose in order to make the ground perfect for him to run in 2014.

Abstention was quite high, breaking 20% and reaching its highest point since 1998. Abstention is technically illegal in Brazil, but turnout is not strictly enforced, especially in remote areas. Turnout is usually lower in these remote areas and higher in urban areas; and thus in some areas low turnout can hurt the left. Turnout was particularly low in Acre, Amazonas and Maranhão. Blank and null votes, however, were lower, because there are fewer possibilities for voter error when you have only two candidates instead of ten or so. Indeed, those whose votes are blank and null now are perhaps in large part voters who deliberately voided their vote to make a message (Plínio, the PSOL’s candidate, cast a blank vote).

The state of Acre had a 44 point swing to the right compared to 2006, making it Serra’s strongest state (Roraima is still in the top, though, narrowly trailing Acre as his second-best state). I don’t know the in-and-outs of economic changes on the ground, but there has likely been a major shift towards agrobusiness in the state. In addition, there are a lot of evangelicals in the North, and a look at results in places like Rio de Janeiro and Espírito Santo (likely explaining Serra’s win there) show a major shift of this demographic towards Serra vis-a-vis the 2006 results.

There is also the case of state governments influencing presidential results. Rio Grande do Norte and Paraíba both had strong swings towards Serra, and in both of these states a left-wing incumbent aligned with Dilma were defeated. In Tocantins, lower turnout likely explains why Dilma’s percentage share actually declined between the first and second round; though here again an incumbent governor allied with the left was defeated (albeit narrowly) for reelection.

While the Northeast trended towards Serra, it should not be interpreted as a sign that something is changing there. Dilma won over 70% of the vote in the region, making it her best region again and there is nothing that could explain a major swing to the right at this point in time, except a weakening of the left in certain urban centres in the region. What we saw happen in the region in 2006 were certainly not a fluke, on the contrary it is now a defining pattern in Brazilian electoral geography.

The whole South, the outer Centre-West and São Paulo had a net ‘trend’ (swinging below the national swing) towards Dilma. Rio Grande do Sul, where Dilma is based, was the only state where she did better than Lula had done in 2006. That being said, she lost in Porto Alegre, her political base. The trend towards her in the rest of the region is part local appeal (Lula had a Northeastern appeal, probably, in 2006) but also perhaps a reflection of a small and almost invisible shift with a part of the urban middle-class as a result of the strong economy in the country which has benefited the middle-classes as well. In Mato Grosso, her well-known and documented support for agrobusiness and hydroelectricity were probably important factors in this ‘trend’.

The ‘evangelical effect’ is probably an explanation for the trend in Espírito Santo but also Rio de Janeiro and Rondônia. These states have a lot of evangelical voters, and they swung heavily towards Serra this year. In Espírito Santo, where offshore oil is booming, oil royalties may have proved to be an issue favourable to Serra.

We finish with a look at the gubernatorial runoffs, and a look at 2014.

In Alagoas, incumbent Governor Teotônio Vilela Filho (PSDB) was reelected with 52.74% of the votes against 47.26% for former Governor Ronaldo Lessa (PDT). Collor’s hypocritical support for his old enemy Lessa wasn’t enough, especially against a good and smart campaigner like Teo Vilela. Although a member of the PSDB, Vilela has placed a lot of emphasis on his ability to work with the federal government to get things done from Alagoas (think of rhetoric similar to “working across party lines” in the US). He has also made sure people think that he’s actually endorsed by Lula or supported by Lula. Furthermore, Vilela, who is honest and competent, has a good record in government and attacked Lessa hard on corruption (Lessa is quite corrupt). When you’re attacked for corruption in Brazil, it’s rarely a good thing to then hang out with the country’s sole impeached President – Collor.

In Amapá, Camilo Capiberibe (PSB) has been elected governor with 53.77% of the votes against 46.23% for Lucas Baretto (PTB). This is a major victory for clean government and a defeat for José Sarney, the corrupt President of the Senate and Senator from Amapá, a state which he basically owns. Capiberibe, endorsed by the PSB and PT in the first round, got a lot of other parties on his side and emerged as a kind of anti-corruption candidate over Lucas, who is corrupt due to his ties with Sarney. In this context, it’s important to note that the incumbent governor (defeated badly on the first round) recently spent a few days in jail. Sarney still wields considerable power, and even though he hates the Capiberibe family, the incoming Governor has said he wants to work with Sarney.

In the Federal District, the next Governor is Agnelo Queiroz (PT) who won 66.10% against 33.9% for Weslian Roriz (PSC). Agnelo isn’t 100% clean, but the DF has had a major corruption scandal in 2009 (with its then-governor removed from office and sent to jail) and the right’s standard bearer, the Roriz family (Joaquim Roriz was removed from the ballot in the end, and was replaced by his wife) are crooks. Agnelo campaigned big on corruption, and promises honest governance. He won almost all of the votes which had gone to smaller candidates in the first round, notably 14% won by the PSOL’s Toninho.

In Goiás, Senator and former Governor Marconi Perillo (PSDB) won 52.99% against 47.01% for former mayor Iris Rezende (PMDB). Marconi Perillo, a popular senator and successful governor till 2007, has won a tough race to succeed his former ally and current rival, retiring Governor Alcides Rodrigues (PP). Alcides Rodrigues and his first round candidate, Vanderlan (PR) who took about 16% both backed Iris Rezende, also backed by Lula.

In Pará, former governor Simão Jatene (PSDB) won 55.74% of the votes against 44.26% for incumbent governor Ana Júlia Carepa (PT). He had retired at the last minute in 2006, and the PSDB’s candidate, Almir Gabriel, had lost to Ana Júlia Carepa thanks to a strong flow of first-round PMDB votes to her. This time, it’s vice-versa. The PMDB, and its local baron, well-known criminal Jader Barbalho, supported Jatene in the runoff, although Jatene is on very poor terms now with fellow tucano Almir Gabriel. Jatene also promises to work across party lines to get pork for his state. Hopefully he doesn’t take Jader Barbalho’s route of getting it.

In Paraíba, former mayor Ricardo Coutinho (PSB) won 53.7% against 46.3% for incumbent governor Ze Maranhão (PMDB). Coutinho, although a former petista, was endorsed by the PSDB/DEM and is considered to be a right-winger or close to it. Ze Maranhão had only taken office as a result of the disqualification of the 2006 winner (Cunha Lima, who was forced out for vote buying), and led a pretty poor campaign, notably refusing to debate Coutinho. Ze Maranhão, who won 49.3% in the first round, also saw his vote share drop.

In Piauí, Governor Wilson Martins (PSB), who took office in March, was reelected with 58.93% against 41.07% for his PSDB opponent, Silvio Mendes. There was never much suspense in this race, though Martins won by a slightly larger margin than polls had predicted.

In Rondônia, former federal deputy Confúcio Moura (PMDB) won 58.68% of the vote against 41.32% for incumbent Governor João Cahulla (PPS), in office since March. Confúcio Moura had received the support of Expedito Junior (PSDB), a top contender who was barred from running under the Clean Slate law. To answer inevitable questions, Confúcio seems to have endorsed Dilma reluctantly but seems to be one of those pure opportunists who have trouble endorsing a candidate when its time (but have no trouble supporting him/her if he/she wins).

In Roraima, the surprise of the night came with the narrow reelection of Governor Anchieta (PSDB) with 50.41% against 49.59% for Neudo Campos (PP). Anchieta, who took office in 2007 following death of former governor Ottomar Pinto (PSDB) had been in hot water after the first round, in which he trailed Neudo Campos by nearly 3 points.

Focus in the political world, for some, has already shifted over to 2014. Dilma is widely expected to run again, although some (mostly those on the right) believe that Lula would like to run again in 2014. However, he’ll be old by then and he has shown no interest in doing so. Lula is hardly a Chavez or a Putin, and though Dilma was his candidate she does not seem to be the type of person who is a perfect puppet and placeholder. There are, however, other names on the broad left/government side which are ambitious and tempted by a run. Eduardo Campos (PSB-PE) is emerging as a major political leader for the PSB and has much weight as Pernambuco’s popular governor. He is definitely ambitious, perhaps the equal of Aécio Neves. Sérgio Cabral (PMDB-RJ), the governor of Rio, is also thought to be interested in running some day.

For the opposition, it was clear from the outset that José Serra was not their ideal candidate. Not extremely charismatic, too old and too connected to Cardoso for his own good, he also faced quiet rebels, notably from the party’s young guard: Aécio Neves and Beto Richa. The easy wins by both of these young and talented individuals were a sign to the party to start renewing itself. It also places Aécio Neves (PSDB-MG) as the early favourite for 2014, with Beto Richa (PSDB-PR) but also Geraldo Alckmin (PSDB-SP) as other potential contenders. In his awkward concession speech, José Serra said he wasn’t bowing out yet and he didn’t close the door to a third run. He also had a snide remark for Aécio when he complimented Alckmin for his loyalty (Serra’s supporters accuse Aécio of disloyalty and not doing all he could for Serra).

The next time Brazil will grace us with elections is in 2012, for municipal elections.

An electoral revolution: the political evolution of Brazil’s Nordeste

Changes in a region’s voting patterns and overall political mood are often spread out over a long period of time, rarely happening overnight in one election. Possibly, the electoral evolution of the Northeast Region, or Nordeste, of Brazil, is an exception. The traditional image of the Northeast being a backwards region dominated by powerful landlords who oppressed a large and poor peasantry has changed considerably, though that, of course, did not come overnight. The change in voting patterns, however, have changed rather drastically in a short period of time.

The Nordeste was the centre of Portuguese Brazil’s colonial economy and was the colony’s wealthiest region – by far- until at least the mid-nineteenth century. Helped by a favourable location and climate, the (coastal) Nordeste’s economy grew, lived and prospered thanks to sugar cane. The need for manual labour on huge sugar plantations especially after the quasi-extermination of the Tupi natives (who were also inadequate for the task) led to the largest slave trade in the western hemisphere. Most African slaves sent to work in the Americas were sent to Brazil, a fact which contributes to the Nordeste’s cultural and racial diversity. As coffee gradually replaced sugar as Brazil’s main export, the Nordeste suffered a quasi-constant decline and degeneration which has, over time, transformed a region which was once the country’s wealthiest into the country’s poorest.

To understand the region’s politics and societal structure, one must first understand the vegetation and precipitation patterns of the region. Basically, the Northeast is divided into three geographical regions (there are actually four, but nobody cares about the fourth). The first is the zona da mata, a wet and green region which forms a long, thin and narrow strip along the Atlantic coastline. This region actually used to be covered by thick rainforest similar to the Amazon, though it was all wiped out by the Portuguese who established sugar cane plantations all along the coast. Sugar cane was and is produced on large estates called engenhos, who were led by wealthy sugar barons who maintained tremendous political influence. After the green zona da mata, another – inland this time – long and thin strip is formed by the agreste, a kind of transitional region between the wet green coastline and the dry dusty interior. Already in the agreste, rainfall is much scarcer and the landscape is much less green. Small agriculture is dominant here. Further inland lies the vast, semi-arid and dustier sertão, the most well-known of the three geographical regions. Prone to long droughts, the sertão is generally unfertile and most agriculture is based around cattle herding. Most herding used to be done on huge estates, the well-known latifundios, led by landowners who dominated a large, poor peasantry. Drought, poverty and lack of income encouraged a massive migration from the dirt poor sertão to major cities of southeastern Brazil.

Slavery and its legacy, as well as a tradition of hegemonic control, unsurprisingly engendered poverty, oppression and an oligarchic paternalist society. Wielding much political and economic power, oligarchs and landowners controlled the economic and political life of their turf, a system which became known in Brazil (and elsewhere) as coronelismo, whereby a local oligarch (a ‘colonel’) controlled a tightly regimented society and delivered their votes en masse to the highest bidder. This power, which came as a result of their wealth and dynastic status, conferred them with considerable power. Their support for the republic in 1889 played a crucial role in its establishment and survival. The system of coronelismo was quasi-universal in Brazil during the café com leite Republic (1889-1930) and continued unfettered in rural areas throughout the country until the 1980s (in some cases, to this day). However, even in the Northeast, the influence and field of action of these bosses was quickly confined to rural areas (where a great majority of the population still lived) while wealthier urban areas became holdouts of organized urban labour or a progressive educated elite. Recife, after all, was a stronghold of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) which polled over 15% in Pernambuco in 1945 and 1947 (industrialist backing of the PCB also explains that in parts).

It is important to note some important things about these ‘colonels’, oligarchs and political bosses which literature on Brazilian history refer to. There is sometimes the image of these men all being the same and favouring the same thing. While it is true, certainly, that most of them largely supported a conservative, elitist (or oligarchic) society which paid little attention to the plight of rural workers or to land reform; some bosses were more progressive than others and some were more nationalistic than others. For example, the elite in Pernambuco was much more progressive than the elite in, say, Bahia or Alagoas. Certain members of the elite had nationalist leanings, and some – I dare say – were somewhat progressive! Not all members of the elite were bad, some did some good for their region, notably by encouraging industrialization. Lastly, a fundamental aspect of the elite was that it was still very much flexible – within the confines of the status-quo – and had no exclusive ties to any political party. During the 1945-1964 era, for example, while the conservative UDN was often noted as the party of the old Northeastern elites, and, true enough, the region was consistently the UDN’s strongest, the local PSD and even PTB were very much dominated by the local elites as well.

It might be surprising to some that even with the advent of the secret ballot and apparent democracy in 1945 that the elites could still hold the power they held. As in much of South America, their power was largely hegemonic, indicating some sort of consent from the base. These political bosses still commanded peasants and through veiled threats of losing their jobs, shelter and source of sparse income they could easily control their voting habits.

Getúlio Vargas’s policies were only aimed at organizing urban labour and using the urban working-class as a base of political power similarly to how the old conservatives used Northeastern peasants as their base of political power. Vargas, himself a landowner (though in a society almost a world apart from that of the Northeast) had no interest in organizing the rural workers or disturbing the conservative status-quo in the vast swathes of the Nordeste. Vargas was never a true left-winger, let alone a radical or a communist. Given the nationalist leanings of certain political bosses in the region, he was able to garner the loyalty of the powerful Northeastern elite; though the Getulist (or PTB) organizing was weaker in the Northeast than anywhere else.

The 1946 Constitution, which restricted franchise to literate voters did much to ensure that the elite would not be disturbed by pesky dirt poor peasants. Encouraging literacy, something promoted both by the church and the government (after 1961), was thus seen as a danger by the elite. João Goulart’s 1963 push for ‘basic reforms’, most notable of which were agrarian and political reform, scared the elite more than a bit. Agrarian reform, of course, would break up the large latifundias which still dominated the sertão and break up the oligarch’s main source of power. Political reform, notably encouraging literacy and expanding franchise to illiterate voters, would transform Brazil into a mass democracy (throughout the 45-64 era, only 15-20% of the population actually voted) and would likely break up the power of the elite; because while the poor (and illiterate) peasantry was tightly controlled by the elites, they were also easy targets for nascent radical movements. What Goulart proposed Vargas would never have done, so the elite was shaken to its base by these reform. They had cared little, in the end, about Vargas’ shenanigans with the urban workers and his flirtation with left-wing nationalism because he didn’t dare disturb them. However, Goulart’s reforms endangered the system altogether. The Northeastern political elite was, therefore, entirely behind the 1964 coup which overthrew Goulart. While the support of the middle-classes and the legalist wing of the military for the coup was crucial, the support of the Northeastern elites undoubtedly played a great role. Conveniently, the 1964 coup and the subsequent decades of military dictatorship killed off the nascent radical political movements and stalled the question of land reform (as a political issue) for a long time.

In this context, the experience of Miguel Arraes in Pernambuco is perhaps of importance in highlighting what the political elite feared would happen. A democratic socialist supported by the PCB, Arraes narrowly won the governorship of Pernambuco in the 1962 elections, in an election which proved to be a major defeat for the ruling conservative elite. Certainly funding and monetary support from José Ermírio de Morais, a big (nationalist PTB) industrialist who was elected Senator the same day helped, but Arraes had been able to win by assembling a coalition uniting urban areas with sugar cane workers who were literate enough to vote. Perhaps Arraes would have been the beginning of the end for the elite if the military hadn’t turned back the clock.

The elite supported the military well until the end, at least until doing so stopped being a good strategy and when the military stopped providing the benefits it had done in the past. Master chameleons, the elite, or at least a good part of it, became, or so they claim, convinced democrats right around the time of the mass protests in favour of direct elections in 1984. Those who didn’t change colours then did so the following year, when the ruling majority’s nomination of Paulo Maluf, an unsavoury man, for the presidency alienated much of the regime’s Northeastern power brokers. These people split from the ruling PDS party and formed the Liberal Front Party (PFL) and promptly supported Tancredo Neves in the indirect 1985 election. For them, it couldn’t have been better given that Tancredo Neves (a fundamentally good man) tragically died right before taking office and José Sarney, one of these master chameleons, became President.

While urbanization, the growth of an independent media and higher literacy disturbed the elite by the 1980s, they still held much sway over the region. In the 1982 election, the pro-military and very conservative PDS swept the Northeast, taking nearly 67% of the vote against 43% nationally. That was a bit before the aforementioned change in colours, and in 1986 the old PDS (which was, by then, a far-right party) collapsed and the main fight in the region was between Sarney’s PMDB (which swept the country) and the PFL. The PFL’s ranks included well-known old conservative oligarchs who had supported the military and now played a key role in the new democratic regime; people such as Antônio Carlos Magalhães (ACM, the strongman of Bahia), Marco Maciel and José Agripino Maia. José Sarney himself, as far as I know, never joined the PFL (but at the same time played a major role in the creation of the party), but he also controlled the PFL organization in his home state of Maranhão. His daughter Roseana, for example, was a longtime member of the PFL (until they kicked her out). That being said, the PFL was not the only party for the old elite, and its support was not even throughout the region (in Ceará, the PSDB was dominant, for example). That being said, the PFL is best thought of as the main party of the elite.

Out of the vacuum on the right in 1989 emerged a political outsider and political novice, the young and flashy governor of Alagoas, Fernando Collor. Collor, whose father killed a fellow Senator and whose grandfather had been one of Vargas’ labour ministers, was the perfect representative for the elite. He was conservative, but also detached from the Sarney government in a way which allowed him to be the candidate of change. Collor was the symbol par excellence of the elite: conservative, dynastic and flexible within the system. After all, he had supported Sarney when it paid to do so, but broke all bridges with him when it was bad PR to do so. The darling of the right-wing media and the elite, Collor was the best candidate to take on the left, led by Lula and Leonel Brizola.

Collor defeated Lula with 53% in the runoff and took 55.7% in the Northeast (which was only his third-best region), but lost to Lula in the state of Pernambuco by a narrow margin of 50.9% to 49.1%. Lula had also done well in Bahia (48.3%), Rio Grande do Norte (47.4%) and Paraíba (45%), and his results certainly were a success for the PT which was extremely weak in the region. It did show that some peasants, formerly strictly regimented into political machines, rebelled in the isolation of the voting booth; but the bottom line was that the political bosses still held considerable sway, especially in rural areas. A better understanding of the nature of the election in the region is provided by a look at results in the context of municipalities.

Nordeste, 1989 election (runoff); source: Eleições em Dados

The map to the left reveals a quasi-perfect urban-rural divide, a divide which was seen throughout the country. Collor won the election almost solely on the power of the rural vote, getting obliterated by varying margins in the quasi-entirety of the country’s major urban centres (he may have won São Paulo narrowly). Maceió, AL is an exception to this rule; but Collor’s ownership of the state (and city) likely explains that. Certainly, however, in cities like Salvador, Recife or Fortaleza; Collor did very badly. Aside from the fact that Northeastern cities, which are far wealthier than the rural areas surrounding them, have been holdouts of urban labour or urban progressives against the ultra-conservative countryside; the urban centres were also the only one in 1989 to have had access to unbiased independent media sources which highlighted Collor’s shady side. His status as an old oligarch and his candidacy as one of the old right was certainly not an advantage in any urban centre, especially the most progressive ones like Recife, Salvador, Fortaleza or Rio.

There are various outspots of red in rural areas, likely explainable by a weak political machine in the specific region or an economy less reliant on agriculture and herding. The best example of such areas are in the São Francisco Valley, in towns such as Juazeiro, Petrolina and Petrolândia, where the economy revolves more around hydroelectricity and industry than around herding. But the main thing here is that the rural areas are varying shades of blue, more often that not darker shades of blue. Certainly Collor dominated in the vast majority of the herding-reliant sertão, which was the base of the political bosses of yesterday, more so than the coastal areas which were slightly less conservative.

Collor’s impeachment in 1992 didn’t end the power of the elite, which showed its flexibility in its relations with Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC). As a rather leftie sociologist and intellectual, FHC likely had little love for the elite and they barely hid their contempt for him. The Bahian baron of the PFL, Antônio Carlos Magalhães, criticized FHC’s anti-inflation Plano Real right at the outset. However, when the Plano Real proved to be a resounding success and Cardoso showed his interest in taking the top job in 1994, the elite widely acclaimed Cardoso as the candidate of the right and his running-mate, Marco Maciel (PFL-PE) gave from their ranks. Cardoso certainly wasn’t their natural choice, and probably not their preferred choice. But pragmatically, FHC was the Brazilian right’s only hope against Lula, who had been leading in all opinion polling until at least mid-summer 1994.

FHC defeated Lula on the back of the resoundingly successful Plano Collor by the first round, taking 54.3% nationally by the first round and 57.6% in the Northeast. Lula won 30.3% in the region, slightly more than what he got nationally and did well in Pernambuco (37%), Sergipe (36.9%), Bahia (35.2%) and Piauí (32%). Contrarily to Collor in 1989, FHC also performed very well in urban areas. Of the state capitals, all but one of which had been swept by Lula in 1989, FHC won five of them and Lula’s win in Salvador was not as massive as it had been in 1989. Certainly, FHC had a better image in urban areas than Collor did. Largely the same thing happened in 1998, though FHC did worse in the Northeast than nationally (47.7% vs. 53.1%) though not as much to Lula’s benefit (31.6% regionally vs. 31.7%) but to the benefit of Ceará’s favourite son Ciro Gomes who won 16% regionally and 11% nationally (and narrowly won his home-state, which was practically a 3-way tie).

Some will argue that 2002 represents the turning point in the Nordeste’s voting patterns, but I disagree. Certainly, Lula won big in the Northeast and that is not a small fact. He turned the region red, but at the same time he turned the quasi-entirety of the country red, even the wealthy, white conservative states of the south. Lula’s appeal in 2002 was broad, something which comes both from his campaign style and rhetoric, which was unusually moderate and ‘calm’ (gone, obviously, was the angry bearded Lula); and from FHC’s widespread unpopularity after a bad second term. That explains why the regional results in the runoff were all within 3-4% of the national result (61.3%). With 61.5% in the Northeast, it was hard to say then that the region was the key stronghold of the new left. What’s more, the only state which Lula lost was in the Northeast – Alagoas, the last holdout of the conservative elite; and a look at results by municipality reveals that you still had a fair number of random patches of conservative blue in the traditional rural strongholds of the elite.

Results of state-level results in 2002 also provide ample evidence that the realignment had not occurred by 2002. With the exception of Piauí where Wellington Dias (PT) defeated incumbent PFL governor Hugo Napoleão, the parties representing the old order held on in most states. In Pernambuco, Humberto Costa (PT) was badly defeated by right-winger Jarbas Vasconcelos (PMDB), while in Bahia Paulo Souto (PFL) easily defeated Jaques Wagner (PT). The candidates of the right, generally speaking, also performed well in the senatorial election. Thus, while Lula won big in the region even in 2002, an analysis of results both at a micro level and a downballot level provides evidence to claim that 2002 was not a realignment and the presidential results were merely part of the wave which swept Brazil.

Results of the 2010 presidential election by municipality (own work)

The realignment came in 2006, which was a defining election in terms of defining the effects of the first left-wing government in Brazil since the 1960s on the voting behaviours of Brazilians. In 2002, in the first round, Lula had done about as well in the Northeast than in Brazil (slightly worse, in fact). In 2006, he performed 18% better in the Northeast than in the country as a whole. In the runoff, that figure was 16%. Overall, he won 66.8% in the region by the first round and took a crushing 77.1% of the votes in the runoff. Just by those results, as well as his sheer domination – even by the first round – in most of the backwoods of the sertão, it was clear that a major realignment had taken place.

At the state level, unlike in 2002, the forces of the left did well. Of course in Bahia, Jaques Wagner unexpectedly defeated incumbent PFL Governor Paulo Souto by a ten-point margin in the first round. In Pernambuco, with the quasi-unanimous backing of Humberto Costa’s first round voters, Eduardo Campos (PSB, Arraes’ grandson) easily defeated governor José Mendonça Filho (PFL) in the runoff. In Ceará, Cid Gomes (PSB) defeated governor Lúcio Alcântara by a crushing 28-point margin in the first round. Finally, in Maranhão, governor Roseana Sarney (PFL) was narrowly defeated by Jackson Lago (PDT) in the runoff, a victory which, at the time, was considered a major blow to the Sarney clan, dominant in Maranhense politics.

The results of the first round of the 2010 election provided no indication that the 2006 result were an aberration. Quite to the contrary, it arguably showed, to some extent, an amplification of the 2006 realignment. With the notable exception of Rio Grande do Norte (which was caused by local conditions), big names on the old right went down to defeat badly. Tasso Jereissati, a dominant Cearan politician of the PSDB, was badly defeated running for what was thought to be easy re-election to the Senate. Marco Maciel, a key figure of the old PFL and a key symbol of the old conservative oligarchs who had supported the military, was badly defeated. César Borges, though allied with Lula, lost badly in Bahia; where Jaques Wagner won a landslide reelection over his 2002 and 2006 rival Paulo Souto. In Pernambuco, finally, Eduardo Campos (PSB) was reelected with one of the biggest margins in Brazilian political history, over a well-known politico (Jarbas) no less.

An amusing anecdote showing the new force of the left in the region is how even those on the right are attempting to place more emphasis on their relations with Lula than their relations with their party. A notable example is that of Teo Vilela Jr, the incumbent PSDB governor of Alagoas in a tough fight for reelection. Nothing on his website indicates his party, let alone his party’s presidential nominee, but instead had a nice article on how Lula had praised his work. He himself also had lots of nice things to say about Lula, all part of a strategy to confuse voters into thinking that he was Lula’s candidate, when technically he’s a member of the main opposition party to the President.

An analysis of the results of the 2010 elections by municipality shows the utter dominance of the left in the sertão. This is where the electoral realignment occurred and where it was most dramatic. In large swathes of the massive sertão, which covers most of the region’s interior, Dilma won well over 60% of the votes and in parts of Bahia, Pernambuco, Ceará, Piauí and Maranhão her results in the sertão were even well into the 70-80% range with a few municipalities (mostly small) giving her over 90% of the votes. Only eight years ago, a fair share of those had still given Serra a near majority of the votes. An interesting case study in the voting shifts at work in the sertão is the municipality of Caetés, Pernambuco. Caetés is the birthplace of Lula, and is a typical dirt poor village in the sertão. In 1994 and 1998, Lula lost the village by a big margin (FHC had even taken over 60% there in 1998). Dilma won 81% this year (Serra won 15%). In 2002, Lula had won 54% in the first round. Most of the littoral remains left-wing, though by somewhat smaller margins. Conversely, the left’s strength in the region’s urban centres (which are much more well-off than the rural areas) has abetted somewhat since the highs of 1989, a trend observed in a number of major urban centres throughout Brazil (ironically, Lula’s average voter in 1989 was probably wealthier than Collor’s). Marina Silva did very well in the region’s major cities this year, in line with her strong performances in well-educated and averagely well-off urban areas; though Serra did very poorly, though Marina likely took a lot of votes which otherwise would have gone to him. That being said, most urban centres, especially Salvador, remain staunchly left-wing; with the exception of places like Maceió and Aracaju.

How did such a realignment happen?

While the Northeast was demographically perfect ground for the left in any western democracy, like in most of Latin America the tight control of the population by an oligarchic elite kept the region safely in conservative hands for most of the twentieth century. The slow moves towards agrarian democracy and somewhat equitable land distribution as well as the gradual loss of power by the old elites through increased education, awareness, freedom and wealth undoubtedly played a major role in ending the power of the conservative dominant class. The increased literacy rate and educational level in the region are also exemplified by the massive collapse in invalid votes. Illiterates can vote since 1988 (though, unlike literate voters, they are not legally compelled to do so), and the vote is now done electronically (since 1994). Unsurprisingly, there is a definite correlation between illiteracy and a high percentage of blank votes. The percentage of invalid votes in the region has dwindled from roughly 30% in 1994 to slightly above 10% this year.

The PT was, at its foundation, a largely urban party based in urban, organized labour. While it did have a few bases of more rural support (notably in Acre), the party was especially weak in the rural Nordeste where it had no natural base with rural workers. It was only the experience of the left in power which allowed the party to build a solid base in the region, thanks to the social policies of the Lula government which are of great importance to the region. There is a very high positive correlation between votes for the left in a municipality and the number of Bolsa Família beneficiaries in said municipality. What Lula and the left has achieved is, in a way, the eternal and unrealized goal of most of the Latin American left: creating a durable alliance between urban and rural workers. That was what Goulart wanted to achieve in 1964, but he was far ahead of his day in that regard.

Some of this would probably not have happened without the flexibility and opportunism of the elite. The elite might have been conservative and downright horrible in most senses of the term, but they certainly weren’t inflexible or stubborn. Their flexibility within the confines of the established system allowed them to survive, and will allow some of them to survive in the future. Brazilian politicians, of course, are not known for their moral stature or their ideological consistency. Most don’t see an issue with supporting two ideologically opposed governments, and most choose their allies based on the amount of money they can offer them. A fair share of the formerly conservative elite thus realized that their new interests lay with Lula, and so they choose to support Lula even though they were all diehard opponents of his back in 1989. Notable Northeastern oligarchs who took this route include José Sarney (PMDB), who has become one of the President’s biggest allies; Fernando Collor (PTB); Renan Calheiros (PMDB); Roseana Sarney (PMDB), a former pefelista expelled for supporting Lula in 2006; Henrique Eduardo Alves (PMDB) and César Borges (PR). People like Garibaldi Alves Filho (and his father) can also be counted as allies, albeit less reliable than Sarney, of the left. Those who haven’t abandoned their right-wing roots, haven’t done so well. Marco Maciel and Tasso Jereissati are good examples. As corrupt and distasteful as they might be, the old elite still carry a lot of weight around with their family names and they are still able to bring pork back to their regions. They might not be doing so well as in the past, but the contemporary coronels who’ve understood where the advantages lie aren’t going to kick the bucket just yet.

Evolution of votes for the PFL in elections to the Chamber of Deputies since 1986

A telling story of the decline of the conservative oligarchy in the region is that of the PFL. While not representative of the entire ruling elite, which was spread out over a whole slew of parties, the PFL is the most representative of the old elite and is intimately linked to conservative oligarchs who allied with the military in 1964, supported it until it became the bad thing to do and quickly converted themselves into convinced democrats, or so they claim. For any right-wing candidate, the support of the PFL was crucial. FHC understood that in 1994 and 1998, and thus accepted an alliance with them, even though it kind of went against everything he stood for as a progressive intellectual opponent of the military regime. The PFL controlled a near majority of governorships and senate seats in the Northeast, and their support was thus key to the right (read, the PSDB). The PFL wasn’t strong in all states of the Northeast, for example they always lacked a base in Ceará and were weak in states such as Alagoas or Paraíba; but overall, they were the dominant party in the region. They held the plurality of the region’s seats in the Chamber of Deputies between 1990 and 2010, and between 1990 and 2006 they controlled at least two governorships in the region, often more than that.

However, as the direct representatives of the old order, they stood to lose the most from the realignment described above. And indeed it did. The chart above shows the evolution of the votes for the PFL in elections to the Chamber of Deputies between 1986 and 2010. 1986 is perhaps abnormaly high given the two-party nature of Brazilian politics that year, but between 1990 and 2002 the PFL won over 24% of the votes in each election region-wide. In 2006, for the first time, their vote fell below 20% to reach 17%; but even then they still controlled a narrow plurality of the seats in the region and topped the poll in the region. It was to be their last hurrah. In 2010, their vote collapsed below the 10% line to reach a paltry 9.41%. A spectacular decline of nearly 15% in a period of 8 years. That has significantly reduced the party’s caucus in both chambers, and they are no longer the region’s dominant party (the PT and PMDB, like in the rest of Brazil, have taken up that role).

The story of the Nordeste’s drastic electoral evolution in such a short period of times highlights not only the decline and perhaps upcoming fall of the coronels and caciques of yesterday, but also highlights a fundamental realignment in the voting patterns of Brazilians in the wake of the first left-wing government in the country since the 1960s. The story of one of Latin America’s most fascinating regions is also the story of many regions of Brazil and Latin America as a whole.

Brazil 2010

The first round of presidential, legislative, gubernatorial and state elections were held in Brazil on October 3. Runoffs for the presidential race and a handful of gubernatorial contests will be held on October 31. Here’s the results of the main races, presidential and otherwise:

Dilma Rousseff (PT) 46.91%
José Serra (PSDB) 32.61%
Marina Silva (PV) 19.33%
Plínio de Arruda Sampaio (PSOL) 0.87%
José Maria Eymael (PSDC) 0.09%
José Maria de Almeida (PSTU) 0.08%
Levy Fidélix (PRTB) 0.06%
Ivan Pinheiro (PCB) 0.04%
Rui Costa Pimenta (PCO) 0.01%
blank and null 8.64%

The main surprise, of sorts, of this election was the fact that Dilma will have to face a runoff against Serra, something which most did not predict. Though she had struggled, so to speak, in the final days, most pollsters predicted that she would still win outright by the first round. It isn’t to say that the pollsters botched this one, given that the last poll by Datafolha the day before the vote had her at 50% with a margin of error of 3%, which places her result within the margin of error. But something certainly happened. Even though voting is mandatory in Brazil, the rule is not strictly applied and abstention always ends up being slightly below 20%, and given that voting in Brazil is electronic through machines, the number of blank and null votes is often quite high. Abstention is always higher in poorer and more remote areas, which tend to favour the PT. Another factor may have been a low potency scandal in the Chief of Staff (Casa Civil)’s office involving Dilma’s successor in that office which she herself held until recently. Such a scandal might have influenced some of the PT’s more urban and educated voters to switch their votes at the last minute to Marina Silva, the Green candidate.  At the same time, some Dilma voters might not have bothered turning out because almost everybody said she’d win outright.

Marina Silva was the main over-performer of the first round, defying almost all expectations and garnering around 19% of the vote. While she surged in the last few days of the campaign, she spent most of it languishing in the low double digits or high single digits, and people had assume d that her ‘centrist’ vote would be squeezed in the last weeks of the campaign. Instead, her vote reflects perhaps discontent by some voters about the polarized political system which, despite a multitude of parties, basically has two national-level coalitions which seem rather solid. On the other hand, her high vote could also reflect her coalescing the evangelical vote (20% or so) behind her, especially after Dilma’s numbers with evangelicals fell in the last few days as rumours circulated about her being supposedly pro-choice and pro-gay marriage. Marina, evangelical herself though hardly an hardcore conservative on social issues, might have benefited from her image as the only evangelical candidate.

The patterns which first emerged in the 2006 election, with the creation of more or less solid “red states” and “blue states” has held in this election. Despite the widespread popularity of Lula and the prosperity which has come, for some more than others, on Brazilians; the division of the electorate along lines of incomes and social class have prevailed. As in 2006, the wealthier (and whiter) states preferred the candidate of the PSDB. Poorer (and often darker-skinned) voters, especially in the impoverished Nordeste preferred the candidate of the PT. The reasons are rather simple: poorer voters feel indebted to Lula’s party and almost worship him. On the other hand, wealthier voters still feel rather uneasy with the PT and are more likely to be worried by arguments that Lula and his allies and trying to transform the PT into an equivalent of the Mexican PRI and rule the country for the next 50 years or so.

All but three states which voted for Alckmin in the first round of 2006 voted for Serra on Sunday. All but one of the states which voted for Alckmin in the runoff in 2006 voted for Serra in 2006 (as did two other states which voted for Lula in the runoff, but Alckmin in the first round). The only state which broke from this line was Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil’s southernmost state, and one of the wealthiest and traditionally more or less conservative (at least recently). Given that Dilma is from Rio Grande do Sul (though born in Minas Gerais), having started her political career in Porto Alegre (which, ironically, she lost) it is explainable. The unpopularity of the state’s PSDB governor, Yeda Crusius, probably helped her as well.

At this point, a map at the municipal level is of some use, so here is a great map provided by the Estado de São Paulo newspaper:

If there’s one state which makes little sense, it has to be Acre. Although it’s one of the PT’s earliest bases outside São Paulo, it had voted for Alckmin in the first round of 2006. This time, however, it heavily backed Serra, in fact it was his best state of all 27, with 52.13% of the vote. This despite having a relatively popular PT state government, and of course being Marina Silva’s home state. Some have suggested a recent growth in agrobusiness here as a possible explanation for this shift in the state, which probably started in 2006. In Xapuri, which was the home base of well-known rubber tapper (and PT founding figure) Chico Mendes, Serra won over 53% of the vote and Marina won only 14% of the vote there, despite being rather closely connected with Chico Mendes’ legacy. As we’ll see later, the gubernatorial results in Acre also got me to scratch my head a bit.

The other results are not surprising. Save for some closer margins in Sergipe (judging from gubernatorial results, the PT state government’s possible unpopularity might explain that) and Alagoas (Maceió is probably the only consistently right-wing urban centre in the region); Dilma crushed in the Nordeste. In Maranhão, where she had the backing of both the Sarney machine and the sociological-demographic nature of the state behind her, she won 70.65% of the vote, her best state. She did especially well in Piauí and Ceará, as well as Pernambuco and Bahia. In the sertão region of the Northeast, Dilma won by some massive margins. Often over 70% of the vote, and over 80% in a number of municipalities as well. The dry and arid sertão, used to droughts and with little year-round agriculture, is dirt-poor and the poorest region of Brazil by far (it’s also Lula’s native land). The more humid and greener coastal regions are slightly wealthier, and historically dominated by sugarcane, but they’re equally poor.

Amazonas is now a rather awkward stickout on maps, with the originality of being Serra’s weakest state (8.5%) and one of Dilma’s strongest (65%) while being surrounded by some of Serra’s best states. The state is very poor (but so are Acre and Roraima), but has benefited a lot from federal funding since 2002 and the PSDB’s policies in regards to trade are rather unpopular in the Manaus Free Trade Zone. Some might be led into thinking that Amazonas is heavily Native (‘Indian’), but in fact Roraima has the highest native population, albeit only 4% or so. On the topic of Roraima, as well as Rondônia and southwestern Pará, the relative strength of the right in those regions is likely due to land use patterns, with a lot of big soy farms (like in Mato Grosso and the western Centre-West region as a whole) and important agrobusiness in the area. The fact that most inhabitants in those regions (who are largely white) settled there during the military regime probably also plays a role. Evangelical voters – who lean more to the right (Democrats in particular, PSDB much less so) than Catholics are also found in large numbers in the isolated regions of the North. Unsurprisingly, given Marina’s staunch opposition to hydroelectric dams and agrobusiness developments in general, she did extremely poorly (between 1 and 7% generally) in the ‘blue’ municipalities of the North and Centre-West.

In the densely populated South and South-West, Serra did best in the wealthiest municipalities, which can be defined as forming a rough string between the northeastern part of Rio Grande do Sul, into the coastal regions of Santa Catarina and Paraná and ending up in São Paulo and the Paraiba Valley. He won the city of São Paulo 40-38 (a map of the vote in the city’s boroughs can be found here); though Dilma won most of the industrial ABC belt (including Lula’s union base of São Bernardo do Campo) though obviously she did badly in places like São Caetano do Sul (the wealthiest municipality in Brazil, which forms the ‘C’ of the ABC belt). Serra also generally dominated in most of the Paulista countryside, though Dilma did well in the industrial areas in and around Campinas, the state’s other main population centre.

Elections are usually won in Minas Gerais, and Dilma won there by a 16 point margin over Serra. Serra was confined to the wealthier, whiter rural areas of southwestern Minas Gerais, while Dilma crushed him by huge margins, often raking up 60-70% of the vote. However, in Belo Horizonte, the state capital and one of the wealthiest towns in Brazil, Marina Silva won 39.88% to Dilma’s 30.92% and Serra’s 27.73%.

Marina Silva won or did well in urban centres, especially those wealthy, educated and younger towns. Belo Horizonte is one of those towns, but a better example is Brasilia – Marina won the DF easily with nearly 42% of the vote, more than 10 points ahead of Dilma. Brasilia is a largely educated, well-off town with a lot of public servants. Marina also did well in Rio (31.91% – a map of the vote in the city’s boroughs can be found here), Niteroi (37.05%), Recife (36.73%), Natal (29.41%), Salvador (30.21%), Fortaleza (31.39%), Manaus (35.9%), Macapa (34.81%) and Rio Branco (35.64%  – her home town). All these towns reflect an averagely well-off, middle-aged to young and very educated electorate common to almost all Green parties in the world. She also performed well in some seaside resort communities such as Vila Velha (ES) and places slightly east of Rio de Janeiro. The second part of her electorate, which can explain her good results in states like Rio but also Amapá and Espírito Santo is an evangelical base, attached to her more for her image as an evangelical than for her program (she is not a social conservative, or at least not unusually social conservative in the national context).

The mere fact that Serra wasn’t knocked out of contention by the first round has given new hope, futile hope, to the PSDB that they still have a shot at winning. In fact, it really doesn’t. Dilma is a mere 3% away from a majority, so on paper she needs barely any votes from Marina Silva. Thus, Marina isn’t necessarily the kingmaker (or queenmaker) she wants to be nor the kingmaker certain make her. She is likely to announce whether or not she endorses somebody in the next 15 days, and has put questions such as abortion (where she wants a referendum on the issue), forestry and the environment on the table. Some say that given that she left her job in the Senate to run for President, she could be interested in negotiating a way into cabinet for herself, though it is hard to envision such a scenario. She is on bad terms with Dilma, with whom she often feuded in the past when they were both in cabinet (especially when Dilma was energy minister). They also disagree on the issue of new hydroelectric power in the Amazon as well as the growth of agrobusiness (such as soy) in the North and Centre-West. Furthermore, while she has already said her personal decision might contradict that of the Green Party, the PV itself seems to be leaning more towards Serra and the second most well-known Green, Fernando Gabeira (PV-RJ) has already endorsed Serra.

The average Green voter has been explained above briefly and divided into two classes. The first demographic, the educated rather affluent urban voter, is more similar to the average Serra voter than the average Dilma voter. For example, all but one of the districts that Marina won in Rio voted for Alckmin in the first round of 2006. Their vote for Marina over the other two could reflect discontent with the two-coalition system which is growing in Brazil, and their vote in the runoff could be a “least worst” vote. The results in Belo Horizonte, Brasilia and Rio will be good guides on election night as to how this electorate split in the runoff. The second demographic, poorer and evangelical, might be guided more by their church and pastor than by the candidate. This is where the touchy issue of abortion comes into play, because these voters likely abandoned Dilma’s ship in the last few days after the rumours that she was pro-choice started swirling. They might be harder to catch than one might think, and that’s why the PT is seriously considering turning around on abortion to adopt a more conservative position in order to court the evangelical vote.

Governors

Nine out of 27 races will end in a runoff on October 31. In general, these gubernatorial races were generally more favourable to the right than federal-level races were. The right was comforted with big wins in Brazil’s two most populous states, São Paulo and Minas Gerais.

Out of 18 states won outright, the PSDB has 4 governors’ mansions, as does the PT and PMDB. The PSB has two, tied with the Democrats. The PMN, a small party aligned with the opposition, has one.

In Acre, the result was pretty boggling. Tião Viana (PT) was expected to easily defeat Tião Bocalom (PSDB), who was a low-key paper candidate, but instead he got a very close race and managed squeak out a win only narrowly with 50.51% to Bocalom’s 49.18%. The PT has ruled in Acre for the last 12 years or so, which indicates that some important change is perhaps taking place in the state’s politics.

In Alagoas, the incumbent Governor, Teo Vilela (PSDB) was a dead man walking a few months ago, but by the first round he placed well ahead of his two main rivals, taking 39.58% of the vote and a comfortable first place ahead of the runoff. A big endorsement from the popular mayor of Maceió helped him a lot, as did his cozying up with Lula (despite being in an opposition party) in a state where Lula is pretty popular. The other surprise was for second place, which went to former Governor Ronaldo Lessa (PDT), who won 29.16%; narrowly pulling ahead of disgraced President, former Governor and incumbent Senator Fernando Collor (PTB) who won only 28.81%. Collor was thought to be the favourite a few months ago and was still considered likely to get into the runoff just days ago, but narrowly missed out on the runoff. The runoff will likely be one of the key races to watch for on October 31. Teo Vilela is favoured, but in a shocking turn of events, Collor endorsed his former enemy, Lessa, for the runoff. Collor, who defeated Lessa in the 2006 senatorial contest, would prefer to have Lessa as Governor as he runs for re-election in 2014.

In Amazonas, incumbent Governor Omar Aziz (PMN) won a landslide re-election, taking 63.87% of the votes against 25.91% for Senator Alfredo Nascimento (PR), a former Lula cabinet minister. The PPS’ Hissa Abrahão won 9.36%.

In Amapá, the incumbent Governor Pedro Paulo (PP) spent some of the last days of his campaign in… jail for corruption. Thankfully, he was easily defeated in his bid for re-election, taking fourth place and only 13.5%. This leaves a runoff between Lucas (PTB), supported by the Sarney machine, and a Sarney rival, Camilo Capiberibe (PSB). Both candidates ended up practically tied, with Lucas ahead with 28.93% and Capiberibe trailing with 28.68%. Jorge Amanjas (PSDB), another Sarney ally, won 28.19% and is likely the kingmaker. Given that the Capiberibe family are the enemies of the Great Sarney Machine in José Sarney’s personal colony, Lucas should be favoured.

Bahia was a great victory for the PT and its candidate, Jaques Wagner, over the previously hegemonic PFL machine led by the late Antonio Carlos Magalhães (ACM). Jaques Wagner’s re-election, over former governor and 2006 rival Paulo Souto (DEM) but also former Lula cabinet minister Geddel Vieira Lima (PMDB), was nothing short of spectacular. Even though he lacked the support of the PMDB, which had been crucial to the PT in 2006, Wagner won a landslide with 63.83% of the vote to Souto’s 16.09% and Geddel’s paltry 15.56%. This plebiscite-like reelection for Wagner is a nice highlight of how the Northeast has shifted far to the left during Lula’s terms.

Ceará Governor Cid Gomes (PSB), brother of Ciro, was easily re-elected against weak opposition with 61.27%. Marcos Cals (PSDB), a paper candidate, did surprisingly well for one, taking 19.51%. He also managed second place against a far more well-known candidate, Lúcio Alcântara (PR), the state’s governor between 2002 and 2006 until he lost to Ciro Gomes.  Lúcio took 16.44% of the vote.

Some runoffs, like that in the Federal District, will be boring. Former cabinet minister Agnelo Queiroz (PT) took 48.41% of the vote, narrowly missing out on a first round win against a fledgling opposition. Joaquim Roriz (PSC), a crook, had his candidacy rejected and gave his candidacy to his wife, Weslian, who still managed 31.50%. Toninho (PSOL) did really well, winning 14.25%, votes which should ensure a landslide win for Agnelo in the runoff. A Green candidate also won 5.64% of the vote.

We knew that in Espírito Santo Renato Casagrande (PSB) would win a first term easily, but that easily? His crushing victory with a full 82.30% of the vote surprised some. Luiz Paulo (PSDB) only managed 15.50% of the vote against the Senator and incoming Governor.

Another interesting runoff in the offing in Goiás, where former governor and incumbent Senator Marconi Perillo (PSDB) missed out on a first round win narrowly, taking 46.33%. He will face the PMDB’s Iris Rezende, a former governor as well, in the runoff. Though Perillo used to be allied with incumbent Governor Alcides Rodrigues (PP), who was in fact his chosen successor in 2006, the two have broken up and the incumbent supported Vanderlan (PR) to succeed him. Vanderlan won 16.62%, but if he supports Rezende, which is quite likely, it means this race is a key tossup.

In Maranhão, incumbent Govenor Roseana Sarney (PMDB) won re-election by the first round, defeating notably her 2006 rival, Jackson Lago (PDT), who defeated her four years ago (but was later forced out of office for vote buying). She narrowly escaped a runoff, which are really perilous for her, with 50.08% of the vote. In second place was the PCdoB’s Flávio Dino with 29.49%. Disgraced Jackson Lago (PDT), the de-facto right-winger in the race, got a paltry 19.54%. Daddy’s girl will likely be happy she escaped a runoff.

In the end, Minas Gerais was not much fun. After surging in the last month, as I had predicted, incumbent Governor Antonio Anastasia (PSDB), supported by outgoing governor Aécio Neves, won rather easily over the earlier favourite, former Lula cabinet minister and Senator Hélio Costa (PMDB). Anastasia won a crushing 62.72% to Hélio’s 34.18%. This third consecutive PSDB win in Minas Gerais, the country’s second most populous, this time on the back of Aécio’s popularity, is an important boost the PSDB at the state level. This, combined with power in São Paulo, gives it important leverage on the state level.

Mato Grosso do Sul incumbent Governor Andre Puccinelli (PMDB – right-wing) was easily reelected with 56% against former governor Zeca do PT’s 42.5%.

In office only since the spring, Mato Grosso Governor Silval Barbosa (PMDB) was easily re-elected. He won 51.21% of the vote, while his closest rival, Mauro Mendes (PSB) won 31.85%. Wilson Santos (PSDB) won 16.55%.

Pará‘s Governor, Ana Julia (PT) is in a very bad shape for reelection though she escaped a first round ousting against former governor Simão Jatene (PSDB). Ana Julia has 36.05% against 48.92% for Simão Jatene. The 10.85% garnered by independent PMDB candidate Juvenil could help her, but Simão Jatene will win the runoff easily.

A surprising result in Paraíba where the predicted easy win for Governor Ze Maranhão (PMDB) was not. The incumbent fell to a narrow second, with 49.30% of the vote against 49.74% for Ricardo Coutinho (PSB – right-wing). The rest of the vote went to far-left sects and the PSOL, votes that could place the incumbent over the top. Another boost for Maranhão is an endorsement from Toinho do Sopão (PTN), who got the most votes for state deputy, and who endorsed him over Coutinho, who has the support of the PTN (which is a fake party). It’s still a key tossup.

As expected, Pernambuco Governor Eduardo Campos (PSB) won a huge landslide, winning 82.84% of the vote overall, nearly 6% better than Aécio Neves’ huge win in MG-2006. He trounced former governor and incumbent Senator Jarbas Vasconcelos (PMDB – right-wing) badly, leaving Jarbas with only 14.06% of the vote. Eduardo Campos will be term-limited in 2014, when Jarbas is up for re-election. Therefore, we could see a third Campos-Jarbas contest then, this time for Senate.

Piauí has a runoff too, but it’s pretty boring. Governor Wilson Martins (PSB), in office since the spring, won 46.37%. Silvio Mendes (PSDB) won 30.08%, while another candidate on the left, João Vicente (PTB) won 21.54%. João Vicente endorsed Wilson Martins, meaning that he’ll win easily in the runoff.

Those hoping for a nice race in Paraná were let down by the easy win there by former Curitiba mayor Beto Richa (PSDB), who won 52.44%, easily beating Senator Osmar Dias (PDT) who won 45.63%. A last-minute poll had shown the race tied 45-45, after weeks of catchup by Osmar Dias, but Beto Richa won by a surprisingly strong margin. His popularity in the capital, Curitiba, likely played a big role in his win.

In Rio de Janeiro, Governor Sergio Cabral (PMDB) won a second-term with no trouble, winning the first round with 66.08% against a paltry 20.68% for Fernando Gabeira (PV – right-wing). Fernando Peregrino (PR), the candidate supported by well-known local politician and former governor Anthony Garotinho did well, winning 10.81%. I like to poke fun at the fact that Cabral spends a lot of time away on vacation, but aside from the PT’s support, he also has a good record with crime, definitely the big issue in Rio. Crime rates dropped quite a bit under his tenure, despite the well-mediatized hostage situation during the summer.

A rare bright spot in Rio Grande do Norte for the declining Democrats, who picked up a PSB seat by the first round with a big win from Senator Rosalba Ciarlini (DEM) over incumbent Governor Iberê Souza (PSB). Rosalba won 52.46% of the vote against Ibere’s 36.25%. Former Natal mayor Carlos Eduardo Alves (PDT) did poorly, winning 10.37% of the vote. Iberê, in office since the spring, had some health problems and the administration of her predecessor, Vilma, who ran for Senate, was rather unpopular.

In Rondônia, Governor João Cahulla (PPS) took office only in the spring and is facing a tough fight for re-election. By the first round, he had 37.14% of the vote against PMDB candidate Confúcio Moura who won 43.99%. PT candidate Eduardo Valverde won 18.16% of the vote, while a top contender, PSDB Senator Expedito Júnior saw his votes discarded because his candidacy is still question to judicial review. At any rate, Expedito Júnior endorsed the PMDB candidate, giving Confúcio Moura a further edge for the runoff.

In Roraima, Governor Anchieta (PSDB), another of those new incumbents, is also in hot water for reelection, trailing PP candidate Neudo Campos with 45.03% to Campos’ 47.62%. With the support of Dr. Petronio (PHS), who won 6.39%, his reelection, however, becomes far more likely. Definitely a runoff to watch.

In Rio Grande do Sul, the PT’s Tarso Genro, who lost in 2006, won his revenge easily, with a big win over former Porto Alegre mayor José Fogaça (PMDB – right-wing) and incumbent Governor Yeda Crusius (PSDB). Tarso won 54.35% of the vote, while Fogaça won 24.74%. Yeda Crusius has been unpopular for a long time and was sure to go down (and badly), and she won only 18.40%, though that’s a bit better than the 15% most people gave her. There is a definite tendency in Brazil that women politicians and officeholders are held to a much higher standard than males and thus punished far more badly than males when they screw up. I dare say that if Yeda Crusius had been a male, she’d have done quite a bit better than that.

In Santa Catarina, former mayor of Florianópolis Ângela Amin (PP) was the favourite until a late surge by Senator Raimundo Colombo (DEM), supported by the PMDB, had her in. Raimundo Colombo won outright with 52.72%, while Ângela Amin took 24.91%. The PT’s Ideli Salvatti won 21.90%. Ângela Amin, well known and well liked in the state, was relying largely on her personal appeal more than partisan support, but she suffered from a late swing by traditional right-wing PP voters from the PP to the Democrats.

In Sergipe, Governor Marcelo Déda (PT) won re-election over his predecessor and old PFL politico João Alves Filho (DEM), taking 52.08% of the vote to João Alves’ 45.19%. Déda had defeated then-Governor João Alves Filho by the exact same margin in 2006.

São Paulo is undoubtedly one of the big prizes in Brazilian gubernatorial races, and this time again it was held easily by the PSDB against the PT. Former Governor and 2006 presidential candidate Geraldo Alckmin (PSDB) was running for a second non-consecutive term against Aloizio Mercadante, an old PT stalwart. Alckmin won 50.63%, less than what Serra had won in 2006, against 35.23% fro Mercadante. Celso Russomanno (PP) took a paltry 5.42%, much lower than predicted, while the PSB’s Paulo Skaf won 4.56%. A Green candidate won 4.13% of the vote, finishing fifth. Alckmin still won the state by a much more decisive margin than his colleague Serra did in the presidential race.

The Tocantins gubernatorial contest was a close one-on-one contest between incumbent Governor Carlos Gaguim (PMDB), who despite being in office only since September 2009, had already managed to become a crook attempting to divert one billion reais; and the state’s first and later three-term Governor, Siqueira Campos (PSDB). Siqueira Campos narrowly won, with 50.52%, against 49.48% for the incumbent criminal, who had been honest enough to say that he was going to hell when the world ended.

Senate

The outgoing Senate, two-thirds of which had been elected in 2002, had a large right-wing caucus of varying shades, notably a large old PFL caucus from the Northeast and a weak PT bench. After this election, the government now has a clear unambiguous majority in the Senate, while the Democrats have suffered heavily. A number of big names from the opposition were taken down by a “red wave” in the Nordeste this year, marking a further evolution in the region’s fast-evolving politics.

PMDB 21 seats (+4)
PT 14 seats (+5)
PSDB 10 seats (-6)
DEM 6 seats (-7)
PTB 6 seats (-1)
PP 5 seats (+4)
PR 4 seats (nc)
PDT 4 seats (-2)
PSB 3 seats (+1)
PCdoB 2 seats (+1)
PSOL 2 seats (+1)
PRB 1 seat (-1)
PPS 1 seat (+1)
PSC 1 seat (nc)
PMN 1 seat (+1)

O Globo classifies 55 of these 81 senators as being pro-government, 22 as being anti-government and four being independent. Results in three states may change when the courts will decide whether to allow or reject the candidacies of key candidates who would have won a seat if their votes had been counted. As it stands now, votes cast for these politicians under judicial review under the Ficha Limpa (clean slate) law were not counted, but they will or will not be counted officially if and when the courts approve their candidacies.

When looking at these races by state, don’t forget that this year two seats were up, meaning that each voter had two votes. The votes were added up, summed to 100% and the top two candidates won. In polls, however, responses added up to 200%. In Senate races, the votes cast are about double the votes cast for president/governor, meaning that if one wants to know overall how many individual voters voted for a candidate, double his percentage and that should tell you (I think, I’m bad at math) the percentage of people who voted for said candidate. Anyway, here’s a look at how the races broke down by state:

Acre: Jorge Viana (PT), the brother of the new governor, narrowly won first place with 31.77% while the right-wing PMN’s Petecão took second place, with 30.90%. Some had thought that the second name on the left-wing slate, Edvaldo Magalhães (PCdoB) could win the second seat, but in the end he fall far short with only 19.13% and barely ahead of João Correia (PMDB right-wing) who won 18.21%.
Seats: 1 PT, 1 PMN. 2007-2015 term: Tião Viana (PT) will be replaced by Aníbal Diniz (PT)

Alagoas: Not much luck for clean government campaigners in Alagoas, with the election of two rather unsavoury and not too clean figures. Federal deputy Benedito de Lira (PP), an old pro-military stooge and ambulance leeches culprit, surged late in the campaign and won a surprising first place overall with 35.94%. This forced incumbent senator and former President of the Senate Renan Calheiros (PMDB) to take the second seat, with 33.42%. Renan had been forced out of his job after a long scandal, Renangate, in which he was accused of accepting funds from lobbyists to pay an illegitimate daughter he had had with a journalist. Former senator and 2006 presidential candidate Heloísa Helena (PSOL) won only 16.6% in the end, falling far short of a seat.
Seats: 1 PP, 1 PMDB. 2007-2015 term: Fernando Collor (PTB)

Amazonas: The main highlight of this election was the defeat of incumbent senator Arthur Virgílio (PSDB), one of the opposition’s top firebrands and a big critic of Lula’s government. Even though he managed 21.91% in a state where Serra won barely 8%, indicating a big personal vote, he fell in third place behind Vanessa Grazziotin (PCdoB) who won 22.89% and former governor Eduardo Braga (PMDB) who won an extremely strong 42.07%. Remember, these results add up to 100% but in reality each voter had two votes, so one can estimate that Braga won the votes of 84% of the state’s voters. Another incumbent, Jefferson Praia (PDT) also fell, winning a mere 8.27%, though he was in a weak shape for reelection at the outset.
Seats: 1 PMDB, 1 PCdoB. 2007-2015 term: Alfredo Nascimento (PR)

Amapá: In this not-so-clean race, whose victors could yet change, the big surprise was the big vote for Randolfe Rodrigues (PSOL), who won 38.94% of the votes. Randolfe, a former leader of the painted-faces 1992 Collor impeachment movement, had the support of Lucas Barreto (PTB), who is in first place in the gubernatorial contest, but this coalition won him a disendorsement from the PSOL. In second place, for now, is Gilvam Borges (PMDB), a shady Sarney stooge, who took 23.19%. Former Governor Waldez Goes (PDT), who spent some time in jail recently along with his acolyte and outgoing governor Pedro Paulo (PP), won only 20.45% of the vote and will not win a seat. Votes cast for João Capiberibe (PSB), a Sarney enemy, were disqualified under the Ficha Limpa law (he was deemed dirty in slightly shady circumstances), but if his candidacy is approved, he would be elected in Gilvam Borges’ stead.
Seats: 1 PSOL, 1 PMDB. 2007-2015 term: José Sarney (PMDB)

Bahia: A big red wave in this big Northeastern state carried incumbent senator César Borges (PR), albeit a rebellious ally of Lula, away. Supported by Geddel (PMDB), who broke with the President and the PT, César Borges was trounced with only 13.52% of the votes, leaving him with no chance against the two official left-wing candidates, PT deputy Walter Pinheiro and former Salvador mayor Lídice da Mata (PSB). Walter Pinheiro took 31% while Lídice won 28.90%. Lower down, José Ronaldo (DEM) took a mere 9.33% and his friend Aleluia (DEM) won 8.12%. Geddel ally and former bionic mayor Edvaldo Brito (PTB) won 6.92%.
Seats: 1 PT, 1 PSB. 2007-2015 term: João Durval (PDT)

Ceará: This race almost had me fall off my chair on election night, and many other people likely fell off outright. One of those people who fell off was Senator Tasso Jereissati (PSDB), a well-known tucano and longtime local politician (serving as governor in the past). Considered a shoo-in for re-election by all, the wave carried him away in a big shock. He won 23.70% and distant third, against 36.32% for Eunício Oliveira (PMDB) and José Pimentel (PT) with 32.39%. Alexandre Pereira (PPS) won 6.35%. The defeat of Jereissati is a big win for Lula, very popular in this state, and certainly a shock to many old right-wing Northeastern politicians (though Jereissati was by far the least distasteful of them all).
Seats: 1 PMDB, 1 PT. 2007-2015 term: Inácio Arruda (PCdoB)

In the Federal District, a big win for two left-wingers of various shades. Incumbent senator, former governor and former Lula ally Cristovam Buarque (PDT) was easily reelected with 37.27%. His running mate, Rollemberg (PSB) won 33.03%. Alberto Fraga (DEM) won 22.87%, while votes cast for former governor Maria de Lourdes Abadia (PSDB) were disqualified under the Ficha Limpa law. Even if they’re counted, she doesn’t have enough to wrestle a seat away from the left. 
Seats: 1 PDT, 1 PSB. 2007-2015 term: Gim Argello (PTB)

In Espírito Santo, riding on the wave of Renato Casagrande (PSB), the two top candidates of his coalition won easily. Vice Governor Ricardo Ferraço (PMDB) won 44.55% (which means nearly 90% voted for him) while incumbent senator Magno Malta (PR), a controversial evangelical ex-pastor won 36.76%. A mere 10.74% for Rita Camata (PSDB).
Seats: 1 PMDB, 1 PR. 2007-2015 term: Ana Rita (PT) will replace Renato Casagrande (PSB)

Snooze in Goiás, with two easy wins for the two incumbents (one of two states where both incumbents won reelection). Demóstenes Torres (DEM) won 44.09% while Lúcia Vânia (PSDB) won 30.56%. The PT’s Pedro Wilson won 17.95% and Paulo Roberto Cunha (PP) 4.65%.
Seats: 1 DEM, 1 PSDB. 2007-2015 term: Cyro Giffor (PSDB), suplente for Marconi Perillo (PSDB)

Sarney stooges win big in Maranhão, with incumbent senator Edson Lobão (PMDB), a close ally of the Sarney clan and a former energy and mines minister in Lula’s cabinet, taking 32.74%. His friend (and Sarney clan ally) João Alberto won 29.74%. In very distant third, Zé Reinaldo (PSB), a former governor and former Sarney ally, now aligned with his enemies, won 13.99%. Roberto Rocha (PSDB) won 12.36% and Edson Vidigal (PSDB) won 9.67%.
Seats: 2 PMDB. 2007-2015 term: Epitácio Cafeteira (PTB)

In Mato Grosso, the first seat saw a big win for former governor and soy king Blairo Maggi (PR, declared wealth of US$86 million). He won 37.08% of the votes (and far more raw votes than the winner in the governor’s race). A bit of a surprise for the second seat, which went to Pedro Taques (PDT) with 24.48%. He defeated Maggi’s ally Carlos Abicalil (PT) who won 18.43%. Antero Paes de Barros (PSDB) won only 11.92%. 
Seats: 1 PR, 1 PDT. 2007-2015 term: Jayme Campos (DEM)

In Mato Grosso do Sul, incumbent Senator Delcídio do Amaral (PT) won reelection easily, taking up 34.90%. The second seat, which went to Waldemir Moka (PMDB right-wing) with 23% was a three-way contest. Murilo Zauith (DEM) won 21.61%, followed closely by Dagoberto Nogueira (PDT) who won 20.49%.
Seats: 1 PT, 1 PMDB. 2007-2015 term: Marisa Serrano (PSDB)

Predictable in Minas Gerais, a key senate contest, which produced the expected results. Wildly popular former governor Aécio Neves (PSDB) won easily with 39.47%. In second place, his colleague and former President Itamar Franco (PPS) who wins the second seat with 26.74%. The PT’s Fernando Pimentel had gained speed in the last few days, but his 23.98% were not enough to overtake Itamar. He could have won if his running mate, Zito Vieira (PCdoB) had polled a bit less than 7.76%.
Seats: 1 PSDB, 1 PPS. 2007-2015 term: Eliseu Resende (DEM)

Honesty isn’t a virtue in Pará, where most people (57.24% of them) had their votes invalidated for voting for a candidate whose votes were not counted. Right now, Flexa Ribeiro (PSDB), not too clean himself (he spent a few days in jail already) but cleaner than his friends, wins 67.73% of the valid votes. In second, for now, is Marinor Brito (PSOL) with 27.11%. The final outcomes hinges on whether or not votes cast for Jader Barbalho (PMDB), incumbent federal deputy seeking to recover a senate seat he had resigned from in 2002 following the SUDAM scandal (where he set up fraudulent businesses, such as a frog farm, to launder money for himself), are valid. If they are, he ousts Marinor Brito for the second seat. Paulo Rocha (PT), a mensaleiros crook, also didn’t have his votes counted, but he does not enough to win.
Seats: 1 PSDB, 1 PSOL. 2007-2015 term: Mário Couto (PSDB)

Paraíba‘s final results could also change as a result of a court decision over votes cast for former governor Cássio Cunha Lima (PSDB) are counted. If they are, he would win. The victory of Vitalzinho (PMDB) with 35.37% is assured, but Wilson Santiago (PMDB), with 33.39% would fall if the former governor’s votes are counted. Incumbent senator Efraim Moraes (DEM) won 28.17%.
Seats: 2 PMDB. 2007-2015 term: Cícero Lucena (PSDB)

A big result in Pernambuco with the epic takedown of a big name, Marco Maciel (DEM). Marco Maciel, who has served a total of 18 years in the Senate, 8 years as VP (under Cardoso) and 3 years as governor, has finally lost in a major blow to the old military clique. He lost badly, taking only 11.86%. In first place, Armando Monteiro (PTB left-wing) with 39.87%, who surprisingly outpolled a well-known state cabinet minister in Humberto Costa (PT) who won 38.82%. Given that Armando Monteiro was presented as the man to vote for to get rid of Marco Maciel, people probably loaded his votes on him and propelled him to first place. Raul Jungmann (PPS), Marco Maciel’s ally, won 7.61%. 
Seats: 1 PTB, 1 PT. 2007-2015 term: Jarbas Vasconcelos (PMDB)

Two right-wingers down in Piauí. Former governor Wellington Dias (PT), very popular, won the first seat with 32.52%. In second place, federal deputy Ciro Nogueira Lima Filho (PP), something of a right-winger, who won 22.69%. However, two right-wing incumbents went down. Mão Santa (PSC), thought to be the best positioned of the two, took third with 14.14%. Heráclito Fortes (DEM), another old right-wing clique figure, lost reelection badly taking 13.84%, only managing fourth ahead of Antonio José Medeiros (PT) who won 13.44%.
Seats: 1 PT, 1 PP. 2007-2015 term: João Vicente Claudino (PTB)

In Paraná, a close call for former governor Roberto Requião (PMDB), who squeaked out his seat with 24.84%, placing second behind Gleisi Hoffman (PT) who wins 29.50%. For most of the night, federal deputy Gustavo Fruet (PSDB) trailed in a very close third, with 23.10%, almost enough to take down Requião. Ricardo Barros (PP), allied with Fruet, won 20.22%.
Seats: 1 PT, 1 PMDB. 2007-2015 term: Álvaro Dias (PSDB)

Rio de Janeiro saw an interesting contest in the end. Another of the campaign’s late-surgers, Lindberg Farias (PT), a former UNE student leader, won easily with 28.65%. That means that a key figure in the 1992 Collor impeachment marches will serve alongside Collor himself, best of all supporting the same government. In second, controversial conservative Lula ally, gospel singer and evangelical bishop Marcelo Crivella (PRB) won 22.66%. He was almost taken down by Jorge Picciani (PMDB), Lindberg’s running-mate, who won a surprisingly strong 20.73%. As for César Maia (DEM), the former mayor of Rio and a well-known local politician, who was thought to be a favourite only a few months ago, he wins 11.06%. Waguinho (PTdoB), a singer and ally of Garotinho, took 8.81%.
Seats: 1 PT, 1 PRB. 2007-2015 term: Francisco Dornelles (PP)

Dynasties still rule supreme in Rio Grande do Norte, with easy reelections for the incumbents. Garibaldi Alves Filho (PMDB) won reelection easily with 35.03%. José Agripino Maia (DEM), the other incumbent, took second with 32.23%. In a contest against José Agripino Maia, the cousin of her ex, former governor Wilma de Faria (PSB) took only 21.89% and lost quite badly. Hugo Manso (PT) won 7.53%. With the election of the other senator, Rosalba Ciarlini (DEM) to the governor’s office, her suplente, Garibaldi Alves (PMDB) will join his son in the Senate. Nice family.
Seats: 1 PMDB, 1 DEM. 2007-2015 term: Garibaldi Alves (PMDB) replaces Rosalba Ciarlini (DEM)

In Rondônia, the Ficha Limpa case has been sorted out already in favour of former governor Ivo Cassol (PP), who takes the second seat with 32.34%. Incumbent senator Valdir Raupp (PMDB) wins first, with 34.29%. However, the other incumbent, Fátima Cleide (PT) is defeated, taking 16.05%. Agnaldo Muniz (PSC) won 13.36%.
Seats: 1 PMDB, 1 PP. 2007-2015 term: Acir Gurgacz (PDT)

In Roraima, the pure opportunist Romero Jucá (PMDB), leader of the government in the Senate (who was also leader of the government for Cardoso…) has won reelection with 27.91%. Angela Portela (PT) wins the second seat with 26.15%, she defeats Marluce Pinto (PSDB) who won 21.42%, a personal rival. Marluce Pinto is the widow of former governor Ottomar Pinto (PSDB), who was a distasteful figure and military ally.
Seats: 1 PMDB, 1 PT. 2007-2015 term: Mozarildo Cavalcanti (PTB)

Not much surprise in Rio Grande do Sul, where Germano Rigotto (PMDB right-wing), former governor defeated in 2006, lost another election. He took third with 21.24%. That placed him behind journalist Ana Amélia Lemos (PP) who won 29.54% and also incumbent senator Paulo Paim (PT), who won 33.83%, surprisingly strong showing. Abgail Pereira (PCdoB) won 13.47%.
Seats: 1 PT, 1 PP. 2007-2015 term: Pedro Simon (PMDB)

In Santa Catarina, not much fun. Former governor Luiz Henrique da Silveira (PMDB right-wing) won easily, taking 28.44%. The PSDB’s Paulo Bauer took the second seat with 25.32%, comfortably ahead of Cláudio Vignatti (PT) who polled 19.44% while Hugo Biehl (PP), an ally of Ângela Amin, took 10.35%.
Seats: 1 PMDB, 1 PSDB. 2007-2015 term: Casildo Maldaner (PMDB) will replace Raimundo Colombo (DEM)

Boring stuff in Sergipe as well. Eduardo Amorim (PSC), a federal deputy allied with the left, won 33.65% and the first seat while incumbent Senator Antônio Carlos Valadares (PSB) won 25.62% and the second seat. In third, the PSDB’s Albano Franco won 18.29% and Machado (DEM) won 13.99%.
Seats: 1 PSC, 1 PSB. 2007-2015 term: Maria do Carno Alves (DEM)

A surprising result in São Paulo, with a very surprising easy victory for PSDB federal deputy for Aloysio Nunes, down even in the final polls (though he had surged in the last few days, ever since Quercia dropped out). Aloysio Nunes, in the end, came first, far ahead of the rest, with 30.42%. His election was certainly one of the most surprising moments on election night. For the second seat, former mayor Marta Suplicy (PT) had to fight with popular black singer Netinho de Paula (PCdoB – her running-mate) to get it. She took 22.61%, and Netinho de Paula took 21.14%, meaning that Netinho de Paula, presumed to be on his way to the Senate, lost out narrowly in the end. A very fine and surprising fourth for Ricardo Young (PV), who polled an excellent 11.20% and in the process managed to outpoll incumbent senator Romeu Tuma (PTB right-wing) who won only 10.79%. Romeu Tuma, however, had already been down by a lot in the end and he was a dead man walking (which is perhaps not the best joke ever given that some fake rumour transformed into ‘news’ regarding his alleged death circulated late in the campaign). 
Seats: 1 PSDB, 1 PT. 2007-2015 term: Eduardo Suplicy (PT)

In Tocantins finally, reelection was easy for João Ribeiro (PR) who won 27.96%. In second place, former governor Marcelo Miranda (PMDB) won 25.41%. Vicentinho Alves (PR), allied with Ribeiro, won 24.77% while 21.86% voted for Paulo Mourão (PT).
Seats: 1 PR, 1 PMDB. 2007-2015 term: Kátia Abreu (DEM)

Chamber of Deputies

In the Chamber, the government overall increased its majority to a supermajority of over 60%, which allows it to alter the constitution and pass legislation more easily. The PT overtook the PMDB to form the largest caucus in the Chamber, which places a petista as the likely future President of the Chamber. The leader of the government in the Chamber, Cândido Vaccarezza (PT-SP) is a likely contender.

The Chamber uses a bizarre and bad electoral system in which voters vote for individual candidates, but votes cast for candidates will count towards that candidate’s party/list and it is that party raw vote result (the sum of the votes cast for the party’s different candidates, basically) which is divided by the total number of votes cast to get the party’s quotient in the specific state. Therefore, celebrity candidates are a good deal for parties in Brazil, given that the system is favourable to those kinds of candidates who can draw a lot of votes. Their votes can drag paper candidates lower down on their list into Congress, and despite the uselessness of parties, the more seats a party has, the more leverage it has in Congress (most Brazilian parties are best understood as lobbies) and the more pork and graft it can garner for itself and its members. One of the most atrocious examples of this system is in São Paulo back in 2002, when the small far-right PRONA got 5 seats on the back of over a million votes cast for its popular charismatic leader Eneas, but the party’s other candidates barely had 1,000 votes apiece. However, Eneas’ big vote (in fact, the biggest vote for an individual in any Brazilian congressional election ever) won the party 5 seats, four of which went to people who got very few votes. As a result, you often get candidates with big votes who don’t win because their coalition overall didn’t get enough votes.

As for their likely incompetence, it isn’t much of a worry given that Congress is full of crooks to begin with and that competence has never been a worry for them. Plus, for those in power it’s probably a win-win given that the celebrities are likely not too smart and can easily be bought for anything.

The new makeup of the Chamber, compared to dissolution of the precedent legislature, is as follows:

PT 88 (+9)
PMDB 79 (-11)
PSDB 53 (-6)
DEM 43 (-13)
PP 41 (+1)
PR 41 (nc)
PSB 34 (+7)
PDT 28 (+5)
PTB 21 (-1)
PSC 17 (+1)
PCdoB 15 (+3)
Green 15 (+1)
PPS 12 (-3)
PRB 8 (+1)
PMN 4 (+1)
PSOL 3 (nc)
PTdoB 3 (+2)
PHS 2 (-1)
PRP 2 (+2)
PRTB 2 (+2)
PSL 1 (+1)
PTC 1 (-1)

The Chamber website counts 311 of these as being allied with the government (the parties included in this calculation all officially endorsed Dilma), 111 as being opposition (the traditional right and the PSOL) and a further 91 as independents (the parties included in this calculation supported the Lula government but did not endorse Dilma, aka they’re opportunists with no shame in admitting it).

The general rule in Chamber elections is that a party’s caucus will be 15 more or less than the party’s caucus at dissolution. That rule holds in this election as well.

The Democrats suffered heavily this election, down from 56 at dissolution and 65 in 2006. The ‘Northeast Revolution’ of 2006/2010 has clearly hurt them a lot. Their 2007 attempt to re-invent itself as a modern, David Cameron-imitating right-liberal party flopped epically; given that they’re still mostly old corrupt oligarchs.

The so-called “left block” of the PSB, PDT and PCdoB did well, winning 77 seats overall. With the PT’s 88 seats, this so-called left has 165 seats. However, the balance of power remains in the hand of the fisiológicos, these corrupt opportunistic parties which will support any government. They were heavily involved in the mensalão scandal, and they all supported Lula’s predecessors without any second thoughts. This block, composed of the PMDB, PP, PR and PTB have 182 seats overall. Therefore, if Serra wins, it is not hard to conceive this bulk of 180 some members jumping over the fence to be allied with Serra. A French-style cohabitation would never happen in Brazil.

The Greens won only one seat more than they held at dissolution (and 2 more than in 2006), showing that Marina’s wave was largely confined to the presidential election (though independent PV candidates did decently well for third parties in some senate and gubernatorial races). The PSOL also kept its three seats, including a strong vote for Chico Alencar (PSOL-RJ) in Rio, who took 240,724 votes (second highest vote in the state) and allowed his colleague Jean Wyllys (PSOL-RJ) to win as well, with only 13,018 votes. The PSOL’s deputies are known for being honest and competent deputies, thus their big wins (overall) are not surprising. In the RJ Legislative Assembly, state deputy Marcelo Freixo (PSOL-RJ) was reelected with 177,253 votes, the second highest in the state. Marcelo Freixo is a key enemy of drug cartels and gangs in the state, cartels which have put his head on their “to kill” list.

The top vote getter in 2010 is Tiririca (PR-SP), the clown, who won 1,353,820 votes. He still needs to pass a literacy test before he can actually become a deputy, but his high vote is a good reflection of the use of celebrities by parties, like the PR, to boost their vote. Undoubtedly, Tiririca was a big boost for the PR. Second most voted in Brazil is Anthony Garotinho (PR-RJ) who won 694,862 votes. Garotinho, former governor of Rio, is a big evangelical figure who enjoys attention, staging a hunger strike which he himself later broke because he was hungry (he’s fat, no wonder). He’s also far more of a celebrity than a competent congressman.

Big names elected include 1994 selecão star Romário (PSB-RJ) – in the RJ Legislative Assembly, Bebeto (PDT-RJ), another 1994 star, was also elected. Former goalkeeper Danrlei (PTB-RS) was also elected. Big defeats include former PT president José Genoíno (PT-SP), Senator Serys (PT-MT), and Leonel Brizola’s grandson Brizola Neto (PDT-RJ) was not re-elected.

Overall, 46.4% of the deputies in this legislature are new. That is a unusually high rate, though it was also high in 2006. Congressmen are unpopular in Brazil and people are increasingly angry over corruption scandals involving congressmen, more so than in the past.

Overall, 63 deputies and 3 senators are evangelicals, which as a block makes it the third largest “party” in the Chamber behind only the PT and PMDB. The evangelicals had suffered in 2006 because a lot of their incumbents were in the mensalão, ambulance leeches scandals. They have already announced they would block legislation which goes against “biblical values” like abortion.

Election Preview: Brazil 2010

Brazil’s mega-election, which has received a fair share of attention recently, is tomorrow. While tomorrow is only the first round, it seems likely that all the important races will be determined tomorrow.

My guide to tomorrow’s election includes information on the presidential contest, key downballot races as well as information on the political parties and the country’s political history since the 1800s. Instead of repeating what has been said about the election in the guide, here’s a rundown of the key races to watch tomorrow:

The presidential contest is the big race, but it’s also one of the least interesting. Indeed, the only question which is unanswered about this race is whether Dilma Rousseff (PT), Lula’s handpicked successor, will be crowned in the first round or if she’ll need to wait a few weeks until the runoff to be crowned. However, in the last few days, Dilma’s numbers have come down some while Marina Silva and José Serra’s numbers got a slight boost. One trend noted by Ibope is that evangelicals (20% of the population) are moving away from Dilma towards Marina (an evangelical herself) and Serra after Dilma made comments which could be interpreted as being pro-choice. Marina Silva could likely get one of the best ever results for Greens in the Americas and up there with top European green showings.

Here is a rundown of other races which will be interesting to watch come election day:

Alagoas (Governor): A perfect three-way contest featuring the incumbent Governor, a former Governor and a former President/Governor. The race is too close to call and will end up in a runoff, but it remains to be seen which of the three top contenders will get the spots in the runoff.

Minas Gerais (Governor): Incumbent PSDB governor Antonio Anastasia has surged ahead of the PMDB’s Hélio Costa in recent weeks, and could win the gubernatorial contest of the second most populous state of Brazil by the first round. The race, as noted before, is a contest between the candidates of Brazil’s two most popular politicians: Lula and Governor Aécio Neves.

Paraná (Governor): Polls have showed that the race between two local heavyweights, former mayor Beto Richa (PSDB) and Senator Osmar Dias (PDT) has gotten a lot closer recently. Will Osmar Dias be able to close the gap with Beto Richa in a polarized contest which will likely be decided by the first round?

Pernambuco (Governor): In his 2006 re-election bid, Aécio Neves in MG won 77% of the vote by the first round. Can Eduardo Campus come to beat that score, a feat which would be tremendous considering that his main opponent isn’t a joke paper candidate?

The Senate has a lot of interesting contests shaping up, but one thing to look at nationally is how the parties hold up. The Democrats could be facing a rout of sorts in the Nordeste, where some of their top incumbents are at risk of losing.

Of the 54 seats up for re-election; 14 are held by the PMDB, 10 by the PSDB, 8 by the Democrats, 7 by the PT, 4 by the PDT, 3 by the PR, 2 by the PTB, 2 by the PRB, 1 by the PSOL, 1 by the PV, 1 by the PSC and 1 by the PSB.

Alagoas (Senate): A close contest between former Senator Heloísa Helena (PSOL)  and deputy Benedito de Lira (PP) is shaping up, though Senator Renan Calheiros (PMDB), despite his fall from grace in the 2007 Renangate scandal, does not seem in danger of losing.

Bahia (Senate): You’ve got three main candidates fighting it out for two seats, and it’s really down to the wire. Incumbent Senator César Borges (PR) could lose outright or could fall in second place (and still win) behind either Walter Pinheiro (PT) or Lídice (PSB).

Minas Gerais (Senate): While it isn’t per se a very interesting race, the presence of two heavyweight candidates: former Governor Aécio Neves (PSDB) and former President Itamar Franco (PPS) makes this contest quite interesting. It will be interesting to watch how close the PT’s Fernando Pimentel is able to get to Itamar.

Pernambuco (Senate): The contest hasn’t received as much press as it should, given that a long-time incumbent and old conservative oligarch Marco Maciel (DEM), who is also a former Vice President, could be going down to defeat quickly against two left-wing candidates. Such a defeat would be a significant highlight in the continuing rout of the old conservative oligarchy in the region.

Rio de Janeiro (Senate): Former Rio mayor and old politico César Maia (DEM) was originally the favourite, but he has been the main victim of the PT’s Lindberg Farias late surge. He seems to be on track to lose quite badly, while Lindberg Farias could outpoll incumbent Senator Marcelo Crivella (PRB), a gospel singer and favourite of the evangelical churches.

São Paulo (Senate): Will black singer and TV host Netinho de Paula (PCdoB) outpoll former mayor Marta Suplicy (PT), or will one of them fall behind the PSDB’s Aloysio Nunes, who has gathered strength in the last days of the campaign?

The races for the Chamber of Deputies are way too plentiful for there to be rundown, but things to look out for will be which candidate garners the most votes nationwide (likely a Paulista), which incumbents lose and how the party lines evolve in the Chamber.

Brazilian elections always feature weird candidates, ranging from actual clowns to famous lookalikes to futbol stars to strippers. Such clownish candidates in 2010 include clown Tiririca (PR-SP), Obama Brasil (PTB-SP), Jeferson Camillo (PP-SP) – whose campaign ad shows him about to have sex, tough-on-crime and tough-on-yellow-ducks Delegado Waldir (PSDB-GO), stripper Mulher Melão (PHS-RJ) and gay soldier Claudio Rocha (PCdoB-RJ).

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